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Nota de la Presidencia del Consejo de Seguridad

En el párrafo 2 de la resolución 2569 (2021), el Consejo de Seguridad solicitó al Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009) que presentara un informe de mitad de período con sus conclusiones y recomendaciones. Por consiguiente, la Presidencia remite adjunto el informe que le envió el Grupo de Expertos (véase el anexo).

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Anexo

Carta de fecha 3 de septiembre de 2021 dirigida a la Presidencia del Consejo de Seguridad por el Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009)

El Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009) del Consejo de Seguridad tiene el honor de remitir por la presente, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el párrafo 2 de la resolución 2569 (2021), el informe de mitad de período sobre su labor.

El informe se presentó el 3 de agosto de 2021 al Comité del Consejo de Seguridad establecido en virtud de la resolución 1718 (2006), que lo examinó el 26 de agosto de 2021.

El Grupo agradecería que la presente carta y el informe se señalaran a la atención de los miembros del Consejo de Seguridad y se publicaran como documento del Consejo.

Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud
de la resolución 1874 (2009) del Consejo de Seguridad

Apéndice

Carta de fecha 3 de agosto de 2021 dirigida a la Presidencia del Comité del Consejo de Seguridad establecido en virtud de la resolución 1718 (2006) por el Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009)

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Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud
de la resolución 1874 (2009) del Consejo de Seguridad

Resumen

En el período que abarca el informe, a pesar de que la República Popular Democrática de Corea estuvo centrada en el empeoramiento de sus dificultades económicas, siguió manteniendo y desarrollando sus programas nuclear y de misiles balísticos. No se notificaron lanzamientos de misiles balísticos intercontinentales ni ensayos nucleares. La República Popular Democrática de Corea probó un nuevo misil balístico de corto alcance que combina tecnologías de misiles balísticos y de guía, y por lo demás mantuvo y mejoró su infraestructura nuclear y de misiles balísticos. Además, siguió buscando en el extranjero material y tecnología para esos programas.

El bloqueo del país en respuesta a la pandemia de enfermedad por coronavirus (COVID-19) ha seguido afectando fundamentalmente a la circulación de personas y bienes, tanto lícitos como ilícitos, tanto dentro del país como de entrada y de salida.

Asimismo, el país continuó exportando carbón y otros productos básicos sujetos a sanciones por vía marítima, pero en un volumen mucho menor. La importación de productos derivados del petróleo comunicada al Grupo de Expertos disminuyó sustancialmente en el primer semestre de 2021. Las investigaciones marítimas y financieras demostraron que cada vez es más sofisticado el mecanismo que utilizan los buques y las estructuras de gestión y propiedad para evadir las sanciones. Además, continuó el uso indebido de los sistemas de identificación automática, la flota de la República Popular Democrática de Corea siguió adquiriendo buques y el país siguió vendiendo derechos de pesca en sus aguas.

La República Popular Democrática de Corea siguió accediendo a las instituciones financieras internacionales y se mantuvo la presencia en el extranjero de sus trabajadores que obtienen ingresos para utilizarlos en programas del Estado. Los funcionarios en el extranjero siguieron sintiendo la presión de obtener fuentes de ingresos. Prácticamente se detuvo la importación de bienes de lujo hacia la República Popular Democrática de Corea.

El Grupo siguió investigando la participación de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en la ciberactividad mundial y la colaboración de sus académicos y universidades con institutos científicos del extranjero, centrándose en estudios que podrían aplicarse en programas de armas de destrucción masiva. El Grupo considera problemas importantes tanto el robo cibernético de fondos y conocimientos técnicos como la transferencia intangible de tecnología por medios académicos.

Las declaraciones de la República Popular Democrática de Corea indican que cada vez es más profunda la crisis humanitaria en el país, aunque el bloqueo en respuesta a la COVID-19 quizá haya disminuido las repercusiones comparativas de las sanciones en la situación humanitaria. El Grupo volvió a enviar su encuesta a las organizaciones humanitarias que ya estaban activas en el país. Dado que el comercio está prácticamente detenido por el bloqueo y las inundaciones malograron la cosecha de 2020, son poco auspiciosas las perspectivas actuales para la población general de la República Popular Democrática de Corea.

El Grupo sigue agradeciendo a los Estados Miembros que hacen un aporte constructivo a su labor. Sin embargo, sigue siendo irregular la colaboración de los Estados Miembros con el Grupo. Más de la mitad de las solicitudes de información que cursa el Grupo no han recibido respuesta. El Grupo debatirá con las partes pertinentes sus ideas para aumentar el grado de respuesta a sus investigaciones. Las recomendaciones del Grupo de Expertos que se derivan del presente informe figuran al final de cada sección y están consolidadas en el anexo 66.

Índice

* Los anexos se distribuyen únicamente en el idioma en que fueron presentados y sin revisión editorial oficial.

I. Introducción

1. En el párrafo 2 de su resolución 2569 (2021), el Consejo de Seguridad solicitó al Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009) que presentara al Comité del Consejo de Seguridad establecido en virtud de la resolución 1718 (2006) un informe de mitad de período con sus conclusiones y recomendaciones[1]. El presente informe abarca el período comprendido entre el 6 de febrero y el 3 de agosto de 2021. La República Popular Democrática de Corea continuó imponiendo controles de fronteras en respuesta a la pandemia de enfermedad por coronavirus (COVID-19) durante todo el período (véase el anexo 1).

II. Actividades recientes relacionadas con el programa nuclear y el programa de misiles balísticos

Programa nuclear

2. El Grupo continuó supervisando el programa nuclear que sigue aplicando la República Popular Democrática de Corea. Aunque no se notificó la ejecución de ningún ensayo nuclear durante el período que abarca el informe, la actividad continuó en los lugares relacionados con el programa.

Central nuclear de Yongbyon

3. Según un Estado Miembro, al parecer se terminó de construir la parte externa del reactor de agua ligera y es probable que ya se haya empezado a instalar la maquinaria. Otro Estado Miembro detectó actividad en el interior de la central mediante imágenes infrarrojas y de otro tipo entre diciembre de 2020 y febrero de 2021, lo que indica que ya se han realizado algunas pruebas. En mayo de 2021, un Estado Miembro observó actividad térmica alrededor de los transformadores eléctricos situados en el lado oriental del turbogenerador (véase el anexo 2). Las imágenes satelitales muestran actividades de construcción en la zona sur del reactor de agua ligera, en particular la aparición de una estructura circular (de 3,5 m de diámetro), que un Estado Miembro consideró que podría ser un pozo (véase el anexo 3).

4. No se ha observado ningún indicio de que estuviera en funcionamiento el reactor de 5 MW (e) en la central nuclear experimental de Yongbyon desde 2018. Se observó movimiento de vehículos en las cercanías del reactor, que un Estado Miembro interpretó que podrían corresponder a tareas de mantenimiento (véase el anexo 4).

5. El Grupo observó actividad en el laboratorio de radioquímica. Desde febrero de 2021, un Estado Miembro viene detectando señales térmicas en el sistema que comunica la planta térmica de carbón con la zona de reprocesamiento, así como salida de humo de las chimeneas. Los Estados Miembros consideraron que esta actividad era indicio de que la central había reanudado las operaciones en algún grado (véase el anexo 5). El Grupo señala la declaración formulada por el Director General del Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica el 7 de junio de 2021, en la que indicaba la posibilidad de que la República Popular Democrática de Corea hubiera iniciado

[1] A los efectos de la publicación del presente informe de mitad de período, seis expertos consideran que la inclusión de las denominaciones geográficas o de los significantes empleados en el material básico de fuentes primarias de terceros no implica la expresión de juicio alguno por parte del Grupo mismo acerca de la condición jurídica de ningún país, territorio o zona, ni de sus autoridades (dos expertos del Grupo mantienen su reserva en cuanto a la inclusión de esta cláusula).

una nueva campaña de reprocesamiento (véase el anexo 6). El Grupo ha observado el humo procedente de la planta térmica también al analizar las imágenes satelitales.

6. El Grupo observó que siguen las actividades en la planta centrifugadora de Yongbyon. El Grupo señaló la presencia de lo que podría ser un remolque de un tanque de nitrógeno líquido junto a la plata en abril de 2021 (véase el anexo 7). El Grupo ha corroborado la observación formulada por un centro de estudios[2] acerca de la presencia de un remolque de un tanque de nitrógeno líquido, lo que podría indicar que la planta está en funcionamiento. Un Estado Miembro notificó que había observado una estructura metálica junto a las unidades de refrigeración de la planta, pero que desconocía el propósito de esa estructura.

Mina de uranio y planta de concentración de uranio de Pyongsan

7. Un Estado Miembro notificó que la planta de concentración seguía en funcionamiento y que se observó actividad en el análisis de las imágenes satelitales. Además, el Grupo observó lo que podría corresponder a un aumento de los desechos sólidos en el depósito de decantación de residuos situado al sur de la planta principal (véase el anexo 8), lo que indica que la planta está en funcionamiento. El Grupo observó, asimismo, lo que podría considerarse movimiento de vagones ferroviarios en la planta (véase el anexo 9).

Polígono de ensayos de Punggye-ri

8. Según un Estado Miembro, las imágenes satelitales indicaron que seguían las actividades en este polígono de ensayos, quizá relacionadas con el mantenimiento de la seguridad.

Otras plantas

9. El Grupo continúa controlando las actividades en las cercanías de Kangson[3], supuesta planta clandestina de enriquecimiento de uranio, donde observó actividad vehicular continua (véase el anexo 10), aunque no pudo confirmar que el edificio ubicado en esa planta realmente tuviera capacidad para enriquecer uranio.

10. Según información de dominio público[4], se considera que la República Popular Democrática de Corea lleva adelante un programa de armas nucleares en la planta de Yongdoktong y que esta funciona también como instalación de almacenamiento de armas nucleares[5]. Un Estado Miembro no pudo confirmar que Yongdoktong se utilizara para almacenar cabezas nucleares, pero observó algún grado de actividad de renovación allí y detectó un nuevo edificio en la zona de almacenamiento de la planta (véase el anexo 11). El Estado Miembro consideró que este nuevo edificio ocultaba la entrada a dos túneles que quizá se utilizaran para trasladar equipo. Además, se detectaron dos nuevas excavaciones en dos valles (véase la figura I). El Grupo también corroboró la observación de un Estado Miembro acerca del edificio y las excavaciones.

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[2] 38 North; véase www.38north.org/2019/06/yongbyon060519/.


[3] S/2021/211, párr. 8. El Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica también mencionó esta planta en sus informes.

[4] Véase CNN, www.cnn.com/2021/03/02/politics/north-korea-satellite-images-yongdoktong-nuclear-site/index.html.

[5] Además, se considera que en esta planta también se efectúan detonaciones de explosivos de gran potencia en ensayos de implosión de dispositivos nucleares (véase Arms Control Wonk, www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1211166/new-construction-at-yondoktong/).

Figura I
Supuesta instalación de almacenamiento de armas nucleares en Yongdoktong

Se detectaron dos nuevas excavaciones en dos valles: una 3 km al oeste (40°01’44”N 125°16’27”E) y otra 3 km al sur (40°00’01”N 125°18’01”E) de la zona principal de almacenamiento (40°01’51”N 125°18’27”E).



Fuente: Planet Labs, 22 de mayo de 2021, 0204 UTC; 16 de julio de 2021, 0526 UTC. Google, 13 de marzo de 2017; 30 de enero de 2019; 4 de diciembre de 2019. El Grupo proporcionó las coordenadas de la planta.

Transferencia intangible de tecnología y actividades de las universidades de la República Popular Democrática de Corea

11. En relación con el párrafo 11 de la resolución 2321 (2016) del Consejo de Seguridad (véase el anexo 12) y a partir de los informes elaborados por los institutos científicos, el Grupo ha investigado la transferencia intangible de tecnología de algunos campos específicos en la que participaron científicos de la República Popular Democrática de Corea. Preocupa al Grupo que el estudio académico avanzado en estructuras compuestas y análisis de vibraciones (que tienen aplicaciones industriales, pero son esenciales para idear programas de equipo nuclear y misiles balísticos) podría permitir a los científicos de la República Popular Democrática de Corea obtener beneficios de la labor conjunta con otros científicos e instituciones académicas. El Grupo localizó 11 trabajos científicos publicados en 2019 por instituciones de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y algunas universidades chinas, en los que participaron algunos científicos concretos de la República Popular Democrática de Corea (véase el anexo 13). El Grupo dirigió una comunicación a China para solicitar que aclarara la naturaleza de esos estudios conjuntos. China respondió lo siguiente: “Las universidades chinas no han efectuado con la República Popular Democrática de Corea ningún intercambio, cooperación científica ni estudio conjunto que estuviera prohibido” (véase el anexo 14). Continúan las investigaciones sobre varios otros trabajos científicos conjuntos[6].

12. El Grupo ha continuado investigando los intercambios académicos entre universidades de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y extranjeras[7], así como las alianzas científicas y técnicas en las que participan científicos de la República Popular Democrática de Corea. El Grupo recibió más información en respuesta a consultas previas sobre los intercambios académicos mantenidos entre la Universidad Kim Il Sung y cuatro universidades de Cuba, Indonesia, la República Árabe Siria y Viet Nam, que figuran en el sitio web de la Universidad Kim Il Sung como “universidades hermanas” y que declaran haber firmado acuerdos de cooperación con la Universidad Kim Il Sung entre 2012 y 2016. Estas cuatro universidades explicaron que el alcance de sus programas de intercambio está limitado a los ámbitos del derecho, los idiomas, el turismo y la educación y señalaron que no violaban ninguna de las sanciones (véase el anexo 15). El Grupo está a la espera de más respuestas de las demás instituciones.

13. El Grupo también solicitó información a 11 universidades que la Universidad de Tecnología Kim Chaek (véase el anexo 16) ha calificado de “amigas internacionales” con las que tiene o ha tenido intercambios. La Federación de Rusia respondió que la Universidad Nacional del Pacífico (Federación de Rusia) no tenía ningún programa oficial de intercambio ni cooperación académicos con la Universidad de Tecnología Kim Chaek y señaló que no violaba ninguna de las sanciones relativas a las consultas del Grupo. La Universidad de Trieste (Italia) también respondió que no tenía ninguna relación oficial con la Universidad de Tecnología Kim Chaek (véase el anexo 17). El Grupo recibió una respuesta de China acerca de los intercambios universitarios con la Universidad Kim Il Sung y la Universidad de Tecnología Kim Chaek, en la que señalaba que “la amistad con las universidades de la República Popular Democrática de Corea no está prohibida en las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad. Las relaciones amistosas, denominadas ‘facultades hermanas’, entre las universidades chinas y las de la República Popular Democrática de Corea no solo responden a la tradición de amistad que mantienen estos dos países, sino que satisfacen las necesidades del pueblo de llevar adelante intercambios y cooperar en cuestiones culturales y educativas” (véase el anexo 14). Las investigaciones siguen en curso.

[6] S/2021/211, párr. 13.
[7] *Ibid.*, párr. 14.

Misiles balísticos

14. El programa de misiles balísticos de la República Popular Democrática de Corea perdió impulso el primer semestre de 2021 frente al ritmo al que venía avanzando los últimos años, cuando la República Popular Democrática de Corea logró sus objetivos más importantes en materia de disuasión y capacidad de ataque. No obstante, el programa mantiene su coherencia y dinamismo, lo que queda demostrado por las pruebas efectuadas el 25 de marzo con un nuevo tipo de sistema de misiles con propergol sólido que combina tecnologías balísticas y de guía, según el análisis del Grupo a partir de la información proporcionada por los Estados Miembros[8], y la exhibición de dos nuevos modelos de misiles balísticos submarinos y un nuevo modelo extragrande de misil balístico intercontinental en los últimos dos desfiles militares (S/2021/211, párrs. 17 a 20). Además, la República Popular Democrática de Corea siguió adaptando su infraestructura de producción industrial y sus bases de misiles balísticos. Si bien las sanciones y las iniciativas de no proliferación que han puesto en marcha los Estados Miembros están reduciendo considerablemente las posibilidades de proliferación de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, el país siguió procurando obtener los componentes de doble uso y la tecnología que necesita para su programa de armas de destrucción masiva.

15. El ritmo con que el país está lanzando misiles balísticos de prueba ha disminuido considerablemente en los primeros siete meses de 2021 (un lanzamiento de dos misiles balísticos de corto alcance) frente a los años anteriores (4 ensayos balísticos en 2020; 13 en 2019 y 15 en 2017). Sin embargo, el programa de misiles balísticos, según lo comunicado por varios Estados Miembros, otorga a la República Popular Democrática de Corea la capacidad de disponer de armas nucleares cuyo tamaño miniaturizado puede adaptarse a las cabezas de misiles balísticos.

16. El 25 de marzo de 2021, según los Estados Miembros, la República Popular Democrática de Corea efectuó ensayos con dos nuevos modelos de misiles balísticos de corto alcance con propergol sólido[9] y tecnología modificada desde un nuevo transportador-erector-lanzador móvil de 5 ejes. Los misiles fueron lanzados sucesivamente desde una instalación militar ubicada en la provincia de Hamgyong del Sur[10], con dirección a oriente (véase la figura II). El misil balístico de corto alcance cayó en el mar después de completar una extraña maniobra ascendente, según varios Estados Miembros (véanse el cuadro 1 y los anexos 18-1 y 18-2).

[8] Dos expertos expresaron la opinión de que no estaban claras la naturaleza y la tecnología de los proyectiles lanzados por la República Popular Democrática de Corea el 25 de marzo de 2021.

[9] S/2021/211, anexo 12.

[10] Según un Estado Miembro, el primer misil fue lanzado alrededor de las 0704 horas y el segundo, alrededor de las 0723 horas desde una zona cercana a Sondok, provincia de Hamgyong del Sur.

Figura II
Lanzamiento de misiles balísticos de corto alcance el 25 de marzo de 2021



Fuente: Rodong Sinmun y Televisión Central de Corea.

Cuadro 1
Lanzamientos y ensayos con misiles o sistemas de tecnología de misiles balísticos y propergol sólido efectuados por la República Popular Democrática de Corea en 2021

Núm. de ensayo en 2021	*Núm. de ensayo desde 2019 hasta este lanzamiento*	*Fecha y hora (local)*	*Tipo notificado*	*Núm.*	*Lugar de lanzamiento notificado*	*Distancia de viaje notificada (kilómetros)*	*Apogeo notificado (kilómetros)*	*Observaciones*	*Clasificación de la Agencia Central de Noticias de Corea*
1º	18º	25 de marzo de 2021, 0706 y 0725 horas o 0704 y 0723 horas	MBCA; al parecer se trata del nuevo modelo de MBCA y transportador-erector-lanzador[a] exhibido en el desfile militar del 14 de enero de 2021, que posiblemente corresponda al MBCA KN-23 ya exhibido y probado pero modificado y de mayor tamaño[b]	2	Zona de Hamju, Hamgyong del Sur, probablemente de una zona delimitada en el sudoeste por el aeródromo militar de Sondok y en el noreste por el aeródromo militar de Yonpo[c]	600	60, quizá 100	-37º lanzamiento de misiles balísticos desde 2019 -Nuevo transportador-erector-lanzador móvil de 5 ejes -Tiempo transcurrido entre lanzamientos: 19 minutos -Deprimido con trayectoria ascendente	Nuevo modelo de misil táctico guiado o Nuevo modelo de proyectil táctico guiado

Fuente: Información proporcionada por Estados Miembros y análisis del Grupo de Expertos.
Abreviación: MBCA, misil balístico de corto alcance.

[a] Si las imágenes de la Agencia Central de Noticias de Corea del 26 de marzo de 2021 son genuinas; se ha demostrado que la República Popular Democrática de Corea ha modificado o falsificado imágenes fotográficas en lanzamientos anteriores, supuestamente con propósitos propagandísticos.
[b] S/2021/211, párr. 18, figura 5 y anexos 11 y 12; y S/2020/151, párr. 194, cuadro 3 y anexos 58.1 y 59.
[c] Esta zona fue utilizada en varias ocasiones para lanzar misiles balísticos de corto alcance, según lo comunicado por el Grupo en S/2020/840 y S/2020/840/Corr.1, cuadro 1, y S/2020/151, cuadro 3. El aeródromo militar de Sondok está ubicado en las coordenadas 39°44’17”N 127°28’07”E y el aeródromo militar de Yonpo, en 39°48’00”N 127°32’21”E.

17. En relación con el nuevo misil balístico intercontinental exhibido en el desfile del 10 de octubre de 2020[11], un Estado Miembro consideró que los motores con toberas articuladas podrían impulsar 170 toneladas y la carcasa podría contener tres a cuatro vehículos de reentrada múltiples independientes (véase el anexo 18-2)[12]. Otro Estado Miembro consideró que este misil balístico intercontinental era un “modelo que no estaba operativo”, si bien el Grupo consideró que el transportador-erector-lanzador móvil de 11 ejes no coincidía con ningún dispositivo equivalente que se haya visto en ningún otro país y que sería un logro de ingeniería demasiado importante para transportar una carga útil no operativa.

18. En relación con los nuevos misiles balísticos submarinos Pukguksong-4 y Pukguksong-5 presentados en los desfiles militares del 10 de octubre de 2020 y 14 de enero de 2021[13], un Estado Miembro consideró que el misil Pukguksong-5 era un modelo no operativo, es decir, que solo era la carcasa de filamento vacía. Según otro

[11] S/2021/211, anexo 10.
[12] Por ahora, los observadores han denominado “Hwasong-16” a este nuevo modelo extragrande de misil balístico intercontinental (que hasta la fecha no fue bautizado en los medios de la República Popular Democrática de Corea).
[13] S/2021/211, anexo 11.

Estado Miembro, su gran diámetro de alrededor de 2 m le permitiría impulsarse más debido a que el motor es más grande[14] que en los modelos anteriores de Pukguksong (véase el anexo 18-2).

19. La República Popular Democrática de Corea sigue desarrollando actividades y construyendo infraestructura en las fábricas (véanse los anexos 19 a 25)[15] y las bases relacionadas con el programa de misiles balísticos (véase el anexo 26)[16], aunque a un ritmo menos intenso debido a la respuesta a la COVID-19, según un Estado Miembro. En las bases, las medidas de engaño están en constante cambio: galerías subterráneas, búnkeres, túneles semienterrados (utilizados para mantener y cargar combustible en los misiles balísticos propulsados con combustible líquido) y otros medios de ocultamiento y camuflaje.

20. Pese al bloqueo por la COVID-19 y a la aplicación de sanciones, la República Popular Democrática de Corea continuó con sus actividades ilícitas dirigidas a obtener componentes concretos del extranjero y a buscar oportunidades para transferir productos propios a sus asociados (véanse los párrs. 21 a 23 del presente informe y S/2020/211, párr. 26). Los representantes de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en el extranjero se encontraron presionados para generar ingresos dirigidos a satisfacer las necesidades de su país. El país mantuvo la cooperación científica y tecnológica con universidades extranjeras (véanse los párrs. 11 a 13).

Adquisición de productos básicos ilícitos y relacionados con armas de destrucción masiva

21. Según los Estados Miembros, los representantes extranjeros de las empresas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y la Academia de Ciencias de la Defensa Nacional[17] —a la que pertenecen la Corporación Comercial de Desarrollo Minero de Corea[18] y la Corporación Asociada Saengpil[19]— que quedaron varados en el extranjero durante la pandemia siguieron importando y exportando municiones para obtener divisas y ayudar con la construcción de armas. En particular, los Estados Miembros determinaron que estos representantes están cooperando con países de Oriente Medio (como la República Árabe Siria y la República Islámica del Irán)[20] en

[14] Sin embargo, el misil Pukguksong-5 no entraría en la plataforma estática de pruebas del astillero sur de Sinpo debido a que el nuevo misil es más grande (véase el anexo 24).

[15] Sobre la actividad industrial vinculada al programa de misiles balísticos (véanse los siguientes anexos): anexo 19, astillero de Nampo, noviembre de 2020 a junio de 2021; *ibid.*: astillero sur de Sinpo, febrero a junio de 2021; anexo 20: "Pyongsong March 16 factory automotive plant", noviembre de 2020 a junio de 2021; anexo 21: "Kusong tank factory" ("No. 95 Factory"); *ibid.*: "No. 112 Factory"; anexo 22: complejo de investigación científica y de misiles balísticos de Sanum Dong, febrero y marzo de 2021; anexo 23: astillero sur de Sinpo, reanudación de la construcción del muelle/toma de agua; anexo 24: astillero sur de Sinpo, edificios en construcción en la zona de la plataforma estática de pruebas; anexo 25: "January 18th Factory", actividad en una posible plataforma de pruebas para motores.

[16] Actividad en las bases vinculadas al programa balístico (véase el anexo 26): "Hoejung-ri missile base"; "Kumchon-ri missile operating base"; "Sangnam-ri missile operating base"; y "Sunchon airbase" de abril a junio de 2021.

[17] Registrada con el número de referencia KPe.021, la Academia de Ciencias de la Defensa Nacional controla una red de empresas pantalla extranjeras cuya tarea es recopilar información científica.

[18] KPe.001, también denominada Changkwang Trading Corporation and External Economic General Bureau (S/2019/691, anexo 32, párr. 6).

[19] También denominada Green Pine Associated Corporation.

[20] Según un Estado Miembro, uno de los dos representantes de la 221 General Bureau y de Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation en la República Islámica del Irán, Kim Hak Chol (también llamado Jong Chol Jin, nacido en 1965, primer secretario de la Embajada de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en Teherán, pasaporte núm. 10821043), viajó de la

proyectos sobre misiles[21], y los representantes de fabricantes de municiones están tratando de vender armas en África y Asia Sudoriental. La República Popular Democrática de Corea aparentemente está buscando diversos medios para afrontar el control estricto de la comunidad internacional y superar el bloqueo autoimpuesto por la COVID-19 reorganizando sus instituciones comerciales (los nombres, las organizaciones, etc.) y efectuando transacciones con transferencias de buque a buque. El Grupo no ha corroborado estas determinaciones.

22. El Grupo está investigando un posible "punto de embotellamiento" en la red de proveedores que probablemente esté vinculado al programa nuclear y de misiles balísticos de la República Popular Democrática de Corea. Según un Estado Miembro, Korea Machinery General Trading, representada por Kim Jong Dok, suele hacer pedidos de material industrial sensible a empresas de terceros países. Desde enero de 2021, Korea Machinery General Trading ha hecho al menos cuatro pedidos a estas empresas, de artículos como (entre otros) acero inoxidable 1Cr18Ni9Ti (véase el anexo 27). Este tipo de acero inoxidable sirve para fines aeronáuticos y para fabricar motores de misiles balísticos propulsados con combustible líquido y la carcasa de las armas nucleares. Se sabe que la República Popular Democrática de Corea busca este tipo de acero, en particular para su programa de misiles balísticos. Otros artículos que se encuentran en los pedidos son válvulas, bombas y balineras. Siguen las investigaciones sobre esta red de proveedores.

Programa de otras armas de destrucción masiva

23. El Grupo está analizando información recibida de un Estado Miembro en la que indica que sospecha que la República Popular Democrática de Corea tiene otras armas de destrucción masiva.

III. Sanciones sectoriales y marítimas

24. El cierre de fronteras ininterrumpido que ha impuesto la República Popular Democrática de Corea en respuesta a la pandemia de COVID-19 ha tenido efectos importantes en el comercio marítimo, en la importación de petróleo refinado y la prohibición de exportar carbón y otros productos básicos. El Grupo ha continuado investigando una serie de prácticas fraudulentas y complejas de expedición utilizadas por la República Popular Democrática de Corea y buques sospechosos para evadir las sanciones, así como la ocultación adrede de prácticas comerciales y de inscripción utilizadas por personas y entidades que las posibilitan. Algunas de las últimas prácticas se describen en una sección aparte del presente informe dedicada a las cuestiones financieras.

25. Las cifras oficiales de las importaciones de petróleo refinado comunicadas al Comité son muy bajas: hasta mediados de julio de 2021, los informes oficiales consignaban un 4,75 % del máximo anual permitido de 500.000 barriles[22]. Un Estado Miembro considera que, en el primer semestre de 2021, la República Popular Democrática de Corea ha importado un volumen de petróleo muy inferior a su promedio histórico, si bien también considera que ha aumentado las importaciones ilícitas, con lo que el país aún podría superar el volumen máximo permitido en 2021.

Federación de Rusia el 20 de enero de 2020 con el pasaporte núm. 108210148. Ha Won Mo, el otro representante en la República Islámica del Irán, utiliza el pasaporte núm. 108210147.

[21] Véanse, por ejemplo, S/2020/151, párrs. 106 y 107, y S/2019/171 y S/2019/171/Corr.1, párr. 72.

[22] Resolución 2397 (2017) del Consejo de Seguridad, párr. 5.

26. Las importaciones ilícitas de productos de petróleo a la República Popular Democrática de Corea continuaron durante el período que abarca el informe, aunque el Grupo recibió escasos informes al respecto. Pese a que se terminó de construir una nueva terminal petrolera en Nampo, el Grupo no recibió ningún informe de que buques petroleros extranjeros hubieran hecho entregas directas en este período, y aunque siguieron efectuándose transferencias de productos de petróleo de buque a buque, sobre todo por la noche, parecería que el volumen ha sido menor.

27. Muchos de los petroleros que el Grupo consigna en sus informes anteriores que han entregado productos de petróleo directamente a la República Popular Democrática de Corea o efectuando transferencias entre buques de esos productos con embarcaciones más pequeñas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea siguen sin ser apresados, pues continúan ocultando su identidad mientras se encuentran anclados en aguas territoriales regionales y utilizan los astilleros locales. Según información reciente facilitada por algunos Estados Miembros, aunque aún no corroborada, la actividad entre buques ha venido aumentando desde mayo de 2021.

Prácticas fraudulentas de expedición

28. Los buques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y otros buques sospechosos que han desarrollado actividades sujetas a sanciones siguen manipulando las señales del sistema de identificación automática (SIA) o no transmitiéndolas para ocultar sus actividades y evitar que se los detecte. Estas actividades abarcan desde transmitir elementos de identificación falsificados hasta técnicas de ocultación sofisticadas en las que las embarcaciones intercambian su identidad.

Falseamiento e intercambio de la identidad de las embarcaciones

29. El Grupo continuó investigando los casos de falseamiento de la identidad de los buques[23], técnica por la cual se altera la estructura física de la embarcación (buque A) para solicitar un nuevo número a la Organización Marítima Internacional con el cual ese buque luego navega fraudulentamente como si fuera un buque diferente (buque B), enarbolando un pabellón distinto. El perfil original del SIA del buque A queda vacante en las bases de datos marítimas, lo que habilita que lo utilicen otros buques sospechosos. Esta táctica de evasión compleja y lenta fue utilizada por varios buques para transportar petróleo no declarado a la República Popular Democrática de Corea. El Grupo considera que este tipo de falseamiento de la identidad de las embarcaciones es una técnica utilizada para evadir las sanciones que permite a los buques sospechosos continuar entregando petróleo refinado a la República Popular Democrática de Corea por medios ilícitos.

El Subblic se hace pasar por el Hai Zhou 168

30. En noviembre de 2020, se observó en imágenes satelitales que el buque Subblic (núm. OMI 8126082), de pabellón desconocido, había emitido señales en las que se identificaba con el nombre Hai Zhou 168 en la Bahía de Sansha (China) (véase la figura III). Hasta marzo de 2021, el Subblic continuó emitiendo señales en las que se identificaba como Hai Zhou 168 en diversas ocasiones. El Grupo ya había recomendado que se incluyera al Subblic en la Lista. El Grupo pidió a China información sobre la presencia del buque en las aguas chinas y sobre las señales fraudulentas emitidas por este, así como información sobre las inspecciones que se hubieran efectuado. China respondió que “sobre la cuestión de que el Subblic emitiera señales identificándose con el nombre Hai Zhou 168, según las investigaciones de China, ninguno de los dos buques ha entrado en puertos chinos desde 2020”.

[23] S/2021/211, párrs. 31 a 36.




Figura III

Buque Subblic, de pabellón desconocido, emite señales como Hai Zhou 168, Bahía de Sansha (China), 26 de noviembre de 2020



Fuente: imágenes, Planet Labs; coordenadas del SIA: Winward[24].

31. La identidad del Hai Zhou 168 (también Smooth Sea 28) (núm. OMI 8514045), que entonces enarbolaba el pabellón de Sierra Leona, fue falseada en enero de 2019, con lo cual su perfil en el SIA quedó vacante para facilitar las transferencias ilícitas de petróleo refinado a la República Popular Democrática de Corea. Las investigaciones del Grupo revelaron que el falseamiento de la identidad de ese buque probablemente comenzó a prepararse a principios de 2016, cuando se efectuaron modificaciones radicales en el buque en un astillero de Tailandia. Para finalizar con el cambio de identidad, el buque Hai Zhou 168 se hizo pasar por un buque nuevo, con el nombre Cheng Xin 1 (también Smooth Sea 22) cuando dejó el astillero de Ningde (China), desde donde supuestamente zarpó por primera vez[25]. El buque regresó al mismo puerto de Tailandia desde el cual había zarpado originalmente, obtuvo una licencia con pretextos falsos y navegó trayectos internos con la identidad Smooth Sea 22 (OMI núm. 9870991) y pabellón de Tailandia. Puesto que el Hai Zhou 168 había cambiado de aspecto y nombre, su perfil original en el SIA quedó vacante para que lo aprovecharan buques como el Subblic para evadir las sanciones (véanse más detalles en el anexo 28 a)).

32. El Grupo solicitó la asistencia de Tailandia para investigar la supuesta falsificación de identidad del Smooth Sea 22[26] y sigue a la espera de su respuesta.

33. El Grupo también hizo un seguimiento de las entidades y las personas que eran propietarias u operaban el buque. Durante la transición de enero de 2019, tanto el Hai Zhou 168 como el Smooth Sea 22 pertenecían a la empresa Cheng Xin Shipping Co. Ltd., inscrita en Hong Kong (China), y estaban administrados por ella. Algunos otros buques que el Grupo ha investigado también aparecieron en el mismo astillero de Ningde, como el Mouson 328 (núm. OMI 9021198), buque que el Grupo también

[24] A menos que se indique lo contrario, todas las fechas y horarios procedentes de la plataforma Winward de inteligencia artificial marítima están registrados en hora estándar del este (EST); todas las fechas y horarios de las imágenes satelitales y demás plataformas de rastreo marítimo están en tiempo universal coordinado (UTC).

[25] IHS Markit.

[26] Según el rastreo del SIA en plataformas marítimas comerciales.

denunció que había intercambiado su identidad. En el anexo 28 a) se presentan la información y las respuestas de estas entidades.

34. En las investigaciones anteriores del Grupo sobre el falseamiento de la identidad del buque Mouson 328, que se hacía pasar por el Smooth Sea 29[27], aparecen las mismas entidades y los mismos astilleros. Tailandia respondió que, acerca del supuesto fraude (S/2021/211, párrs. 31 a 36), sus autoridades obtuvieron suficientes pruebas que confirman las conexiones entre el Mouson 328 y la falsa identidad con la que estaba navegando. Las autoridades estaban examinando nuevamente la inscripción del buque Smooth Sea 29, que sospechaban era falsificada. Este buque no se ha utilizado como transporte desde que llegó a Tailandia en noviembre de 2019 (véase también el anexo 28 b).

El Billions No.18 (también Kingsway) se hace pasar por el Apex (también Shun Fa)

35. En mayo de 2021, un Estado Miembro confiscó el buque denominado Billions No. 18 (también Kingsway) (núm. OMI 9191773) que navegaba con pabellón de Mongolia y la denominación Apex (también Shun Fa) (núm. OMI 8528864) tras confirmar que había ocultado su identidad al ingresar en un puerto de ese Estado Miembro el 5 de mayo de 2021. Al confiscar el buque, el Estado Miembro impidió que el Billions No. 18 continuara operando[28]. Las bases de datos del SIA revelaron que la embarcación había emitido señales haciéndose pasar por el buque Shun Fa, de pabellón mongol. Sin embargo, el número OMI de ese buque pertenecía, a su vez, al buque mongol Apex[29], que había sido retirado del registro de buques de Mongolia en junio de 2021.

36. Las investigaciones llevadas adelante por el Estado Miembro después de confiscar el buque revelaron que los datos sobre el motor del Shun Fa, como el modelo, coincidían con el del Billions No. 18. Otros datos que confirman la identidad real del buque son los rastros físicos de manipulación del número OMI que se observaron en la embarcación y otros trabajos manuales y el equipo transportado a bordo.

37. El Grupo aportó información sobre el Billions No. 18 (también Kingsway) en 2017, en relación con la entrega de petróleo refinado a la República Popular Democrática de Corea[30]. Después de que el Grupo incluyera al buque en la lista de sanciones, se falseó adrede su identidad para ocultar al que (entonces) se llamaba Kingsway y hacerlo pasar por un buque distinto con un número OMI diferente, con lo que se logró eludir su sanción. Aplicando una y otra vez estas tácticas de engaño, el buque siguió operando sin que lo detectaran durante casi tres años, incluso después de que se lo incluyera en la lista, y en ese lapso accedió a servicios prohibidos, como el abanderamiento y pagos financieros (véanse más detalles en el anexo 29 a)[31].

38. El Grupo rastreó los antecedentes de viajes y propiedad del buque Apex al investigar el falseamiento de su identidad. Los documentos oficiales consignan que el Apex había navegado previamente con pabellón chino y el nombre Zhe Sheng 26

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[27] S/2021/211, párrs. 31 a 36.

[28] Se le impuso la prohibición de recalar en puertos el 28 de diciembre de 2017 después de que se confirmó que había efectuado una transferencia entre buques con un buque de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, el Rye Song Gang (núm. OMI 7389704) en octubre de 2017.

[29] Según los documentos oficiales publicados en el sitio web de la OMI, el buque no está matriculado con la denominación Shun Fa sino Apex.

[30] S/2018/171 y S/2018/171/Corr.1.

[31] El aviso de marzo de 2019 publicado por la Oficina de Control de Activos Extranjeros de los Estados Unidos de América incluía al Kingsway en una lista que tanques petroleros que se consideraba habían participado en transferencias entre buques con tanques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea.

desde 2016 hasta que fue incorporado en el pabellón de Mongolia en 2018. Sin embargo, la comparación de fotografías procedentes de fuentes de dominio público muestra que son muy diferentes y corresponden a dos buques diferentes, con lo que se entiende que es fraudulenta la declaración del Apex de que se denomina Zhe Sheng 26 (véase la figura IV).

Figura IV
Comparación entre los buques Apex y Zhe Sheng 26



Fuente: FleetMon, VesselFinder y un Estado Miembro.

39. Otras investigaciones posteriores indican una conexión entre el Apex y el Billions No. 18 (que entonces navegaba como el Kingsway) debido a que tenían la misma dirección postal. La empresa titular del certificado de conformidad del Kingsway, United Ships Maritime Corp[32], tiene registrada una dirección postal en el

[32] IHS Markit.

mismo edificio de la ciudad de Kaohsiung que Chen Chao-Jung[33]. Chen es el director y único accionista de la empresa Better Smart Ltd., constituida en Belice, propietaria y administradora del Apex desde julio de 2018.

40. El Grupo se dirigió por escrito a Taizhou Zhesheng Shipping Co. Ltd., entidad china que figuraba como propietaria del Zhe Sheng 26, a Yong An Shipping Sdn Bhd, empresa con sede en Malasia que presentó la documentación de matriculación de Better Smart Ltd. como propietaria del Apex, y al propio Chen. El Grupo aún no ha recibido ninguna respuesta (véanse más detalles en el anexo 29a).

41. Mongolia respondió aportando información sobre el Shun Fa (también Apex) en la que se demostraba que el buque había cambiado de propietario varias veces y que esos cambios de propiedad no estaban actualizados en las bases de datos marítimas[34]. En la documentación de expedición figuraba New East Investment Inc. como anterior propietario del Apex (véase el anexo 29 b). Otra empresa constituida en Hong Kong, Joy Wealthy Trading Limited, compró el Shun Fa en octubre de 2019. En una carta enviada a la Administración Marítima de Mongolia, el propietario de Joy Wealthy, un tal Sr. Wang, alegó que no había hecho ningún negocio ilegal y que había efectuado “la comprobación del buque en 2019 antes de comprarlo, y no se observa ningún problema con el Registro de Buques de Mongolia en ese momento”. También declaró que “[...] yo también soy una víctima si se demuestra que el buque está incluido en la lista de sanciones”[35]. Mongolia canceló la inscripción del Shun Fa el 2 de junio de 2021 (véase el anexo 29 c).

Transmisiones fraudulentas para eludir la detección

42. Pese a que se canceló el abanderamiento de varios buques de pabellón extranjero que el Grupo ya había determinado que realizaban transferencias prohibidas de petróleo refinado a la República Popular Democrática de Corea, estos siguen operando y transmitiendo elementos de identificación fraudulentos en el SIA. Estas tácticas engañosas quizá permitan a los buques atracar en puertos para reabastecerse, cambiar de tripulación o recibir servicios de reparación y mantenimiento.

43. El Grupo considera que los diversos métodos utilizados por los buques para ocultar su identidad corresponden a actividades cuyo fin es eludir las sanciones. Al no haberse tomado medidas contra ellos, estos buques de “entrega directa”[36], a pesar de que ya no disponen de bandera, han seguido operando. El Grupo observa que los buques que navegan sin pabellón se consideran apátridas y, por ende, están sujetos a las leyes marítimas del país en cuyas aguas territoriales se encuentren, así como al párrafo 9 de la resolución 2397 (2017) del Consejo de Seguridad[37].

El Diamond 8

44. Los datos de seguimiento marítimo y las imágenes satelitales de mayo de 2021 mostraron que el Diamond 8 (núm. OMI 9132612) emitía señales fraudulentas haciéndose pasar por el Chang Shun 8, de pabellón mongol (núm. de identidad del servicio móvil marítimo 457222000), en la zona de fondeo de Ningde (China) (véase la figura V). El Grupo ya informó que Sierra Leona había cancelado el abanderamiento

[33] 陳昭榮.

[34] Los cambios de propiedad no estaban al día en la OMI.

[35] La carta fue remitida por las autoridades de Mongolia y se encuentra en el archivo del Grupo.

[36] Buques con un pabellón distinto de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que han entregado ilícitamente petróleo refinado a la República Popular Democrática de Corea.

[37] En el párrafo se decide que los Estados Miembros deben decomisar, inspeccionar y confiscar cualquier buque que se encuentre en sus puertos o en sus aguas territoriales si tienen motivos razonables para considerar que ha estado involucrado en actividades que han violado las distintas resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad.

del Diamond 8 en agosto de 2020 debido a que el buque había estado involucrado en actividades que incumplían las sanciones. El Grupo solicitó a Mongolia información sobre la emisión fraudulenta de señales provenientes del buque.

45. Mongolia confirmó que había matriculado al Bonvoy 6 (núm. OMI 8682969), anteriormente de pabellón hondureño, con el nombre Chang Shun 8 y el mismo número de identidad del servicio móvil marítimo, 457222000, en septiembre de 2020, y que canceló su matrícula el 24 de septiembre de 2020 debido a los vínculos con la República Popular Democrática de Corea (véanse los anexos 30 a) y b). La última vez que el Bonvoy 6 emitió señales con su perfil del SIA fue en septiembre de 2019 en la bahía de Luoyuan (China). Sure Metro Ltd., entidad constituida en Hong Kong, era la administradora habitual del Bonvoy 6. La información proveniente de fuentes de dominio público indica una conexión entre el particular que supuestamente adquirió el cargamento de petróleo refinado para el Diamond 8 y Sure Metro Ltd. El Grupo está investigando otros vínculos de la red relacionados con el Diamond 8 desde la perspectiva de la financiación comercial (véanse los párrs. 165 a 170)[38].

46. El Grupo solicitó a China información sobre la identidad del buque, incluida la identidad real y la legitimidad del buque que emitió señales con la identidad del servicio móvil marítimo (ISMM) de pabellón mongol antes mencionada y sobre cualquier medida que se hubiera aplicado al buque de conformidad con las resoluciones pertinentes del Consejo de Seguridad. China respondió que “estos dos buques son de distinto tipo, por lo que es difícil que uno pueda pasar por el otro. Desde 2020, ninguno de los dos buques ha entrado en puertos chinos”. Las respuestas completas recibidas de China sobre las cuestiones marítimas figuran en los respectivos anexos marítimos.

47. El Grupo observa que el anexo 34 del presente informe revela que se sabe que los buques emitían elementos identificadores fraudulentos que no coincidían con su eslora, tipo o pabellón, y que la manipulación deliberada de un tipo de buque o de la eslora declarada en el perfil del SIA puede detectarse mediante la observación.

[38] Véase también c4ads.org/black-gold.

Figura V

El Diamond 8 emite señales haciéndose pasar por el Chang Shun 8, bahía de Sansha (China), 2 de mayo de 2021



Fuente: Planet Labs y Estado Miembro.

El Bonvoy 3 (también Fu Shun 3)

48. El Bonvoy 3 (núm. OMI 8714085), buque que, según el Grupo, entregó petróleo refinado a la República Popular Democrática de Corea en 2019 y 2020, también fue administrado por Sure Metro Ltd. hasta mayo de 2018. El buque pasó a ser propiedad de Faith Trade Group Ltd., empresa registrada en las Islas Vírgenes Británicas, y fue rebautizado Fu Shun 3. Después de que el Grupo publicó su informe de agosto de 2020 (S/2020/840 y S/2020/840/Corr.1), el buque pasó a ser propiedad de Lu Chang Shipping (HK) Co. Ltd.[39] (véase el anexo 31). Este *modus operandi* general de los cambios de propiedad es coherente con los informes anteriores del Grupo, en los que los buques implicados en la violación de sanciones pasan por cambios de propiedad o de administración que no se actualizan en las bases de datos marítimas, aunque el buque haya quedado expuesto. Las investigaciones del Grupo indican, además, que las diferentes entidades involucradas con el Bonvoy 3 pertenecen a la misma red que los particulares asociados al Diamond 8[40]: por ejemplo, Lu Chang Shipping también figuraba como propietario y operador del Chang Shun 8 (véase el caso anterior). El Grupo todavía no ha recibido respuesta de Lu Chang Shipping.

El Xing Ming Yang 888

49. El Xing Ming Yang 888 (núm. OMI 8410847)[41] utilizó la identidad fraudulenta Vi fin, de pabellón hondureño (núm. de identidad del servicio móvil marítimo 334191000) en mayo de 2021 mientras emitía el distintivo de llamada 9LU2843, anteriormente asociado al buque de entrega directa Vifine (núm. OMI 9045962)[42], a su vez renombrado Un Hung y reabanderado en la República Popular Democrática de Corea en agosto de 2020[43]. El nombre Vi fin no está matriculado en la OMI (véase el anexo 32). El Grupo ha recomendado incluir en la Lista a los tres buques por entregar

[39] 鷺昌船務(香港)有限公司.

[40] Las investigaciones siguen en curso.

[41] S/2021/211.

[42] S/2020/151.

[43] Información sobre el pabellón actualizada por la OMI en 2021.

petróleo refinado a la República Popular Democrática de Corea en múltiples ocasiones.

Lugares frecuentados por los buques de entrega directa

50. Las bases de datos marítimas, las imágenes satelitales de alta resolución y la información proporcionada por los Estados Miembros indican que muchos de los petroleros de entrega directa cuya inclusión en la Lista ya propuso el Grupo han navegado por aguas cercanas a la zona portuaria de Ningde, la zona de la isla de Dongyin y la zona de Sando Dao (China) o regresado habitualmente a ellas, donde no han emitido señales del SIA o lo han hecho de forma fraudulenta. Entre marzo y abril de 2021, los buques Bonvoy 3, Diamond 8 y Rich United (también Xin Hai) (núm. OMI 9129213) estuvieron anclados cerca de la isla de Dongyin, mientras que el New Konk (núm. OMI 9036387) y el Yuk Tung (núm. OMI 9030591), que figura en la Lista, estuvieron anclados cerca de Fu'an y la isla de Xiyang, respectivamente (véase el anexo 33 a). En los informes anteriores del Grupo se consigna que estos buques de entrega directa navegaban por estas aguas, de modo que su aparición por estas zonas no constituye un incidente aislado.

51. Un Estado Miembro proporcionó una lista adicional de buques, en la que están incluidos buques petroleros de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, buques que han participado anteriormente en transferencias entre buques con buques de pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y otros buques de interés, en aguas territoriales chinas (véase el anexo 33 b). El Grupo observa la presencia repetida y habitual en estas aguas de buques con pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, asociados a la República Popular Democrática de Corea y sospechosos de haber estado involucrados en la evasión de sanciones. El Grupo entregó a China esa lista de buques, que también consigna los mencionados anteriormente e incluidos en el anexo 33 a y b, y solicitó información sobre sus actividades, los elementos de identificación con los que emitían señales y la validez de esos elementos, así como las fechas, el origen y el destino de los buques y el propósito por el que declaraban que navegaban en aguas chinas.

52. China respondió que "según la verificación china [...] los buques sospechosos de entregar productos de petróleo refinado a la República Popular Democrática de Corea [...] no entran en los puertos chinos desde 2020".

Buques de carga con pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que falsifican su perfil en el SIA

53. Los buques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea emplearon técnicas similares para ocultar su presencia y los lugares donde comercian. Aunque se ha observado que la mayoría de los cargueros de la República Popular Democrática de Corea no emiten señales del SIA, los que sí, emiten principalmente elementos de identificación fraudulentos, sobre todo en aguas de Ningbo-Zhoushan (China), donde se han reunido para transferir su carga de carbón. Aunque esos perfiles fraudulentos del SIA ocultan la verdadera identidad de los buques, son identificables en las bases de datos marítimas comerciales.

54. Las incoherencias observadas en los datos abarcan la emisión de señales que no consignan las dimensiones de la embarcación; los datos incompletos o incoherentes; varios cambios de identidad en el servicio móvil marítimo transmitido o en los números OMI en un lapso corto; la emisión de números OMI no registrados; y la información poco probable sobre el tipo de buque[44]. En un caso, el Zai Zhou 1 (núm.


[44] Por ejemplo, un buque de carga que emite señales como si fuera un barco de pesca o buques que se hacen pasar por una plataforma petrolífera.

OMI 8664149), con pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, no ocultó su bandera mientras transmitía desde un número de identidad y nombre de servicio móvil marítimo diferente cuando llegó a aguas de Ningbo-Zhoushan en marzo de 2021 (véase la figura VI). Mientras estaba en Ningbo-Zhoushan, el buque cambió de identidad y emitió señales como si fuera de pabellón chino, pero con el mismo nombre, Harvest 1. El Zai Zhou 1 fue captado en imágenes satelitales el 3 de mayo de 2021 junto a otros buques de pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea cargados de carbón (véase la figura VII). El Grupo proporcionó otros ejemplos de emisiones fraudulentas de otros buques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea (véase también el anexo 34) y solicitó a China información sobre las actividades de los buques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, los elementos de identificación con los que emitían señales y la validez de esos elementos, así como las fechas, el origen y el destino de los buques y el propósito por el que declaraban que navegaban en aguas chinas.

55. China respondió que "según la verificación de China [...] la mayor parte de los buques que supuestamente están entregando carbón a China [...] no entran en los puertos chinos desde 2020".

Figura VI

Zai Zhou 1 de la República Popular Democrática de Corea emite señales como si fuera otro buque de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y con otros elementos de identificación, marzo a abril de 2021



Fuente: Windward, con anotaciones del Grupo de Expertos; mapa e imágenes satelitales: un Estado Miembro.

Figura VII

Zai Zhou 1 cargado de carbón junto a buques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, Ningbo-Zhoushan, mayo de 2021


Fuente: Un Estado Miembro.

56. Aunque esos buques pueden utilizar tácticas de evasión física, como cubrir su nombre con pintura o utilizar números falsos del servicio móvil marítimo o de la OMI, la mera observación permite detectar si ha habido manipulación deliberada del tipo de buque o de su eslora en el perfil del SIA con el fin de ocultarse.

Zonas de transferencia ilícita entre buques

57. Un Estado Miembro aportó la siguiente actualización gráfica sobre los lugares en los que hubo transferencias ilícitas de buque a buque entre embarcaciones asociadas a actividades sujetas a sanciones relacionadas con la República Popular Democrática de Corea entre 2019 y 2020 (véase la figura VIII). La mayor concentración de actividad se mantuvo coherente con los informes anteriores del Grupo (área central señalada con un círculo) y se añadieron dos nuevas zonas de actividad en 2020 (zonas superior e inferior señaladas con un círculo).

Figura VIII
Zonas de transferencia entre buques asociadas a la República Popular Democrática de Corea, febrero de 2019 a agosto de 2020



Fuente: Un Estado Miembro; círculos: el Grupo.

Otros *modus operandi* relacionados con la evasión de sanciones


El Gold Star

58. El Grupo está investigando al Gold Star (núm. OMI 9146247), anteriormente de pabellón camerunés, por las sospechas de que transfirió productos de petróleo refinado en varias ocasiones a buques de pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y asociados a esta en 2019 y 2020 (véanse más detalles en el anexo 35 a)).

59. Según un Estado Miembro, el Gold Star cargó petróleo refinado desde una terminal petrolera situada en Yangpu, isla de Hainan (China), y lo transfirió al Kum Jin Gang 3 (núm. OMI 8791667), de pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, a mediados de noviembre y principios de diciembre de 2019. A finales de agosto de 2020, las bases de datos marítimas mostraban que el buque estaba de nuevo en Yangpu, donde permaneció hasta su salida hacia un puerto de Ningde (China) en noviembre de 2020. Un documento de autorización portuaria reveló que el Gold Star había utilizado fraudulentamente los elementos de identificación del Ocean Star, de pabellón mongol, para ocultar su identidad (véase el anexo 35 b)) y entrar en Ningde.

No se registró ninguna otra señal del buque en el SIA hasta su llegada a la costa de Dili en mayo de 2021 (véase la figura IX).

Figura IX
Última emisión de señales del SIA del Gold Star, Dili, mayo de 2021[45]



Fuente: Windward, Google Earth, con anotaciones del Grupo de Expertos; imágenes satelitales del buque: Airbus Defence and Space.

60. Mongolia confirmó la matrícula provisional del Ocean Star con el número OMI 8351584 desde el 30 de septiembre de 2020 hasta el 11 de enero de 2021, cuando el buque fue excluido de su registro. Antes de su matriculación, el buque había navegado con el nombre Zhe You 8 y pabellón chino[46]. Dama Trade Co. Limited prestó servicios de registro de sociedades a los propietarios registrados de Ocean Star. Dama Trade Co. Limited utiliza la misma dirección en Hong Kong[47] que otro proveedor de servicios empresariales que registró a J&C Shipping Co., Ltd.[48], así como otros proveedores que han inscrito otros buques de entrega directa previamente investigados por el Grupo.

61. J&C Shipping era la empresa propietaria y operadora del buque mientras se llevaron a cabo las actividades sospechosas de evasión de sanciones. El Estado

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[45] A junio de 2021.
[46] Al parecer, no hay ningún historial del seguimiento comercial de este buque. El buque figura actualmente (a junio de 2021) con su inscripción original de pabellón chino en las bases de datos marítimas.
[47] Dirección postal: Oficina 19C, Centro Lockhart, 301-307 Calle Lockhart, Wan Chai, Hong Kong, China.
[48] 捷程海運有限公司.

Miembro ha determinado además que una entidad de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, Mulgil Trading General Corporation, también estuvo implicada en la contratación del buque para importar sin declarar productos de petróleo refinado a la República Popular Democrática de Corea. El Grupo se dirigió por escrito a China en septiembre de 2020 con el fin de informar a las autoridades acerca de la presencia del buque sospechoso en aguas chinas frente a Yangpu, en la isla de Hainan, y les solicitó información sobre la ubicación del buque, los datos sobre la identidad, las actividades de transferencia de buque a buque y la carga, además de preguntarles sobre Cheng Yuantai, que figuraba como director fundador y accionista de J&C Shipping entre 2019 y 2020[49] según los datos del registro de sociedades de Hong Kong. En la figura X se muestra la respuesta de China.

Figura X
Respuesta de China sobre el Silver Star 1/Gold Star y la información del propietario registrado J&C Shipping

(4) OC.233

The Chinese side did not find the vessel "Golden Star" staying in waters off Yangpu port of Hainan. With regard to the Chinese national Cheng Yuantai who was mentioned in the Panel's letter as relevant to this case, in fact, Cheng is a nearly 80-year-old farmer. He does farming at home place all year long. There is no company under his name. He does not have any certificate for exiting and entering Chinese borders, and has no relation with any companies in Hong Kong SAR or DPRK vessels. China hopes that the Panel does not readily believe information which is against facts.

Fuente: Un Estado Miembro.
Nota: "Golden Star" se traduce igual que "Gold Star" al mandarín. El Gold Star (núm. OMI 9146247), buque sobre el cual el Grupo solicitó información, está en investigación.

62. Para eludir la detección, los buques operados por J&C Shipping emplearon un *modus operandi* que abarcó transferir de manera ilícita su carga por la noche dentro de las aguas territoriales chinas; descargar pequeñas cantidades de combustible durante las operaciones entre buques que duraban de cuatro a seis horas; mantener los buques fuera del puerto en detrimento de la salud y la seguridad de la tripulación; y falsificar los elementos de identificación, como utilizar un nombre y un número OMI fraudulentos para entrar en un puerto chino.

63. Posteriormente, el Estado Miembro indicó que un tal Cheng Bin, de J&C Shipping, dirigió estas actividades durante los períodos en los que se enmarca la investigación. Cheng se comunicaba a través de la aplicación de mensajería WeChat y utilizaba diferentes números telefónicos para cada una de las operaciones entre buques.

64. Las investigaciones del Grupo revelan que las actividades de J&C Shipping son coherentes con el *modus operandi* empleado por otras entidades que poseían o administraban buques previamente investigados por el Grupo, es decir, no dejaban rastros en línea; establecían una empresa fantasma con un único director que no

[49] Los datos del registro de sociedades de Hong Kong revelaron que Cheng Yuantai transfirió la dirección a una persona rusa, Yuri Chernilovskiy, domiciliado en Nakhodka, Primorskiy Krai (Federación de Rusia), en abril de 2020.

tuviera ninguna relación con el buque (véase la figura IX); y utilizaban proveedores de servicios de registro de sociedades como una capa más, todo ello con el fin de ocultar la verdadera identidad del beneficiario final y eludir las sanciones.

65. El Grupo solicitó a China información sobre el petróleo transferido desde una terminal en Yangpu, las denuncias de transferencias ilícitas entre buques con la República Popular Democrática de Corea y los buques asociados a esta, la diligencia debida llevada a cabo por las autoridades pertinentes sobre la validez de los datos de identificación proporcionados por el Gold Star en el puerto, la validez de la información proporcionada por J&C Shipping respecto del titular que obra en el registro de sociedades y cualquier otra medida adoptada en las investigaciones o detenciones relacionadas con el Gold Star.

66. China respondió que el Gold Star había salido de Yangpu a finales de noviembre de 2019, pero que no había entrado en puertos chinos desde entonces, y que no disponía de información sobre la transferencia que supuestamente efectuó el buque de productos derivados del petróleo refinado. Además, declaró que el Ocean Star no había presentado ninguna "solicitud de entrada en puerto" en los puertos chinos en noviembre de 2020 y que el documento de autorización portuaria "es falso". China también declaró: "El Ocean Star no entró en los puertos chinos y el Gold Star no entró en los puertos chinos con la identidad fraudulenta del Ocean Star". En cuanto a J&C Shipping, China declaró lo siguiente:

> La empresa J&C Shipping de Hong Kong (China), que el Grupo indica en su carta que es operadora de Gold Star, fue cancelada en marzo de 2021. No hay constancia del comercio de importación y exportación de esta empresa ni de su participación en actividades de contrabando relacionadas con la República Popular Democrática de Corea. China espera que el Grupo no tome por verdadera la información que no se ajusta a los hechos sin verificarla de antemano.

67. El Grupo también solicitó información a muchas otras partes, como el Camerún, la Federación de Rusia, Mongolia, Palau, Sierra Leona y Timor Leste, así como a la entidad o las entidades propietarias o administradoras actuales o anteriores responsables de los buques, como Cheng Bin. En el anexo 35 a) se presentan las respuestas recibidas a este respecto.


El Ji Yuan (también denominado Chang Long)

68. Un Estado miembro informó que el buque Ji Yuan (también Chang Long[50]) (núm. OMI 9044140), que anteriormente enarbolaba el pabellón de Sierra Leona, había transportado varios cargamentos de Hong Kong a la República Popular Democrática de Corea, como un Mercedes Benz de clase S en septiembre y octubre de 2019 (véase la figura XI) y dos contenedores de productos electrónicos no especificados en noviembre del mismo año. Al parecer, el envío del vehículo de lujo fue facilitado por Yee Fat Motor Trading (H.K.) Company, empresa inscrita en Hong Kong (véanse también los párrafos 73 y 146).

[50] El buque navegó con pabellón mongol y nombre Chang Long desde agosto de 2020 hasta junio de 2021, cuando fue dado de baja.

Figura XI

Trayecto de viaje del buque Ji Yuan a la República Popular Democrática de Corea, de septiembre a octubre de 2019



Fuente: Un Estado Miembro.


69. Las investigaciones del Grupo sobre los viajes efectuados por el buque en octubre y noviembre de 2019 revelaron que también había emitido señales con otro número de ISMM, a saber, 300800121[51], el que, en el caso del envío de septiembre de 2019, habría colocado la señal falsa del SIA del buque en aguas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea. Esta información es coherente con las fechas que el Estado Miembro facilitó acerca de la presencia del Ji Yuan en la República Popular Democrática de Corea el 28 de septiembre de 2019 (véase la figura XII). Los saltos de señal del SIA, que mostraban que el mismo ISMM estaba en dos lugares diferentes a la misma hora, indicaban que el Ji Yuan estaba haciéndose pasar por un buque que operaba en aguas chinas (véase el anexo 36 a)).

[51] Al parecer, esta ISMM pertenece a un carguero de 20 metros de eslora que navega con los nombres alternativos de *Ataizhouxinluo* y *Guanyunyu60230*.



Figura XII

Emisión de señales ISMM falsas del Ji Yuan, que lo sitúan en aguas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, septiembre de 2019



Fuente: Windward, con anotaciones del Grupo de Expertos.

70. En los datos del registro de sociedades figuraba como director de Jiyuan Shipping Ltd.[52], constituida en el Reino Unido de Gran Bretaña e Irlanda del Norte, Zhuang Jixiang, domiciliado en Fujian (China). Según el registro, la secretaría de Jiyuan Shipping, Yunma Tianlong International Consulting Co. Limited[53], también había desempeñado la misma función con las entidades Always Smooth Ltd. y Good Siblings Ltd., que eran las propietarias registradas de buques[54] que, según el Grupo, habían infringido las sanciones.

71. El Grupo solicitó ayuda a China, Mongolia, Sierra Leona, el Reino Unido y otras entidades relacionadas. En los anexos 36 a) a c) se ofrecen más detalles sobre el caso y las respuestas.

72. China confirmó la información proporcionada al Grupo acerca de que la entidad propietaria registrada estaba inscrita en el Reino Unido y proporcionó alguna información relativa a la carga del buque (véase el párr. 146).

73. Mongolia proporcionó información y documentación sobre el buque, en la que se observaba que el Ji Yuan había sido vendido por una empresa registrada en la República de Corea, Korea Marine Transport Co., Ltd., a una empresa constituida en Hong Kong, Good Job Trading Limited, el 26 de julio de 2019 por 1,1 millones de

[52] Según el registro, la empresa fue disuelta el 23 de marzo de 2021.

[53] La dirección postal de la empresa en United G25, Waterfront Studios, 1 Dock Road, Londres, Reino Unido de Gran Bretaña e Irlanda del Norte, al parecer registra varias empresas que prestan servicios de secretaría.

[54] Los buques eran el Lucky Star (núm. OMI 9015278), entonces con pabellón de Togo, y el Asia Bridge (núm. OMI 9010022), entonces con pabellón de Togo.

dólares (véase el anexo 36 d)). Después, las acciones del buque se transfirieron de Good Job a Jiyuan Shipping Ltd. el 15 de agosto de 2019 por 1 dólar (véase el anexo 36 e)), justo antes de que tuviera lugar la supuesta entrega de un coche de lujo a bordo del Ji Yuan a la República Popular Democrática de Corea el mes siguiente (véanse también los párrs. 68 y 146). Mongolia dio de baja el buque, que navegaba con el nombre de Chang Long y su pabellón, junto con los correspondientes certificados expedidos, el 14 de junio de 2021 (véase el anexo 36 f)). La circular marítima de Mongolia se adjunta en el anexo 36 g).

74. Sierra Leona proporcionó la documentación solicitada y confirmó que el Ji Yuan había sido eliminado de su registro de buques el 3 de abril de 2020 debido a su participación en actividades prohibidas por las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad.

75. El Reino Unido respondió que estaba haciendo un seguimiento de la información solicitada sobre las empresas en cuestión y que enviaría más detalles a su debido tiempo.

Adquisición de buques

76. Desde 2019[55], la República Popular Democrática de Corea ha ampliado su flota incorporando antiguos buques cisterna y de carga de pabellón extranjero, con lo que contravino las resoluciones pertinentes de las Naciones Unidas que prohíben el suministro, la venta y la transferencia directa o indirecta de buques antiguos y nuevos a la República Popular Democrática de Corea. Varios de los buques habían estado navegando sin pabellón durante algunos años antes de ser registrados por la República Popular Democrática de Corea, momento en el que siguieron navegando y comerciando, entregando petróleo refinado de manera ilícita a la República Popular Democrática de Corea y exportando carbón procedente de este país. En varios casos, los buques estuvieron administrados por las mismas entidades y siguieron una trayectoria de propiedad muy similar antes de ser vendidos. Un Estado Miembro ha considerado que varios de los buques estuvieron controlados por la República Popular Democrática de Corea antes de enarbolar su pabellón.

77. Varios de estos buques fueron denunciados por el Grupo antes de que se actualizara su información tardíamente respecto de que pertenecían a la República Popular Democrática de Corea, incluso mediante su venta a compradores no declarados. Algunos de los buques fueron vendidos en sitios web de subastas de buques, mientras que otros fueron adquiridos a través de intermediarios. A continuación se detallan ejemplos de buques que fueron incorporados en el registro de buques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en 2020.

El Sin Phyong 5 (antes denominado Woo Jeong)

78. El buque Woo Jeong, antes con pabellón de la República de Corea, también denominado Sin Phyong 5 (núm. OMI 8865121)[56], fue incorporado en el pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en octubre de 2020. Al igual que en el caso de otros buques que el Grupo denunció que estaban bajo el control de la República Popular Democrática de Corea (como el Enterprise (núm. OMI 9153331)[57], véase el párr. 81), la última emisión de señales en el SIA del Woo Jeong se registró en aguas de Shidao (China) alrededor del 27 de julio de 2019. Young Sung Global Co. Ltd. estaba registrado como el último propietario, operador y administrador del

[55] Según los registros de la base de datos marítima, en 2019 y 2020 se incorporaron a la flota de la República Popular Democrática de Corea más de una docena de petroleros, así como buques de carga.

[56] Información actualizada por la OMI en 2021.

[57] S/2021/211, párrs. 71 y 72.

Woo Jeong antes de que pasara a manos de la República Popular Democrática de Corea[58]. El 10 de septiembre de 2019, la República de Corea confirmó que el buque ya no pertenecía a su flota porque había exportado mercancías a la República Popular Democrática de Corea.

79. Según Young Sung Global, el buque fue vendido a través de intermediarios y adquirido por una entidad china. La empresa intermediaria que localizó al comprador tuvo a su cargo todos los trámites de venta con el intermediario en China. El buque fue vendido en julio de 2019 a un tal Zhang Rusheng, en nombre de Deepika Shipping and Trading Ltd., que figura como comprador. El Grupo observa que Deepika Shipping también figuraba como propietario registrado y operador del *Sen Lin 01* (núm. OMI 8910378)[59], buque de entrega directa que desde entonces ha enarbolado el pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y navega con el nombre Kwang Chon 2[60]. Además, Korea Myongryu Trading Co., entidad de la República Popular Democrática de Corea propietaria del Sin Phyong 5, también es propietaria del Sin Phyong 2 (núm. OMI 8817007)[61], tanque petrolero que el Grupo ya ha informado que había adquirido la República Popular Democrática de Corea en 2019, tras entregar petróleo refinado a la República Popular Democrática de Corea cuando navegaba con el nombre Tianyou. Las investigaciones siguen en curso. Véanse más detalles en los anexos 38 a) a c).

80. Otros buques que pasaron a enarbolar el pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea fueron el Xin Hai (núm. OMI 7636638), rebautizado como Wol Bong San (véanse los anexos 37 a) y b)), y el Ming Zhou 6 (núm. OMI 8829878), rebautizado como Tae Phyong 2 (véase el anexo 39).

Redes de la cadena de suministro

81. El Grupo continuó sus investigaciones sobre el Enterprise (núm. OMI 9153331), buque asociado a la República Popular Democrática de Corea, que ha seguido exportando carbón procedente de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en 2021. La documentación actualizada obtenida por el Grupo reveló que las direcciones del operador del Enterprise[62], Dalian Taiyuan International Shipping Agency Co. Ltd., proporcionadas a las bases de datos marítimas eran diferentes de las que obran en los registros de expedición. La dirección del operador que figuraba en los documentos de expedición coincidía con la dirección de un edificio asociado a Vast Win Trading Limited, antiguo propietario del buque Jie Shun, que se encuentra en la Lista (núm. OMI 8518780). La anterior directora y accionista única del buque, Gu Min, también estuvo asociada a las investigaciones del Grupo sobre el Jie Shun (véase el anexo 40). Las investigaciones siguen en curso.

Transferencia de derechos de pesca

82. Según la información proporcionada por un Estado Miembro, la República Popular Democrática de Corea sigue vendiendo derechos de pesca a entidades de un país tercero, lo que les permite operar en sus aguas territoriales. En 2020, se obtuvieron varios documentos oficiales, como certificados de derechos de pesca y pólizas de seguro, emitidos por la Corporación Nacional de Seguros de Corea de la República Popular Democrática de Corea (KPe.048), de flotas pesqueras de terceros países. También se obtuvo de estas flotas pesqueras un mapa de una zona especial

[58] Registrado por la OMI como propietario, administrador y operador del buque desde junio de 2012 hasta octubre de 2019.
[59] Véase S/2020/151.
[60] Véase S/2020/840.
[61] *Ibid.*
[62] La última vez que se registró en el sitio web de la OMI.

donde se permite pescar[63] y las directrices para las flotas pesqueras publicadas por las autoridades de la República Popular Democrática de Corea (véase el anexo 41). Según un Estado Miembro, los derechos para pescar en aguas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea durante un período de cuatro a cinco meses se habían adquirido por un precio de entre 200.000 renminbi (30.867 dólares) y 300.000 renminbi (46.301 dólares).

83. El Grupo sigue recibiendo información, incluso sobre los posibles puertos de salida, las señales ISMM de los buques y las entidades privadas pertinentes implicadas en actividades de transferencia de derechos de pesca. Las investigaciones siguen en curso.

84. En el período que abarca el informe, el Grupo escribió de nuevo a Choe Un Bok, Presidenta de la Asociación General de Coreanos en China, quien al parecer está implicada en la venta de derechos de pesca de la República Popular Democrática de Corea[64], y a Weihai Peninsula Vessel Fuel Co. Ltd., involucrada en la planificación de una empresa conjunta de pesca con una entidad de la República Popular Democrática de Corea[65]. China respondió (véase el anexo 42) que, según su investigación, no se habían encontrado pruebas sustanciales sobre la supuesta implicación de la Asociación General de Coreanos en China y Weihai Peninsula Vessel Fuel Co. Ltd. Las investigaciones siguen en curso.

Exportaciones marítimas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea

Buques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que exportan carbón

85. De febrero a mayo de 2021, un Estado Miembro determinó que se exportaron al menos 364.000 toneladas métricas de carbón procedente de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en buques con pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y controlados por la República Popular Democrática de Corea a la zona de Ningbo-Zhoushan en al menos 41 cargamentos[66]. El Grupo observa que este volumen aproximado de carbón exportado durante el cuatrimestre fue significativamente inferior a las cifras correspondientes a 2020 proporcionadas por el mismo Estado Miembro, cuyos cálculos indicaban que, en 12 meses, se habían exportado al menos 4,8 millones de toneladas métricas de carbón y otros minerales sujetos a sanciones en 636 cargamentos enviados a China (véase el anexo 43)[67].

86. Sin embargo, el Estado Miembro también ha considerado que la República Popular Democrática de Corea estaba preparada para reanudar las exportaciones de carbón a gran escala. Las imágenes satelitales del 4 de abril de 2021 muestran 32 buques con pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en el puerto de Taean (República Popular Democrática de Corea) en las que todos menos tres van cargados de carbón (véase el anexo 47). El Grupo sigue vigilando la situación.

87. La exportación de cargamentos de carbón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea ha seguido la modalidad ya descrita: los buques que enarbolan el pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y los que están controlados por la República Popular Democrática de Corea se encuentran en las mismas zonas dentro de las aguas de Ningbo-Zhoushan; han participado en transferencias entre buques con

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[63] Denominado literalmente “처벌작업구역” por las autoridades de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, se trata de un mapa simplificado de una zona situada en aguas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en la que se permitía pescar a los buques de un país tercero con vigilancia estricta.

[64] Véase S/2021/211, párr. 54, y anexo 32 a).

[65] *Ibid.*, párr. 55 y anexo 32 b).

[66] Información correspondiente a mayo de 2021.

[67] Dos expertos consideraron que es necesario verificar la información de este párrafo.

grandes cargueros de pabellón chino; y han emitido elementos de identificación fraudulentos o no han transmitido señales del SIA en absoluto.

88. En un cambio radical con respecto a la actividad observada anteriormente, en la que barcazas costeras extranjeras importaban carbón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea[68], el Grupo no recibió información de que dichas barcazas hubieran entrado en aguas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en 2021.


89. El Grupo siguió solicitando ayuda a China respecto de la presencia de múltiples buques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y vinculados a la República Popular Democrática de Corea en aguas de Ningbo-Zhoushan (véase la figura XIII), donde han seguido reuniéndose para exportar carbón mediante transferencias entre buques[69] (véase también el anexo 44).

90. Varios de estos buques han aparecido en informes anteriores del Grupo por exportar carbón de forma ilícita en las mismas aguas. Varios de los buques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea siguieron en la misma zona durante un lapso (véase la figura XIV[70]). Estas zonas están controladas por las autoridades portuarias y otras autoridades marítimas competentes que recopilan información sobre las actividades de los buques.

[68] Véase S/2020/151, párrs. 67 y 68, y S/2021/211.
[69] Véase S/2021/211.
[70] Entre ellos, Myong Sa Sim Ni, Enterprise, Kwang Myong, Puk Dae Bong y Su Ri Bong.

Figura XIII


Ilustración de los buques con pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y de los buques asociados a la República Popular Democrática de Corea, Ningbo-Zhoushan (China), 5 de abril de 2021



Fuente: Un Estado Miembro.

Figura XIV

Buques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en diferentes lugares próximos a Maji Shan (China), zona del Servicio de Tráfico Marítimo, marzo y abril de 2021



Fuente: Un Estado Miembro.

91. El Grupo solicitó a China información sobre cada uno de los buques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea presentes en aguas chinas, los elementos de identificación con los que emitían señales, su carga, cualquier transferencia entre buques realizada en aguas chinas con el tipo y la cantidad de carga descargada, la identidad de los buques receptores y las entidades y personas propietarias y operadoras de los buques receptores, y el destino final de la carga de carbón descargada.

92. China respondió lo siguiente:

> [...] 10 buques con número OMI no entraron en los puertos chinos alrededor del 5 de abril de 2021. De esos 10 buques, Kum Jing Gang y Un Bong 2 presentaron solicitudes de entrada en puerto a Dalian y Yantai respectivamente, pero finalmente no entraron en los puertos. En cuanto a los otros 16 buques sin número OMI, China no pudo comprobar su información, ya que China no es el Estado del pabellón de esos buques.

93. El Grupo ha recibido imágenes de un Estado Miembro en las que se observa a las patrullas chinas de aplicación del derecho marítimo operando muy cerca de varios buques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en varias ocasiones. Según los informes, todos estos buques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea descargaron su carbón en buques de pabellón chino. El Grupo solicitó a China la información que las lanchas patrulleras chinas pudieran poseer sobre la identificación y las actividades de los buques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, los buques que recibieron el carbón transferido y cualquier actividad relacionada que se hubiera desarrollado[71].

94. China respondió de la siguiente manera:

> China concede importancia a la lucha y la regulación de las actividades marítimas ilegales. El patrullaje y la aplicación de la ley por parte de los guardacostas chinos ayudan a mantener el orden de la navegación en las aguas de jurisdicción china, además de cumplir fielmente las obligaciones derivadas de las resoluciones pertinentes del Consejo de Seguridad. Las aguas de Ningbo-Zhoushan son una zona marítima con un tráfico muy intenso de diversos tipos de buques. Es totalmente normal que la guardia costera china patrulle esa zona. Las actividades de las fuerzas del orden de un país atañen a su seguridad nacional. China solicita al Grupo Especial que respete los derechos e intereses legítimos de los Estados Miembros y que no incluya en su informe información no verificada relativa a los buques guardacostas chinos, ya que se verá afectada su seguridad.

95. El Grupo toma nota de la preocupación de China por la seguridad de su guardia costera y sigue centrándose en los buques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea identificados anteriormente. El anexo confidencial 45 contiene las imágenes facilitadas por el Estado Miembro.

Cargueros que recibieron carbón procedente de la República Popular Democrática de Corea

96. El Grupo sigue investigando las transferencias de carbón que tienen lugar en aguas territoriales chinas entre buques de pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y grandes buques de carga a granel de pabellón chino[72]. El Grupo está investigando dos casos de buques de carga con pabellón chino que, según

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[71] Un experto se opone a que se incluya información relativa a la aplicación de la ley en los párrs. 93 a 95.

[72] Véase, por ejemplo, S/2021/211, párrs. 58, 65 y 66.

ha informado un Estado Miembro, han cargado carbón procedente de buques con pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en aguas de Ningbo-Zhoushan mediante la transferencia entre buques y han entregado ese carbón en puertos chinos entre febrero y abril de 2021. Los dos buques emitían señales ISMM asociadas a China y uno de ellos tenía un número OMI registrado. El Grupo recibió imágenes satelitales en las que se detallaban los viajes de los buques, en particular sus transferencias nocturnas entre buques, la presencia de los buques chinos en el puerto de China con carbón en su bodega, los buques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que transfirieron el carbón y detalles sobre las fechas y horas de las actividades de los buques. El análisis efectuado por el Grupo acerca de las rutas de los buques de pabellón chino, los cambios de calado notificados, la proximidad de los buques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea cuando transmitían en el SIA y el análisis de los puertos donde atracaron los buques chinos son coherentes con la información proporcionada por el Estado Miembro. Esta información fue remitida a China junto con una solicitud de información adicional.

97. China respondió lo siguiente:

> Las autoridades chinas competentes están investigando y verificando la información y, por ahora, no tienen nada que comunicar al respecto. Dado que la investigación sigue en curso, China solicita que el Grupo Especial no incluya en su informe información relacionada con estos buques y trate de no interrumpir la investigación y la aplicación de la ley por parte de China.


98. En vista de las investigaciones que está efectuando China sobre los buques mencionados, el Grupo ha conservado la información sobre los elementos de identificación, los datos y las imágenes de los buques, así como la investigación sobre las entidades que figuran en la lista y que son propietarias y administradoras. El Grupo se pondrá al día sobre la investigación de China a su debido tiempo.

Exportación de carbón procedente de la República Popular Democrática de Corea e importación de carga humanitaria en un único viaje de ida y vuelta

99. Según la observación del Grupo y del Estado Miembro, a 11 de mayo de 2021, más de veinte buques de carga de la República Popular Democrática de Corea estaban anclados frente a la esclusa de Nampo (República Popular Democrática de Corea), que se ha convertido en una zona de cuarentena a largo plazo para los buques (véase la figura XV).

Figura XV

Buques con pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y buques asociados a la República Popular Democrática de Corea anclados frente a la esclusa de Nampo (República Popular Democrática de Corea) tras regresar de puertos y zonas portuarias de China, 11 de mayo de 2021




Fuente: Un Estado Miembro.

100. Estos buques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea han regresado de puertos de China, según la información proporcionada por Estados Miembros. Al parecer, algunos de los buques, como el Ko San (núm. OMI 9110236), con pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, que fueron rastreados por el Grupo, habían descargado carbón procedente de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en aguas de Ningbo-Zhoushan antes de navegar hacia el puerto de Dalian (China), donde el Estado Miembro declaró que el buque "cargó ayuda humanitaria" el 1 de julio[73] para importarla a la República Popular Democrática de Corea (véase la figura XVI). Véanse más detalles en el anexo 46.

[73] El análisis portuario indicó que el Ko San estaba atracado en la terminal de cereales de Beiliang, en Dalian (China).

Figura XVI

Ko San exportó carbón e importó probable carga humanitaria en un solo viaje, mayo a julio de 2020



Fuente: Sea-web, IHS Markit, con anotaciones del Grupo de Expertos; imágenes en el recuadro: Windward; imágenes satelitales: un Estado Miembro.

101. El Grupo observa que los buques están autorizados a transportar carga humanitaria a la República Popular Democrática de Corea siempre que no hayan participado en actividades para evadir sanciones, de conformidad con el párrafo 9 de la resolución 2397 (2017) del Consejo de Seguridad, en el que se estipula que los Estados Miembros decomisarán, inspeccionarán y confiscarán los buques que se encuentren en sus puertos y también podrán decomisar, inspeccionar y confiscar cualquier buque sujeto a su jurisdicción que se encuentre en sus aguas territoriales si el Estado Miembro tiene motivos razonables para considerar que ha estado involucrado en actividades, o en el transporte de artículos, que se hayan prohibido en virtud de las resoluciones[74].

[74] Véase también S/2021/211, párrs. 58, 63 y 64.

102. En el anexo 46 se describen otros casos comunicados por un Estado Miembro que contienen imágenes satelitales y las investigaciones del Grupo sobre los buques Thae Song 8 (núm. OMI 9003653), Min Hae (núm. OMI 8672897) y Tae Phyong 2 (antes denominado Ming Zhou 6) (núm. OMI 8602763) de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que han descargado de forma similar carbón procedente de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en aguas chinas y han recogido carga de ayuda humanitaria en puertos chinos en un mismo viaje.

103. El Grupo solicitó ayuda a China sobre la actividad de cada uno de los 26 buques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que se observan en la figura XV, por ejemplo, información sobre los buques que descargaron carbón procedente de la República Popular Democrática de Corea u otros productos básicos sujetos a sanciones mediante transferencias entre buques en aguas territoriales chinas en 2021; todos los buques implicados en el transporte de carbón procedente de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que también recojan carga humanitaria en puertos chinos; y todo trueque de exportaciones de carbón procedentes de la República Popular Democrática de Corea sujetas a sanciones a cambio de cereales u otras importaciones desde China.

104. China respondió de la siguiente manera:

> Thae Song 8, Min Hae y Tae Phyong 2 entraron en el puerto de Longkou sin carga y navegaron hasta el puerto de Nampo después de cargar fertilizantes y plaguicidas. Ko San entró en el puerto de Beiliang (Dalian) sin carga y dejó el puerto tras cargar arroz. China no consideró que estos barcos hicieran contrabando de carbón dentro de las aguas territoriales chinas y no tenía ninguna razón para prohibirles entrar en los puertos sin carga y cargar material humanitario.

Recomendaciones

Acerca del falseamiento y el intercambio de la identidad de las embarcaciones

105. **Los Estados Miembros y los registros de buques deberían publicar circulares actualizadas sobre los perfiles digitales del SIA falseados que se hayan detectado que se están utilizando para ocultar la identidad real de los buques a fin de advertir sobre la prohibición de comerciar con ellos**.

106. **Cuando haya sospechas acerca de la validez de los elementos de identificación de un buque en concreto, las autoridades portuarias y otras autoridades marítimas pertinentes deberían efectuar las comprobaciones necesarias en el historial de dichos buques que entren en las aguas de su jurisdicción portuaria, de conformidad con el párrafo 9 de la resolución 2397 (2017)**.

107. **Los registros de pabellón deberían exigir a todos los solicitantes de matriculación que incluyan fotografías actualizadas del exterior (proa, cubierta de popa) y del interior de su buque en las que aparezcan los elementos de identificación**.

108. **Los Estados Miembros que disponen de astilleros que prestan servicios a buques con pabellón extranjero deben concienciar sobre el riesgo de que los buques pretendan efectuar alteraciones físicas u otras modificaciones para ocultar su identidad con el fin de realizar actividades sujetas a sanciones**.

Sobre el intercambio de información

109. **Los registros de pabellón deberían publicar periódicamente una lista de buques dados de baja en su sitio web y en circulares marítimas para informar a la comunidad marítima en general**.

110. **El uso indebido de ISMM es una tendencia que afecta a varios registros de pabellón. Para impedir el uso fraudulento de ISMM de los registros de pabellón, el Grupo anima a los registros y a los Estados Miembros en cuyas aguas los buques transmiten elementos de identificación fraudulentos a que investiguen dichos buques y comuniquen los resultados de sus investigaciones, en particular al Grupo, sobre todo cuando se trate de actividades que pudieran entrañar la evasión de sanciones**.

Sobre la manipulación del SIA

111. **Los Estados Miembros deberían vigilar e investigar a los buques que emitan elementos de identificación sospechosos, especialmente en las aguas en las que se sabe que operan buques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y buques vinculados a ese país**.

112. **Los registros de pabellón deberían garantizar la presencia de personal dedicado exclusivamente a supervisar los datos del SIA de la flota de sus registros como parte de sus actividades de diligencia debida, por ejemplo, comunicándose con los buques que emiten información del SIA que es diferente de la de su perfil registrado**.

113. **Las sociedades de clasificación deberían certificar, en inspecciones de seguridad periódicas, que cada buque disponga de un único SIA de tipo A que esté en funcionamiento. Las inspecciones deberían buscar pruebas de la existencia de múltiples SIA**.

Acerca de la información relativa a la propiedad efectiva

114. **El Grupo reitera su recomendación de que los Estados Miembros exijan a sus autoridades competentes que revelen la información sobre la propiedad efectiva respecto de todas las entidades jurídicas que deseen registrar embarcaciones en su registro de buques. Los Estados Miembros con pabellón de conveniencia deberían esforzarse por reunir información de identificación y de contacto de cada persona que posea o ejerza el control sobre la entidad extranjera a la que pertenece cada buque, ya sea como accionista mayoritario, como entidad que financia la empresa o como directivo superior o responsable de la adopción de decisiones. Dicha información debe ponerse a disposición de las entidades pertinentes, como las fuerzas de seguridad, así como del Grupo, para facilitar la aplicación de las sanciones**.

Estadísticas comerciales y cuestiones aduaneras

115. El comercio exterior registrado de la República Popular Democrática de Corea se desplomó desde principios de 2020 como consecuencia de las medidas instituidas para controlar la pandemia de COVID-19. Las exportaciones totales registradas en 2020 alcanzaron unos 156,9 millones de dólares, alrededor del 33 % de las cifras de 2019. Las importaciones ascendieron, en total, a 558,1 millones de dólares, alrededor del 20 % de la suma correspondiente a 2019 (véase el cuadro 2). Según un Estado Miembro, las sanciones impusieron considerables costos adicionales al comercio legal (por ejemplo, la necesidad de aplicar descuentos considerables a los precios de exportación, precios más altos a las importaciones, aumento de las primas de seguro,

aumento del costo de las operaciones financieras y complicaciones en el despacho de aduanas)[75].

Cuadro 2

Comercio registrado de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, 2018 a 2020

(Miles de dólares de los Estados Unidos)

	2018	*2019*	*2020*
Exportaciones	352 611	473 550	156 867
Importaciones	2 327 431	2 726 196	558 071
Balanza comercial	**(1 974 820)**	**(2 252 646)**	**(401 204)**

Fuente: mapa de comercio del Centro de Comercio Internacional, consultado el 6 de julio de 2021.

116. Algunas operaciones comerciales se reanudaron en marzo de 2021 después de que las autoridades de la República Popular Democrática de Corea construyeran instalaciones de desinfección para las mercancías importadas[76] e hicieran algunas excepciones para reabrir las fronteras. Sin embargo, al poco tiempo volvieron las restricciones fronterizas (véase el anexo 1).

117. Las estadísticas de acceso público, incluso las elaboradas por los asociados comerciales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, representan solo una parte del comercio exterior del país y a veces consignan datos erróneos. El uso erróneo de los códigos de país, en el que el código de país de la República Popular Democrática de Corea (KP) se introduce por error en lugar del código de país de la República de Corea (KR), el verdadero asociado comercial, suele ser el problema más frecuente[77]. El Grupo escribió a la Organización Internacional de Normalización sobre este asunto, pero no ha recibido respuesta.

118. A partir de los registros del Centro de Comercio Internacional sobre los datos comerciales nacionales, algunos de los cuales parecían corresponder a categorías sujetas a sanciones, el Grupo solicitó a 69 Estados Miembros información sobre transacciones efectuadas con la República Popular Democrática de Corea, así como detalles sobre cualquier caso de rechazo de despacho o incautación de bienes exportados a la República Popular Democrática de Corea o importadas desde ese país.

119. El Grupo también solicitó a las autoridades aduaneras de los Estados Miembros que informaran acerca de la aplicación práctica de las obligaciones en materia de sanciones, como el requisito de inspeccionar todos los cargamentos cuyo destino o cuya procedencia fuera la República Popular Democrática de Corea y de incautarlos y eliminarlos cuando se encontraran artículos prohibidos (véase en el anexo 49 el modelo de formulario del Grupo).

120. Muchos Estados Miembros indicaron que no se había registrado ninguna actividad comercial con la República Popular Democrática de Corea en 2020 y 2021, mientras que otros declararon que las transacciones no habían contravenido las sanciones de las Naciones Unidas. Varios Estados Miembros informaron al Grupo sobre los resultados de las investigaciones de casos de posible incumplimiento. Véase

[75] Véanse en el anexo 48 las estadísticas comerciales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea correspondientes a 2020 por producto básico (código SA).

[76] "North Korea turns airport into COVID-19 disinfection center to boost trade", *NK PRO (NK News)*, 16 de abril de 2021. Puede consultarse en https://www.nknews.org/pro/north-korea-turns-airport-into-covid-19-disinfection-center-to-boost-trade/.

[77] Véase S/2021/211, anexo 41.

el anexo 50, que contiene datos comparativos que, en muchos casos, demuestran las discrepancias entre las estadísticas de comercio internacional y los datos nacionales.

121. El Grupo constató que las autoridades aduaneras de los Estados Miembros habían respetado las prohibiciones, aunque en ocasiones debieron determinar si el intercambio comercial de determinados artículos con la República Popular Democrática de Corea estaba prohibido o no. En el anexo 51 figura la lista de productos básicos de código SA restringido que el Grupo utiliza para supervisar la aplicación de la prohibición sectorial.

122. En respuesta a la consulta del Grupo, China respondió lo siguiente:

> El principal motivo por el que los datos del Centro de Comercio Internacional difieren de la cifra oficial notificada por China es que este considera que los productos producidos en China y exportados a un tercero y luego transferidos a la República Popular Democrática de Corea son exportaciones chinas a ese país y ajustan los datos en consecuencia. Esta maniobra es incoherente con los hechos y el Centro no actualiza ni corrige sus datos a tiempo.
>
> China también subrayó que no se registraron transacciones de artículos prohibidos con la República Popular Democrática de Corea.

123. A pedido del Grupo, Tailandia informó acerca de 12 registros de exportaciones en las que figuraba como destino la República Popular Democrática de Corea, que posteriormente se retiraron y dieron lugar a la devolución de los bienes. Véase el anexo 52. Los intentos de exportación fueron varios envíos de productos eléctricos (transformadores, diodos) del grupo de códigos prohibidos 85 del SA, pero también artículos de perfumería, cuya categoría sujeta a sanciones a veces resulta difícil determinar.

124. Bulgaria informó al Grupo sobre las exportaciones de aditivos nutricionales (véase el anexo 53).

125. Singapur reconfirmó que había incautado un transbordo de vino y zumos y que las aduanas eliminaron los productos tras recibir una orden judicial a tal efecto (véase el anexo 54)[78].

126. En comunicaciones escritas con el Uruguay, el Grupo explicó que la prohibición sectorial de las transferencias no solo era aplicable al "material químico, nuclear o biológico, como se detalla en [...] la resolución 2270 (2016)", como Uruguay había supuesto anteriormente, sino también a otros productos básicos enumerados en el anexo 51. El Grupo de Expertos está dispuesto a asesorar, caso por caso, para ayudar a las autoridades aduaneras uruguayas a tomar sus propias decisiones sobre las exportaciones e importaciones en las que esté previsto que participe la República Popular Democrática de Corea. El Grupo subraya que la decisión final es prerrogativa de cada Estado Miembro, pero vuelve a sugerir a los Estados Miembros que utilicen como orientación la lista completa de productos básicos que tienen código SA restringido (véase el anexo 51).

127. Guatemala informó al Grupo que, en diciembre de 2020, el Departamento Normativo de la Intendencia de Aduanas realizó mejoras a la Declaración Aduanera Centroamericana (DUCA), a efecto de no permitir validación de las declaraciones DUCA-D y cuando consignen el código KP (Corea República Democrática). Además, se dio a conocer de manera interna y externa (Publicación de cápsula informativa y *Aduana Moderna*) información sobre que no debía consignarse el código KP en las declaraciones de importación (véase el anexo 55)[79].

[78] *Ibid.*, párr. 117.

[79] El Grupo ha solicitado aclaraciones sobre esta cuestión.

128. Guyana informó al Grupo que la Autoridad Fiscal de Guyana estaba incorporando un sistema de perfiles de riesgo en el Sistema Aduanero Automatizado (SIDUNEA) patrocinado por la Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre Comercio y Desarrollo (UNCTAD) para emitir alertas sobre las transacciones (véase el anexo 56).

129. El Grupo tiene la intención de continuar con el análisis comparativo de las estadísticas y los datos de dominio público proporcionados por los Estados Miembros para señalar cualquier posible discrepancia e investigar su causa.

130. Las principales mercancías exportadas ilegalmente desde la República Popular Democrática de Corea son el carbón, los minerales, el hierro, la arena y los tejidos. Según un Estado Miembro, en 2020 se exportaron millones de toneladas métricas de carbón, así como quizá otros minerales sujetos a sanciones. Hasta mayo de 2021, la República Popular Democrática de Corea había exportado al menos 364.000 toneladas métricas de carbón (véase el párr. 85).

131. El Grupo examinó varios procedimientos judiciales chinos relacionados con las exportaciones ilegales de carbón, arena y zinc. Entre el 30 de octubre y el 3 de noviembre de 2019, cinco ciudadanos chinos conspiraron para contrabandear hacia China carbón procedente de la República Popular Democrática de Corea. Los pagos se hicieron a Fuzhou Tenghuang Trade Co. Ltd. y el carbón fue transferido a buques pertenecientes a Nanjing Feixiong Ocean Shipping Company. Un tribunal chino[80] declaró a los acusados culpables de contrabando y les aplicó penas de prisión y multas.

132. Otro caso judicial estuvo vinculado al buque Hao Fan 2[81], que contrabandeaba carbón procedente de la República Popular Democrática de Corea hacia China pasando por la Federación de Rusia. Supuestamente, el carbón fue vendido por Champion Global Trading Limited, con sede en Hong Kong, a Chifeng Shenhua Material Trade Co. Ltd. Los expedientes judiciales chinos indicaban que, en junio de 2019, varios de los mismos co-conspiradores también habían facilitado transferencias entre buques de polvo de zinc procedente de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, actividad ilícita en la que también participó Unphung Joint Venture Company (empresa conjunta entre Unphasan Trading Corporation, con sede en la República Popular Democrática de Corea, y Liaoning Wellhope Agri-Tech Joint Stock Corporation, con sede en China).

Recomendaciones

133. **El Grupo recomienda que la Organización Internacional de Normalización estudie posibles medidas para evitar el uso erróneo de los códigos de país de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y la República de Corea (KP y KR, respectivamente)**.

134. **El Grupo recomienda a los Estados Miembros que racionalicen sus listas de control de exportaciones e importaciones utilizando como material de apoyo la lista no oficiosa de productos básicos prohibidos elaborada por el Grupo (véase el anexo 51)**.

135. **El Grupo observa que los Estados Miembros podrían estudiar la posibilidad de utilizar el sistema SIDUNEA creado por la UNCTAD (sistema de gestión aduanera informatizada, utilizado actualmente en más de 80 países; véase**

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[80] Véase https://wenshu.court.gov.cn/.

[81] La empresa Shen Zhong International Shipping (KPe.073) fue incluida en la Lista el 30 de marzo de 2018 por su actividad como administradora naval y comercial del Hao Fan 2.

https://asycuda.org/es/) para controlar las transacciones con las jurisdicciones sujetas a sanciones.

136. **El Grupo recomienda que las autoridades aduaneras de los Estados Miembros utilicen los recursos antes mencionados para informar a los agentes comerciales de su respectiva jurisdicción y para que los utilicen con fines de diligencia debida, especialmente cuando se trate de productos básicos prohibidos en relación con el comercio con jurisdicciones sujetas a sanciones**.

IV. Embargos, entidades y personas incluidas en la Lista y trabajadores en el extranjero

Embargos

Casos relacionados con el documental The Mole: Undercover in North Korea

137. El Grupo siguió investigando algunas de las actividades reflejadas en el documental *The Mole: Undercover in North Korea*[82]. Uganda respondió que los organismos gubernamentales pertinentes seguían investigando y Camboya respondió la consulta inicial del Grupo, pero no ha respondido a las preguntas complementarias. China respondió lo siguiente:

> Hay sospechas de que el documental mencionado en la carta fue producido con medios ilegítimos, lo que ha socavado la autenticidad y la credibilidad de la información, de manera que el Grupo no debe tomarlo como fuente de información creíble para sus investigaciones sobre las presuntas actividades de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en contravención de las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad. El Grupo debe llevar a cabo su trabajo de manera justa, objetiva e imparcial.

Myanmar

138. El Grupo reiteró su anterior solicitud de que se le proporcionara información sobre la cooperación militar entre Myanmar y la República Popular Democrática de Corea, incluida la cooperación en materia de misiles balísticos desde octubre de 2006, así como pruebas del regreso de los técnicos de Myanmar y de la República Popular Democrática de Corea a su respectivo país de origen[83].

139. Myanmar respondió lo siguiente:

> Las Fuerzas Armadas de Myanmar siguen comprometidas con la no proliferación y están cumpliendo activamente las obligaciones jurídicas internacionales en materia de desarme nuclear y no proliferación de armas de destrucción masiva, así como de desarme de las armas prohibidas por el derecho internacional humanitario. Las Fuerzas Armadas de Myanmar apoyan la eliminación total de las armas de destrucción masiva y cumplen sus obligaciones internacionales en virtud de los siguientes instrumentos jurídicos internacionales y regionales en materia de no proliferación de los que Myanmar es parte.

[82] Véase S/2021/211, párr. 90 y anexo 88.
[83] Véanse S/2019/171, párr. 78, y S/2020/151, párr. 110.

Emiratos Árabes Unidos

140. El Grupo siguió investigando a las personas relacionadas con la empresa Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID). Ri Hyong Thae sigue haciendo viajes internacionales de cooperación en actividades relacionadas con las armas entre varios países y la República Popular Democrática de Corea y en compañía de otras personas que figuran en la Lista del Comité del Consejo de Seguridad establecido en virtud de la resolución 1718 (2006). El Grupo solicitó más información sobre Ri a los Emiratos Árabes Unidos y aún no ha recibido respuesta.

Uso indebido de propiedades de embajadas

141. El Grupo continuó su investigación sobre las propiedades de la Embajada de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en Sofía y solicitó información a Bulgaria sobre los informes que mostraban que las empresas búlgaras seguían anunciando el alquiler de la "Terra Residence", que al parecer era la antigua residencia del Embajador (situada en el número 6 de la calle Andrei Sakharov, barrio de Mladost 1, Sofía, 1784)[84]. Bulgaria respondió que, en febrero de 2017, se había informado a la Embajada que tenía prohibido utilizar los bienes propiedad de la Embajada de la República Popular Democrática de Corea para cualquier fin distinto de las actividades diplomáticas y consulares, y se le había instado a cesar inmediatamente toda actividad de este tipo. Se recomendó encarecidamente a las empresas locales Terra Group y Technologica, que estaban registradas en la dirección mencionada, que rescindieran su respectivo contrato de alquiler y cumplieran el régimen de sanciones. Según las autoridades búlgaras, estas empresas no han efectuado desde entonces ningún pago en concepto de alquiler a la Embajada de la República Popular Democrática de Corea (véase el anexo 57).

Aplicación de la prohibición relativa a los artículos de lujo

142. La importación de bienes de consumo, incluidos los artículos de lujo (prohibidos en virtud del párrafo 8 a) iii) de la resolución 1718 (2006)), ha cesado casi por completo debido al cierre de las fronteras. Los intercambios comerciales privados a través de la frontera son casi inexistentes.

143. Sin embargo, algunos artículos publicados en medios de comunicación indican que se transportaron ilícitamente en buques algunos bienes y suministros de lujo importados (como "neumáticos y piezas de automóvil, materiales de construcción y diseño de interiores, suministros para el chalet de la familia de Kim Jong Un, artículos de lujo y otros artículos") a los puertos de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, como Nampo, desde un depósito ferroviario situado en la frontera, donde quedaron almacenados en trenes[85].

Vehículos de lujo

144. El Grupo continuó investigando las redes que posibilitaron la entrega a la República Popular Democrática de Corea de dos vehículos de lujo Mercedes Benz clase S en 2018 desde Italia. European Cars & More S.R.L había participado sin saberlo en la reventa en tránsito de los vehículos en 2018. La empresa informó además al Grupo que también había vendido anteriormente en 2017 y 2018 otros tres vehículos de lujo de Mercedes Benz —un Mercedes S600 Guard, un S650 Maybach y un S600 Pullman con los números de identificación WDD2221761A356488,

[84] Véase S/2021/211, párr. 110.

[85] "Cargo in freight train at Dandong Station transported into North Korea by boat", *Daily NK*, 31 de mayo de 2021; puede consultarse en www.dailynk.com/english/cargo-freight-train-dandong-station-transported-north-korea-boat/.

WDD2229801A351655 y WDD2229761A333357— a LS Logistica & Spedizioni S.R.L.C, que era la misma empresa que había intervenido en el envío de los vehículos de clase S en 2018. El Grupo todavía no ha recibido respuesta de esta empresa.

145. El Grupo se ha puesto en contacto con Daimler en relación con estos tres últimos vehículos. Daimler confirmó que los vehículos fueron producidos por Daimler AG en Sindelfingen (Alemania) a petición de un cliente italiano. Según la autoridad de registro italiana, los vehículos estuvieron registrados en Italia hasta 2020, antes de ser revendidos “dentro y fuera de Europa”; aún no se ha determinado la ubicación de los vehículos. El Grupo continúa sus investigaciones, incluso con las autoridades aduaneras italianas[86].

146. El Grupo recibió información de un Estado Miembro acerca de que la empresa Yee Fat Motor Trading (H.K.) Ltd., con sede en Hong Kong[87], había facilitado el envío de un automóvil de lujo a la República Popular Democrática de Corea transportado por el Ji Yuan (núm. OMI 9044140, también denominado Chang Long) (véanse también los párrs. 68 y 73). El Estado Miembro también informó que, en noviembre de 2019, el Chang Long (que navegaba con el nombre Ji Yuan) había transportado dos contenedores llenos de productos electrónicos no especificados a la República Popular Democrática de Corea. El Grupo se dirigió por escrito a las partes pertinentes. China respondió: “La investigación preliminar no encontró ninguna transacción comercial entre la empresa de Hong Kong (China), ‘Yee Fat’ y la República Popular Democrática de Corea. En cuanto al cargamento de salida que transportaba el buque Ji Yuan*,* China está investigando y verificando la información en profundidad”. China indicó además: “El destino de parte de la carga es la República de Corea y el buque es propiedad de una empresa del Reino Unido”. Yee Fat aún no ha respondido. La investigación sigue en curso.

147. El Grupo continuó su investigación sobre la transferencia de vehículos Toyota Lexus a la República Popular Democrática de Corea. Según un Estado Miembro, Jiangsu Overseas Group Foreign Economic and Technical Cooperation, Ltd.[88] estuvo implicada en un intento de envío de vehículos de lujo por valor de más de 1 millón de dólares, entre ellos los nuevos Lexus LX570 SUV de 2020, a la República Popular Democrática de Corea. Al parecer, un cargamento de estos vehículos llegó a Ningbo (supuestamente desde los Emiratos Árabes Unidos) a finales de septiembre de 2020 y fue entregado posteriormente a la República Popular Democrática de Corea. Al parecer, estas transacciones fueron facilitadas por los representantes en China de Korea United Development Bank de la República Popular Democrática de Corea (KPe.033), Credit Development Bank y Korea Kyongeun Trading Corporation. El Grupo aún no ha recibido ninguna respuesta a sus solicitudes de información.

Otros artículos de lujo

148. El Grupo observa que los envíos de bebidas alcohólicas a la República Popular Democrática de Corea fueron casi inexistentes desde principios de 2020 y que dichas bebidas dejaron de conseguirse en el mercado interno debido a las restricciones relacionadas con la COVID-19.

149. Según la información de que dispone el Grupo a partir de fuentes de dominio público, la Banda de la Comisión de Asuntos Estatales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea hace poco comenzó a utilizar en público lo que, según fuentes de los medios de comunicación, es un piano de cola de alta gama, que apareció en transmisiones televisadas por las emisoras oficiales de la República Popular

[86] Véase S/2021/211, párrs. 113 y 114.

[87] 義發汽車(香港)有限公司, Dirección: 28 Kam Tin Road, Yuen Long District, Yuen Long District, New Territories, Hong Kong (China).

[88] Situada en el número 55, Zhongshan-lu, Gulou-qu, Nanjing, provincia de Jiangsu (China).

Democrática de Corea[89]. La transferencia de dichos instrumentos de lujo a la República Popular Democrática de Corea contravendría la obligación de los Estados Miembros de aplicar las resoluciones pertinentes del Consejo de Seguridad, dado que el Consejo, en el párrafo 8 a) iii) de su resolución 1718 (2006), prohibió el suministro, la venta o la transferencia directos o indirectos de artículos de lujo a la República Popular Democrática de Corea (véase el anexo 58). El Grupo solicitó al supuesto fabricante información sobre el producto.

Recomendaciones

150. **El Grupo reitera su recomendación de que los Estados Miembros racionalicen sus listas de control de las exportaciones especificando los bienes de lujo prohibidos conforme a los objetivos de las resoluciones 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) y 2321 (2016), pero sin caer en ampliaciones innecesarias a fin de no restringir el suministro de bienes no prohibidos a la población civil ni provocar efectos humanitarios negativos una vez que se reanude el comercio**.

151. **El Grupo reitera su recomendación de que los Estados Miembros alienten a las entidades y los ciudadanos de su territorio que exporten artículos de lujo a incorporar en los contratos cláusulas que impidan la reventa de esos artículos a la República Popular Democrática de Corea**.

152. **El Grupo reitera su recomendación de que los Estados Miembros y las organizaciones competentes alienten a las empresas de expedición y transporte marítimo a establecer un sistema de control riguroso de los consignatarios que tenga en cuenta el riesgo de transbordo**.

Oficina General de Reconocimiento (KPe.031)

153. El Grupo siguió investigando los ciberataques perpetrados por agentes de la República Popular Democrática de Corea vinculados a la Oficina General de Reconocimiento, incluida en la Lista de las Naciones Unidas[90]. Según múltiples informes de los medios de comunicación y las empresas de ciberseguridad, los ciberagentes de la República Popular Democrática de Corea atacaron a empresas de defensa de todo el mundo.

154. En el período que abarca el informe, los medios de comunicación informaron que el Grupo Lazarus, agente que ejecuta ciberamenazas y está asociado a la Oficina General de Reconocimiento de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, efectuó ciberataques contra dos empresas de defensa alemanas dirigiéndose a empleados con falsas ofertas de trabajo[91]. Otros medios de comunicación afirmaron que el Grupo Lazarus y el Grupo Kimsuky, otro agente que ejecuta ciberamenazas y que está estrechamente vinculado a la Oficina General de Reconocimiento, habían efectuado ciberataques contra los sectores rusos de defensa, energía y tecnología de la

[89] "Kim Jong Un's new favorite band lives life of luxury in new music videos", *NK News*, 24 de junio de 2021; puede consultarse en www.nknews.org/2021/06/kim-jong-uns-new-favorite-band-lives-life-of-luxury-in-new-music-videos/.

[90] Véase S/2020/840, anexo 48, en que se detallan las funciones de la Oficina General de Reconocimiento y otras organizaciones en las ciberoperaciones de la República Popular Democrática de Corea.

[91] Véase www.br.de/nachrichten/deutschland-welt/cyberspionage-gegen-deutsche-ruestungskonzerne,SJSDtK2 (en alemán).

información en 2020, cibercampaña que se denominó “ThreatNeedle”[92, 93]. El Grupo ha investigado estos incidentes[94].

155. El Grupo también sigue investigando la adquisición cibernética ilegal de activos económicos mediante el robo de propiedad intelectual efectuada por la República Popular Democrática de Corea, que constituye evasión de las sanciones. Según los informes de las empresas de ciberseguridad y los medios de comunicación, algunos agentes generadores de amenazas persistentes que se sabe que están asociados a la República Popular Democrática de Corea efectuaron ciberataques contra las empresas farmacéuticas que desarrollan vacunas contra la COVID-19[95]. El Grupo corroboró estas actividades con los Estados Miembros y observa que las tácticas, las técnicas y los procedimientos de los ataques coinciden con los ciberataques notificados anteriormente y llevados a cabo por agentes de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, como Lazarus. Una empresa farmacéutica dijo al Grupo que las posibles repercusiones de la amenaza eran importantes, pero no se encontraron pruebas que indicaran que el agente generador de amenazas hubiera logrado su objetivo. La empresa aplicó medidas de seguridad adicionales para proteger sus sistemas informáticos.

Trabajadores en el extranjero

156. El Grupo continuó sus investigaciones sobre los trabajadores en el extranjero de la República Popular Democrática de Corea. Un Estado Miembro informó al Grupo que los nacionales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea habían permanecido en varios países y habían seguido obteniendo ingresos en 2020 y 2021 en los ámbitos de la tecnología de la información, la construcción, la electrónica y la agricultura, con lo que contravinieron directamente el párrafo 8 de la resolución 2397 (2017). El Grupo sigue investigando.

157. El Grupo también obtuvo información de otro Estado Miembro acerca de que, en varios países del sudeste asiático, los restaurantes de la República Popular Democrática de Corea habían estado operando después del plazo de repatriación de diciembre de 2019. El Grupo está investigando.

158. El Grupo informó anteriormente[96] que tres trabajadores médicos y tres traductores de la República Popular Democrática de Corea estaban trabajando en la provincia de Pichincha (Ecuador). Su contrato debía finalizar en mayo de 2020 (véase el anexo 60). Ecuador informó al Grupo que se habían tomado las medidas pertinentes para rescindir el contrato de los trabajadores y repatriar a los nacionales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea. El Grupo sigue de cerca este caso.

V. Cuestiones financieras

159. A partir de sus propias investigaciones, la información proporcionada por los Estados Miembros y los informes de dominio público, el Grupo considera que no se ha disminuido lo suficiente el acceso de la República Popular Democrática de Corea a las instituciones financieras mundiales. El Grupo también observa que las

[92] Véase www.kommersant.ru/doc/4538451 (en ruso); véase también www.kommersant.ru/doc/4426131 (en ruso).

[93] Véanse en el anexo 59 extractos del informe de Kaspersky.

[94] Un Estado Miembro afectado informó al Grupo que estaba llevando a cabo una investigación.

[95] “North Korea-linked hackers targeted J&J, Novavax in hunt for COVID research”, *Reuters*, 2 de diciembre de 2020; puede consultarse en www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-north-korea-cyber/north-korea-linked-hackers-targeted-jj-novavax-in-hunt-for-covid-research-idUSKBN28C1UE.

[96] Véase S/2020/840, párr. 129.

operaciones financieras ilícitas del país siguen concentrándose en el este y el sudeste de Asia, donde los procesos opacos de inscripción de las empresas socavan el cumplimiento y los procedimientos de las instituciones financieras para conocer a sus clientes. En consecuencia, la República Popular Democrática de Corea sigue manteniendo y aprovechando las redes de empresas ficticias para facilitar la evasión de sanciones relacionadas con las actividades marítimas, las transacciones comerciales, la importación de artículos de lujo, el trabajo ilícito y el blanqueo de activos virtuales.

160. Un examen que está llevando adelante el Grupo sobre la financiación del comercio relacionada con las actividades de evasión de las sanciones marítimas muestra que la República Popular Democrática de Corea sigue inscribiendo empresas en jurisdicciones de baja transparencia. El incumplimiento por parte de los proveedores de servicios empresariales, especialmente en lo que respecta a la gestión de la identidad, es un factor clave en la capacidad del país para generar y ocultar sus actividades ilícitas. En muchos casos, las investigaciones del Grupo descubrieron que el titular real de varias empresas ficticias era, de hecho, un propietario falso. En la mayoría de los casos, unas simples comprobaciones de identidad revelaron que los supuestos propietarios efectivos no tenían ningún vínculo con el sector marítimo y, en algunos casos, no eran conscientes de que su identidad se había utilizado para registrar una empresa ficticia.

Supuestas empresas conjuntas en China

161. Según la información de dominio público y la información proporcionada por un Estado Miembro, la República Popular Democrática de Corea sigue formando empresas conjuntas con entidades que tienen sede en China.

162. En enero de 2021, el Grupo comenzó a investigar a Yongxiang International Trading Company Limited, empresa que supuestamente firmó un contrato de “cooperación estratégica” con el Korea Computer Center[97] con el fin de suministrar sistemas para puntos de venta, que se utilizan para facilitar el procesamiento de pagos digitales al por menor (véase el anexo 61). China respondió: “Los artículos cuya exportación a la República Popular Democrática de Corea esté prohibida no serán despachados en las aduanas chinas ni siquiera cuando se firmen los contratos correspondientes” (véase en el anexo 62 la consulta que formuló el Grupo a China y su respuesta). Según su sitio web, Yongxiang International Trading Company Limited mantiene vínculos con el banco central de la República Popular Democrática de Corea desde 2017. Las investigaciones siguen en curso.

163. Según los documentos obtenidos por el Grupo, una empresa con sede en la República Popular Democrática de Corea, Choseon Xinxing Information Technology Trade Association[98], es propietaria del 60 % de una empresa con sede en China (véase el anexo 63). Según la información procedente de un Estado Miembro, se sospecha que la Asociación Comercial de Tecnología de la Información Choseon Xinxing tiene vínculos con el Departamento de la Industria de las Municiones (KPe.028). Las investigaciones siguen en curso[99].

[97] Según la información proporcionada previamente al Grupo por un Estado Miembro, el Korea Computer Center depende del Departamento de la Industria de las Municiones (incluido en la Lista con el número de referencia KPe.028). Véase el informe más reciente del Grupo sobre ese centro en S/2020/151, párrs. 123 a 125.

[98] Nombre de la empresa en chino: 朝鲜新兴信息技术贸易会社.

[99] Un experto se opone a este párrafo porque es preciso corroborar mejor su contenido.

Representaciones bancarias en el extranjero

164. El Grupo continúa investigando a representantes bancarios de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en el extranjero. En respuesta a las investigaciones en curso del Grupo[100], un Estado Miembro comunicó al Grupo que "decenas de representantes bancarios de la República Popular Democrática de Corea siguen operando en todo el mundo en 2020" y proporcionó una lista no exhaustiva en la que se consigna que los representantes bancarios de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que están operando en el extranjero ascienden a 6 en la Federación de Rusia, 22 en China[101], 1 en Indonesia y 1 en Singapur[102]. El Estado Miembro señaló además que, en varios casos, una sola persona puede representar y realizar operaciones financieras en nombre de varios bancos de la República Popular Democrática de Corea simultáneamente y que no hay información que indique que los bancos hayan sido cerrados. El Grupo sigue investigando estas denuncias acerca de las representaciones bancarias en el extranjero.

Financiación del comercio y evasión de sanciones marítimas

165. Según un informe reciente[103] y los artículos publicados en los medios de comunicación posteriormente, el Grupo Winson, que tiene su sede en Singapur y amplias operaciones a nivel mundial y que se dedica principalmente al comercio internacional de petróleo al por mayor y al suministro de combustible en alta mar, es un nodo fundamental en las actividades de adquisición ilícita de combustible de la República Popular Democrática de Corea. A partir de ese informe y las investigaciones previas, el Grupo inició una investigación sobre las transacciones relacionadas con la venta de gasóleo y la posterior transferencia de buque a buque entre el entonces Super Star (núm. OMI 9085388)[104], del pabellón de Nauru, y el Diamond 8 (núm. OMI 9132612)[105], de pabellón desconocido, en torno al 1 de mayo de 2020 (UTC) y de nuevo en torno al 14 de junio de 2020 (UTC), en evidente violación de la resolución 2397 (2017) y del párrafo 18 de la resolución 2375 (2017).

166. En abril de 2021, el Grupo solicitó documentación financiera y comercial sobre las actividades del Grupo Winson relacionadas, entre otras cosas, con el Super Star y el Diamond 8. El Grupo también pidió aclaraciones sobre los procesos y procedimientos de diligencia debida que hubiera puesto en marcha el Grupo Winson para mitigar el riesgo de evasión de sanciones[106]. En su respuesta al Grupo, el Grupo Winson señaló su compromiso con el cumplimiento de las sanciones y proporcionó

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[100] Véase S/2021/211, párrs. 140 y 141 y anexo 72.

[101] Dos expertos se oponen al uso de información no verificada.

[102] Li Hyun, condenado y sentenciado en junio de 2020.

[103] Véase "Black Gold - Exposing North Korea's oil procurement networks", Royal United Services Institute, 22 de marzo de 2021; puede consultarse en www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/project-sandstone-special-report-black-gold-exposing-north-koreas-oil-procurement-networks. Véase también "5 takeaways from investigating covert oil deliveries to North Korea", *New York Times*, 22 de marzo de 2021en www.nytimes.com/2018/05/02/world/asia/chinese-prom-dress.html.

[104] Este buque está desguazado en la actualidad.

[105] El Grupo ya ha recomendado que se incluya al Diamond 8 en la Lista y señala además que el buque es el petrolero de mayor tamaño que suministra petróleo de forma ilícita a la República Popular Democrática de Corea. Véanse los informes anteriores del Grupo sobre el Diamond 8 en S/2020/151, párr. 21, S/2020/840, párrs. 25 a 39, y S/2021/211, párr 49.

[106] El Grupo ya se había dirigido por escrito al Grupo Winson en mayo de 2018 para destacar los riesgos derivados de que la República Popular Democrática de Corea recurriera a cadenas mundiales de abastecimiento de petróleo, a la complicidad de nacionales extranjeros, al registro de empresas en el exterior y al sistema bancario internacional a fin de evadir las sanciones de las Naciones Unidas. La carta también ofrecía orientaciones sobre la diligencia debida y las mejores prácticas de franco a bordo.

un resumen de sus procedimientos de diligencia debida, que la empresa puso en marcha en 2018[107].

167. Al explicar las transferencias entre los buques Super Star y Diamond *8*[108], el Grupo Winson declaró que su cliente mayorista, Sino Global Trade Co. Ltd. (anteriormente Super Gold Holdings Inc.) fletó a plazo el Super Star desde una entidad de Winson, Golden Shelter Limited. Después, Sino Global decidió que el Super Star recibiera el gasóleo de Winson Oil (Wholesale) Pte Ltd., en régimen de franco a bordo[109]. Sino Global luego vendió partes de ese gasóleo a una empresa llamada "Zfullboto Co. Ltd.", que asignó el Diamond 8 a Sino Global para que recibiera ese gasóleo mediante una transferencia entre buques con el Super Star.

168. Los representantes de Winson también informaron al Grupo de Expertos que habían llevado a cabo verificaciones de diligencia debida sobre Sino Global, en la que hallaron que su único accionista y director era Chien Chih-wei (簡志瑋) y que la empresa no figuraba en ninguna lista de entidades sujetas a sanciones[110]. Los contratos de gasóleo entre Winson y Sino Global indican, en concreto, que "El producto de este contrato no se venderá a Corea del Norte ni a ninguna entidad norcoreana ni a ningún otro país sujeto a sanciones". Según un alto directivo del Grupo Winson, "Winson no participó en la venta de cargamentos de Sino Global a Zfullboto, ni en la asignación del DIAMOND 8 efectuada por Zfullboto a Sino Global" y una persona llamada "Ivy" operaba en nombre de Zfullboto[111].

169. Sin embargo, la información obtenida por el Grupo revela que Chien Chi-wei utilizó la dirección 150 de la calle Cheng'ai, distrito de Fengshan, Kaohsiung, Provincia China de Taiwán, para registrar a Sino Global (véase el anexo 64)[112]. Esta es la misma dirección utilizada por un empleado de alto nivel jerárquico del Grupo Winson en una solicitud presentada a la OMI para el buque An Ping (núm. OMI 7903366)[113], en la que figuraba como propietario del buque Spring Gain International Limited[114]. El mismo empleado también utilizó un correo electrónico del Grupo

[107] Como parte de su política de cumplimiento de las sanciones, el Grupo Winson señala específicamente que lleva a cabo la debida diligencia sobre las posibles contrapartes, incluye cláusulas sobre las sanciones en sus contratos y lleva a cabo una gestión de riesgos adecuada antes de celebrar contratos.

[108] El Grupo Winson reconoció la transferencia entre buques.

[109] Winson Oil (Wholesale) Pte Ltd. forma parte del grupo de empresas Winson, con sede en Singapur.

[110] El Grupo no pudo identificar ningún perfil en línea, información de contacto ni otra información que sugiriera la participación de la empresa en la industria petrolera. Estos son indicadores que alertan sobre la posibilidad de que se trate de una empresa ficticia, que el Grupo ya ha denunciado.

[111] Zfullboto Co. Ltd. (中盛博通有限公司), empresa constituida en enero de 2019, no tiene rastros en línea y figura que es propiedad de un ciudadano chino llamado Chen Jieyue (陳節約), domiciliado en la ciudad de Shishi, provincia de Fujian (China).

[112] Los expedientes judiciales de la Provincia China de Taiwán indican que Chien Chih-wei en algún momento residió en ese mismo domicilio. Los mismos expedientes judiciales indican también que Chien utiliza el alias Chien Ko-yeh (簡科曄). Los expedientes de la empresa indican que una persona que el Grupo cree que es Chien también operaba una empresa llamada Fengxin Enterprise (鋒馨企業社) desde esa misma dirección. Además, Chien figuraba como supervisor de Taishun Trading —empresa de venta de petróleo situada en el piso inferior a Winson Shipping (Taiwán) Co., Ltd. y Jiu Li Shuen Trading (organización de Winson)— desde el 3 de septiembre de 2018 hasta el 11 de febrero de 2019.


[113] El An Ping entregó petróleo en Nampo en dos ocasiones en 2020.

[114] Véase el informe anterior del Grupo sobre el An Ping en S/2021/211, párr. 46 a) y anexo 25. Spring Gain International sigue incluyendo como datos de contacto el número de teléfono y fax de Winson Shipping (Taiwan) Co. Ltd. en las bases de datos comerciales.

Winson en la solicitud, junto con un número de teléfono y fax vinculados a Winson Shipping (Taiwan) Co. Ltd.[115, 116].

170. Un examen de las redes sociales (véase el anexo 64) indica que el mencionado empleado y Chien tienen una relación cercana. Además, las publicaciones en las redes sociales obtenidas por el Grupo demuestran que Chien mantiene relaciones cercanas con varias personas que ocupan puestos de responsabilidad en Winson Shipping (Taiwan) Co., Ltd., Jiu Li Shuen Trading y Taishun Trading. Dados estos vínculos sustanciales, el Grupo sigue investigando al Grupo Winson y sus filiales, así como a los propietarios y operadores de Zfullboto.

Figura XVII
Red que posibilita la transferencia entre los buques Super Star y Diamond 8



Fuente: Grupo de Expertos.

Activos virtuales y proveedores de servicios de activos virtuales

171. Según la información proporcionada por los Estados Miembros, así como la información de dominio público, el Grupo considera que la República Popular Democrática de Corea sigue realizando campañas de suplantación de identidad personalizada en el sector de las criptomonedas. Estas campañas hacen un uso intensivo de las plataformas de medios sociales para localizar a los posibles objetivos, así como para establecer el primer contacto. Un Estado Miembro informó al Grupo que los ciberagentes suelen utilizar plataformas de comercialización masiva por correo electrónico para enviar y rastrear los mensajes de suplantación de identidad; enviar enlaces relevantes a artículos de noticias o archivos adjuntos (no maliciosos) para iniciar el contacto; enviar archivos maliciosos a través de plataformas populares de intercambio de archivos en la nube; y efectuar llamados telefónicos al personal de ayuda de las plataformas de cambio de criptomonedas.

Recomendaciones

172. **El Grupo toma nota del examen realizado en octubre de 2020 por el Grupo de Acción Financiera acerca de la recomendación 1 y su nota interpretativa (R.1**

[115] Ahora conocida como Zheng Yu Shipping Co., Ltd. (正毓船舶股份有限公司).
[116] Un experto opinó que después del nombre de la empresa es necesario insertar “ubicado en la Provincia China de Taiwán”.

e INR.1) de exigir a los países y a las entidades del sector privado que "identifiquen, evalúen, comprendan y mitiguen los riesgos de financiar la proliferación" relacionados con "la posibilidad de que se incumplan, no se apliquen o se evadan sanciones financieras específicas". De conformidad con este requisito, el Grupo recomienda a todos los Estados Miembros y a las entidades del sector privado que repasen las orientaciones del Grupo de Acción Financiera sobre la evaluación y la mitigación del riesgo de financiar la proliferación (*Guidance on Proliferation Financing Risk Assessment and Mitigation*)[117].

VI. Efectos no deseados de las sanciones

173. En el párrafo 25 de su resolución 2397 (2017), el Consejo de Seguridad reafirmó que las sanciones de las Naciones Unidas no tenían el propósito de acarrear consecuencias humanitarias adversas para la población civil de la República Popular Democrática de Corea ni de perjudicar o restringir la actividad económica, la cooperación, la ayuda alimentaria, la asistencia humanitaria u otras actividades que no estuvieran prohibidas en virtud de las resoluciones pertinentes del Consejo, y destacó también la necesidad y responsabilidad primordial del país de atender plenamente las necesidades de subsistencia de su población.

174. Según algunos organismos de las Naciones Unidas, Estados Miembros y organizaciones no gubernamentales, sigue deteriorándose la situación humanitaria de la República Popular Democrática de Corea. En abril de 2021, Kim Jong Un subrayó la gravedad de la situación económica del país, señalando que "la situación alimentaria del pueblo se está volviendo tensa, ya que el sector agrícola no ha podido cumplir su plan de producción de cereales debido a los daños causados por el tifón del año pasado"[118], y la situación fue calificada oficialmente de "crisis alimentaria"[119], lo cual está respaldado por los datos oficiales[120]. Esta declaración coincidió con una inusual volatilidad de los precios de muchos productos básicos de consumo, escasez de alimentos, caída del acceso a bienes y servicios, compras por pánico y una nueva disminución de la disponibilidad de suministros y servicios médicos. El Grupo atribuye el deterioro de la situación humanitaria en la República Popular Democrática de Corea a los factores que se detallan a continuación:

a) Las medidas relacionadas con la prevención de la COVID-19, como el cierre de fronteras desde enero de 2020 y la casi interrupción de las importaciones de productos de consumo, la disminución de los ingresos por exportaciones y los límites estrictos a la capacidad de compra de alimentos y otros bienes esenciales;

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117 Puede consultarse en https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Guidance-Proliferation-Financing-Risk-Assessment-Mitigation.pdf.

118 Declaraciones de Kim Jong Un durante el pleno del Comité Central del Partido de los Trabajadores en junio, período en el que tradicionalmente el agotamiento de las reservas de alimentos está en su nivel más bajo. Véase "Kim Jong Un admitted food security issues as party plenum event kicks", *NK News*, 19 de agosto de 2021, en www.nknews.org/2021/06/party-plenum-event-kicks-off-kim-jong-un-admits-food-security-issues.

119 "North Korea admitted 'food crisis,' says grain to be distributed to population", *NK News*, 20 de junio de 2021. Puede consultarse en www.nknews.org/2021/06/north-korea-admits-food-crisis-says-grain-to-be-distributed-to-population/.

120 Según la información oficial proporcionada por la República Popular Democrática de Corea, "la producción de 2018 fue de unos 4,95 millones de toneladas, la más baja de los últimos 10 años", y los expertos estiman una escasez de alimentos de alrededor de 1,3 millones de toneladas en 2021. Véase también "N. Korea says its food production down to 10-year low in 2018", *The Korea Herald*, 14 de julio de 2021, en http://www01.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20210714000330.

b) La continuación de las restricciones relacionadas con las sanciones de las Naciones Unidas: En sus informes anteriores, el Grupo determinó que estas restricciones, como las limitaciones a la importación de combustible, maquinaria y piezas de repuesto, tenían efectos no deseados en la seguridad energética, el transporte civil, la agricultura, la atención de salud, el saneamiento y la higiene. Aunque el Grupo no puede determinar los efectos reales en términos cuantitativos y señala, además, que probablemente hayan disminuido debido al cierre de las fronteras del país, las limitaciones impuestas a los viajes y las restricciones de las importaciones, considera que, en el período que abarca el informe, las sanciones probablemente hayan tenido algunos efectos no deseados y seguirán teniendo consecuencias humanitarias negativas una vez que se abran las fronteras[121];

c) Los intentos de aumentar el control centralizado de la economía y las limitaciones más estrictas impuestas a la actividad del mercado (por ejemplo, la restricción de las ventas internas de bienes de consumo distintos de los alimentos), por lo cual las personas ya no encuentran estímulo para desarrollar actividades económicas.

175. El Grupo siguió evaluando las repercusiones de la pandemia de COVID-19 y de las sanciones sobre las operaciones humanitarias en la República Popular Democrática de Corea. En mayo de 2021, el Grupo hizo una encuesta a 38 organizaciones de las Naciones Unidas y organizaciones no gubernamentales que solicitaron exenciones al Comité del Consejo de Seguridad establecido en virtud de la resolución 1718 (2006), ya sea directa o indirectamente[122] (véase un resumen de las respuestas en los anexos 65 1) a 65 3)).

176. Las organizaciones que respondieron observaron escasa o ninguna mejora en su capacidad para llevar a cabo operaciones de ayuda humanitaria desde que se cerraron las fronteras en enero de 2020[123]. La mayoría de las organizaciones ya no tienen personal en el país y carecen de acceso a la información, lo que hace imposible un seguimiento independiente. La continuidad de las restricciones de movimiento impuestas al poco personal que queda ha debilitado las relaciones con los funcionarios locales. Esta menor transparencia dificulta cada vez más la solicitud de nuevos fondos. Las organizaciones luchan por mantener los gastos generales aunque no se estén ejecutando proyectos.

177. En cuanto a los efectos de las sanciones en la ayuda humanitaria, los principales motivos de preocupación para las organizaciones son los retrasos en la recepción de exenciones; la ausencia de un canal bancario estable, lo que, en última instancia, aumenta los costos y riesgos administrativos; los retrasos en el despacho de aduanas; la menor voluntad de los proveedores extranjeros; el aumento de los costos de los bienes y las operaciones humanitarias; la reducción del riesgo por parte de las instituciones financieras; y la disminución de la financiación para las operaciones. Una organización señaló: “Los conocimientos jurídicos necesarios para comprender la información relacionada con los mecanismos de sanciones y la ausencia de un canal directo para que las ONGI residentes se comuniquen con el Comité de Sanciones del Consejo de Seguridad han resultado, en algunas ocasiones, perjudiciales para otras

[121] Dos expertos opinan que no cabe duda de que las sanciones de las Naciones Unidas han tenido efectos no deseados en la situación humanitaria. Otro experto señala que no hay pruebas que respalden la percepción de que las sanciones han influido en la situación humanitaria de la República Popular Democrática de Corea.

[122] Véase un resumen de las respuestas a la encuesta anterior en S/2021/211, párrs. 173 y 174 y el anexo 99 a).

[123] Según una organización, las medidas impuestas por la República Popular Democrática de Corea han provocado una escasez de producción nacional, lo que en última instancia afecta a la población civil.

tareas y responsabilidades". Los complicados procedimientos aduaneros generan importantes retrasos, aunque las importaciones hayan recibido las exenciones correspondientes. Los proveedores de los grupos de ayuda han dejado de presentar ofertas, argumentando concretamente que el problema son las autoridades aduaneras[124]. Según otra organización, las medidas de "boicot secundario" han impedido las transacciones bancarias para pagar las compras de suministros humanitarios y que los buques entraran en los puertos de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, por lo cual los homólogos de la República Popular Democrática de Corea han renunciado a los proyectos humanitarios destinados al país. Los retrasos en el envío y la logística también se han atribuido al cumplimiento de las sanciones y a la aplicación de las normas aduaneras.

178. El Grupo reconoce la importancia de la ayuda humanitaria mientras el país se recupera de la pandemia y subraya la necesidad de que los Estados Miembros se aseguren de que la ayuda humanitaria al país no encuentre obstáculos, de conformidad con las resoluciones pertinentes. El proceso de exención, que ha mejorado considerablemente desde el inicio de la pandemia, debería agilizarse aún más y hacerse más transparente y fácil de entender.

Recomendaciones

179. **El Grupo hace notar la utilidad de las sesiones informativas semestrales de los organismos competentes de las Naciones Unidas sobre los efectos no deseados de las sanciones y recomienda que el Comité mantenga esa práctica**.

180. **El Grupo reitera la necesidad de tomar medidas urgentes para restablecer el canal bancario**.

181. **El Grupo recomienda que el Consejo de Seguridad siga ocupándose de las cuestiones y los procesos que mitigan los efectos adversos no deseados de las sanciones en la población civil de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y en las operaciones de ayuda humanitaria dirigidas a la población vulnerable de ese país y a superar las consecuencias de la pandemia de COVID-19**.

VII. Informes nacionales sobre la aplicación

Estados Miembros que han presentado informes sobre la aplicación de las resoluciones pertinentes

182. Al 31 de julio de 2021, 66 Estados Miembros habían presentado informes sobre su aplicación de la resolución 2397 (2017); 81 Estados Miembros sobre la resolución 2375 (2017); 95 Estados Miembros sobre la resolución 2371 (2017); 90 Estados Miembros sobre la resolución 2321 (2016); y 107 Estados Miembros sobre la resolución 2270 (2016). Aunque globalmente se presentaron más informes, el Grupo observa que sigue siendo importante el número de Estados que no han presentado informes sobre la aplicación de la resolución 2397 (2017) (127, entre ellos un miembro no permanente del Consejo de Seguridad en 2019).

183. Por otra parte, la tasa de respuesta general de los Estados Miembros a las consultas del Grupo sobre sus investigaciones es inferior al 50 % y la tasa de respuesta de las entidades y los particulares es aún más baja. El Grupo observa que los Estados

[124] Desde 2018, viene aumentando el precio de los bienes para los proyectos humanitarios, a veces hasta un 25 %, lo que termina ejerciendo presión sobre los presupuestos operativos de las organizaciones de ayuda.

Miembros, las entidades y las personas deben acatar las resoluciones pertinentes del Consejo de Seguridad y responder a las indagaciones del Grupo de manera oportuna.

VIII. Recomendaciones

184. En el anexo 66 se incluye una lista consolidada de las recomendaciones.

Annex 1: COVID-19, Democratic People's Republic of Korea border measures

DPRK maintained its COVID-19 blockade imposed in January 2020. Cross-border movement of people and trade remains generally forbidden. Flights and passenger rail services into and out of Pyongyang have been suspended, although there have been media reports of limited border crossing in the reporting period. The diplomatic presence in Pyongyang has continued to shrink as the few remaining missions have repatriated staff; international staff of UN agencies and non-governmental organizations have left the country. DPRK continues to declare to the WHO that the country remains free of the COVID-19 virus.

In the reporting period, DPRK made a number of preparations, in the form of "disinfection centres" built near the border, to resume a measure of cross-border trade in March-April 2021, and there was a small rise in trade figuresat the time. The respite from a total blockade was brief, however, due to resumed fears of COVID-19 variants beyond DPRK's borders and, according to media reports,[1] a "grave incident" relating to COVID-19 protection measures in the country.

Maritime exports of sanctioned commodities continued, at relatively low rates. Similarly, undeclared oil products were imported by sea, but at very low levels compared to previous years.

The DPRK government has held emergency meetings and, unusually, has publicly admitted to an increasing economic crisis and associated food shortages in the country.

DPRK's COVID-19 blockade, which prevents repatriated DPRK nationals from entering their own country, causes practical difficulties for Member States in implementing paragraph 8 of resolution 2397 (2017), even long after the deadline for that action has passed. However, DPRK's blockade also provides an opportunity for DPRK workers overseas to remain there, and to continue to earn wages which are likely to contribute to governmental programmes. The Panel continues to watch closely how Member States have addressed this issue.

Source: The Panel

1. https://www.nknews.org/2021/06/grave-covid-19-incident-in-north-korea-prompts-politburo-meeting-state-media/?t=1634861200262

Annex 2: Light Water Reactor (LWR) - Electrical transformers on the eastern side of the turbine generator



Source: Planet Labs Inc. 23 June 2021

Annex 3: Construction activities in the area south of the LWR






Source: Planet Labs Inc. 23 June 2021

Annex 4: Vehicle activities in the vicinity of 5MW(e)



Source: Planet Labs Inc. 18 April 2021



Source: Planet Labs Inc. 23 June 2021

Annex 5: Radiochemical Laboratory and Coal-fired thermal plant, and signs of chimney smoke



Source: Planet Labs Inc.

Annex 6: Excerpt of IAEA Director General's Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors

The Agency continues to monitor the nuclear programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Since my report to the Board of 3rd of September 2020, some nuclear facilities in the DPRK have continued to operate while others have remained shut down. There are indications consistent with internal construction activities at the experimental light water reactor (LWR). There are no indications of operation at the 5MW(e) nuclear reactor or of the production of enriched uranium at the reported centrifuge enrichment facility at Yongbyon. There are ongoing indications of activity at the Kangson location.

The steam plant that serves the Radiochemical Laboratory has continued to operate since my last Statement to the Board in March. The duration of this operation is consistent with the time required for a reprocessing campaign at the Radiochemical Laboratory. It is not, however, possible to confirm that reprocessing is taking place.


The DPRK's nuclear activities remain a cause for serious concern. The continuation of the DPRK's nuclear programme is a clear violation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions and is deeply regrettable.

I call upon the DPRK to comply fully with its obligations under Security Council resolutions, to cooperate promptly with the Agency in the full and effective implementation of its NPT Safeguards Agreement and to resolve all outstanding issues, especially those that have arisen during the absence of Agency inspectors from the country.

The Agency is intensifying its readiness to play its essential role in verifying the DPRK's nuclear programme.

Source: IAEA, IAEA Director General's Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors (7 June 2021), https://www.iaea.org/iaea-director-generals-introductory-statement-to-the-board-of-governors-7-june-2021**Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.** (Accessed on 11 July 2021)

Annex 7: Yongbyon Centrifuge Plant




Source: Planet Labs Inc. 18 April 2021



Source: Planet Labs Inc. 23 June 2021

Annex 8: Pyongsan Uranium Mine and Concentration Plant



Source: Planet Labs Inc. 13 June, 2021



Source: Planet Labs Inc. March 10, 2021 *Source*: Planet Labs Inc. June 13, 2021

Annex 9: Pyongsan Uranium Mine and Concentration Plant



Source: Planet Labs Inc. 5 April, 2021



Source: Planet Labs Inc./ From top to bottom, 20 April 2021, 19 May 2021, 17 July 2021

Annex 10: Suspected uranium enrichment facility in Kangson



Source: Planet Labs Inc. 5 April, 2021

Annex 11: Suspected nuclear weapons storage facility in Yongdoktong



Source: Google Earth: January 2021



Source: Google Earth: January 2019

Annex 12: Panel's enquiry to the universities listed on Kim Chaek University of Technology website



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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL PANEL OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1874 (2009)

REFERENCE: [redacted]
YOUR REFERENCE

3 June 2021

Dear Sir/Madam,

I am writing to you with regard to ongoing efforts of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) to gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016) and 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017), in particular incidents of non-compliance.

The Panel would like to request information on academic exchanges between [redacted] and the DPRK's Kim Chaek University of Technology (KCUT),. The KCUT website, as of 28 May 2021, lists [redacted] as having "international friendship cooperation" status with KCUT (Annex 1).

The Panel is making enquiries concerning scientific and technical partnerships with DPRK scientists in academic fields covered by the relevant provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (below). The Panel seeks information to assess whether these partnerships have involved joint studies which may have contributed, or continue to contribute, to the development by the DPRK of technologies related to its WMD programme.

Paragraph 17 of resolution 2270 (2016), reinforcing paragraph 28 of resolution 1874 (2009) which called for Member State vigilance, states that "all Member States shall prevent specialized teaching or training of DPRK nationals within their territories or by their nationals of disciplines which could contribute to the DPRK's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including teaching or training in advanced physics, advanced computer simulation and related computer sciences, geospatial navigation, nuclear engineering, aerospace engineering, aeronautical engineering and related disciplines". Furthermore, paragraph 10 of resolution 2321 (2016) clarifies that for the purposes of implementing paragraph 17 of


[redacted]

CC: Permanent Mission of China to the United Nations

resolution 2270 (2016) specialized teaching and training which could contribute to the DPRK's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapons delivery systems includes, but is not limited to, advanced materials science, advanced chemical engineering, advanced mechanical engineering, advanced electrical engineering and advanced industrial engineering.

Moreover, in paragraph 11 of resolution 2321 (2016) the Security Council decided that all Member States shall suspend scientific and technical cooperation involving persons or groups officially sponsored by or representing the DPRK except for medical exchanges unless in specified cases exempted by the 1718 Committee or in all other cases notified in advance to the Committee.

Furthermore, the Panel has concerns that if DPRK scholars have access to the internet, libraries, and exchanges with other scholars, they may use this access to collect proliferation sensitive information which could contribute to the DPRK's WMD and ballistic missile development or the enhancement of its military operational capability. The Panel also has concerns that networks developed during overseas exchange programs may be used to facilitate the transfer of intangible technology applicable to the DPRK's WMD programme.

In addition, paragraph 8 of resolution 2397 (2017) requires all Member States to repatriate to the DPRK all DPRK nationals earning income in their jurisdiction and all DPRK government safety oversight attachés within 24 months from 22 December 2017 and to submit midterm and final reports on repatriation. The Panel notes that paragraph 8 of resolution 2397 (2017) covers all DPRK citizens who are earning income, regardless of work authorization, visa category, and how the payment is labelled.

In connection with the above, and in its effort to gather reliable and verifiable information, the Panel would be grateful for your assistance in providing the following:

1. Information on the current status of [redacted] academic exchange with Kim Chaek University of Technology.

2. The total number of DPRK students who have studied at [redacted] since 2017, as well as the number of current DPRK students. Please specify their degree programs (whether Masters, PhD, post-doctorate researchers, etc.), fields of study and subject of their scientific collaborations, if applicable. Please provide information on any scholarships or sponsorship they have received / are receiving.

3. Confirmation if any DPRK scholars have been affiliated with [redacted] since 2017. If so, please provide the Panel with the following information:

   3-1) A list of the DPRK scholars (name, affiliation, area of research, period of affiliation) as well as copies of documents showing their source(s) of income while in China including sponsorships (if applicable);
   3-2) Information on whether any financial support, such as scholarships, for the DPRK scholars are provided by [redacted]; and

2


3-3) Information regarding any non-financial resources provided by [redacted] including the use of facilities and access to databases and IT.

Paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 2569 (2021) urges all Member States and other interested parties to cooperate fully with the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal. The Panel would welcome any other information that you might consider relevant to this issue.

Given the importance the Panel attaches to this investigation, we would be grateful for any information to be supplied within six weeks of the date of this letter. As the Panel intends to report on these matters in its next report to the Security Council, we would be grateful to receive a timely response to ensure that your reply can be taken into consideration. Please send the reply to the Panel at dppa-poe1874@un.org.

Should you or your designated representative wish to discuss this request or any follow-up matters, please contact the Panel through Mr [redacted] and Mr. [redacted]

Yours Faithfully,



Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Annex 1: Website of Kim Chaek University of Technology

3

Source : The Panel

Annex 13: Table summarizing specific scientific collaboration projects between institutes in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Universities in China

DPRK Institutes	Chinese Universities	Year	Journal or Subject	Title and web reference	Authors
Pyongyang University of Mechanical Engineering	[redacted]	2019	Composites Part B: Engineering Volume 159, 15 February 2019, Pages 418-436	Three-dimensional exact solution for the free vibration of thick functionally graded annular sector plates with arbitrary boundary conditions https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1359836818329238	[redacted]; **Choe, Kwangnam** - Pyongyang Univ Mech Eng, Dept Light Ind Machinery Engn, Pyongyang 999093, DPRK; [redacted]
Institute of Information Technology, University of Sciences, Pyongyang	[redacted]	2019	Composite Structures Volume 209, 1 February 2019, Pages 277-299	A general vibration analysis of functionally graded porous structure elements of revolution with general elastic restraints https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0263822318326035	[redacted] **Sok, Kyongjin** - Univ Sci, Inst Informat Technol, Pyongyang, DPRK; [redacted]

DPRK Institutes	Chinese Universities	Year	Journal or Subject	Title and web reference	Authors
Pyongyang University of Mechanical Engineering; Chongjin Mine & Met Univ	[redacted]	2019	Composite Structures Volume 208, 15 January 2019, Pages 127-140	A modeling method for vibration analysis of cracked laminated composite beam of uniform rectangular cross-section with arbitrary boundary condition https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0263822318325017	**Kim, Kwanghun -** Pyongyang Univ Mech Eng, Dept Eng Machine, Pyongyang 999093, DPRK; **Choe, Kwangnam -** Pyongyang Univ Mech Eng, Dept Light Ind Machinery Eng, Pyongyang 999093, DPRK; **Kim, Sok -** Chongjin Mine & Met Univ, Dept Informat Eng, Chongjin 999091, DPRK; [redacted]
Pyongyang University of Mechanical Engineering	[redacted]	2019	Composite Structures Volume 225, 1 October 2019, 111155	Dynamic analysis of composite laminated doubly-curved revolution shell based on higher order shear deformation theory https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0263822319306919	**Choe, Kwangnam -** Pyongyang Univ Mech Eng, Dept Light Ind Machinery Eng, Pyongyang 999093, DPRK; **Kim, Kwanghun B. -** Pyongyang Univ Mech Eng, Dept Eng Machine, Pyongyang 999093, DPRK; [redacted]
Kim Chaek University of Technology	[redacted]	2019	Composite Structures Volume 224, 15 September 2019, 111040	The effects of coupling mechanisms on the dynamic analysis of composite shaft https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0263822318331763	**Ri, Kwangchol; Choe, Kwangnam** -_Pyongyang Univ Mech Eng, Dept Light Ind Machinery Eng, Pyongyang 999093, DPRK; **Han, Poknam -** Kim Chaek Univ Technol, Coll Ship & Ocean Technol, Pyongyang 999093, DPRK;

DPRK Institutes	Chinese Universities	Year	Journal or Subject	Title and web reference	Authors
					[redacted]
Pyongyang University of Mechanical Engineering	[redacted]	2019	Composites Part B: Engineering Volume 158, 1 February 2019, Pages 55-66	Free vibration analysis of laminated composite elliptic cylinders with general boundary conditions https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1359836818325332	[redacted] **Choe, Kwangnam -** Pyongyang Univ Mech Eng, Dept Light Ind Machinery Eng, Pyongyang 999093, DPRK. [redacted]
Kim Il Sung University	[redacted]	2019	Chemical Engineering Science Volume 207, 2 November 2019, Pages 1017-1029	Optimization of thermo-mechanical properties of shape memory polymer composites based on a network model https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0009250919305846	[redacted] **Yun, Kumchol -** Kim II Sung Univ, Fac Mech, Pyongyang, DPRK

DPRK Institutes	Chinese Universities	Year	Journal or Subject	Title and web reference	Authors
Kim Il Sung University	[redacted]	2019	Materials & Design Volume 181, 5 November 2019, 107926	Investigation of thermodynamic and shape memory properties of alumina nanoparticle-loaded graphene oxide (GO) reinforced nanocomposites https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264127519303648	[redacted] **Yun, Kumchol**; [redacted] **Yun, Kumchol** - Kim II Sung Univ, Fac Mech, Pyongyang 950003, DPRK
Pyongyang University of Mechanical Engineering	[redacted]	2019	Composites Part B: Engineering Volume 159, 15 February 2019, Pages 447-460	A closed form solution for free vibration of orthotropic circular cylindrical shells with general boundary conditions https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S135983681832924X	[redacted] **Choe, Kwangnam,** Pyongyang Univ Mech Eng, Dept Light Ind Machinery Eng, Pyongyang 999093, DPRK; [redacted]

Source : The Panel

Annex 14: Reply from China to the Panel

8. University exchange (OC.162, OC.167-174)

The establishment of friendship with the universities in the DPRK is not prohibited by the Security Council resolutions. The friendly relationship like “sister college” between Chinese and the DPRK universities is not only out of the traditional friendship, but also meets the needs of the people to carry out exchanges and cooperation in culture and education.

China has always been strictly implementing the relevant provisions of the Security Council resolutions and maintaining strict regulation over academic exchanges. There is no prohibited academic exchanges, scientific research cooperation or joint studies between Chinese universities with the DPRK. China hopes that the Panel will work on the basis of the resolutions and the facts, and refrain from expanding the interpretation of the resolutions.

In addition, when investigating relevant cases, the Panel should engage with the Chinese side through the channel of the Chinese Mission to the United Nations, instead of directly sending letters to Chinese universities. China requests that the Panel, as a professional body, does not include the universities in its report to avoid sending any wrong signals.

Source : The Panel

Annex 15: Replies from "Sister University" of Kim Il Sung University

1) Reply from Cuba

[Translation from Spanish]

2102605E.docx 1

Translated from Spanish

Permanent Mission of Cuba to the United Nations

Note No. 85/2021

New York, 24 February 2021

Sir,

Pursuant to the request for information from the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) contained in note No. S/AC.49/2021/PE/OC.15, I have the honour to convey the following information:

A framework cooperation agreement on academic and scientific exchange was signed between Kim Il Sung University in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the University of Havana on 18 July 2014, and remains in effect until 2024. The agreement is fully in line with the relevant Security Council resolutions.

Since the signing of the agreement, no activities have been undertaken between the two universities.

There are no students from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the Registry of Graduates of the University of Havana for the period 2017–2020.

Unrelated to the agreement signed by the two institutions, four nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are currently enrolled in undergraduate studies at the University of Havana. They are studying for bachelor's degrees in law, social communication, English language and tourism, and are relatives of diplomats of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea accredited in Cuba.

[redacted]

Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established

pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009)

Cuba is firmly committed to fulfilling its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and international law and thus strictly complies with Security Council resolutions.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(*Signed*) Pedro Luis **Pedroso Cuesta**

Ambassador

Permanent Representative

Source : The Panel

(Original)



REPUBLICA DE CUBA
Misión Permanente ante las Naciones Unidas
315 Lexington Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

Nota No.85/2021

Nueva York, 24 de Febrero 2021

Estimado [redacted]

Atendiendo a la solicitud de información contenida en la nota S/AC.49/2021/PE/OC.15, del Panel de Expertos establecido en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009) del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas, tenemos a bien trasladar la información siguiente:

La Universidad Kim Il Sung de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y la Universidad de La Habana firmaron un Convenio Marco de Colaboración para el Intercambio Académico y Científico, el 18 de julio de 2014, con vigencia hasta el 2024. Dicho Convenio está en plena correspondencia con las resoluciones pertinentes del Consejo de Seguridad.

Se informa, además, que desde la firma del Convenio Marco de Colaboración para el Intercambio Académico y Científico no se han desarrollado acciones entre ambas Universidades.

En el Registro Histórico de Estudiantes egresados de La Universidad de La Habana, en el período 2017-2020, no figuran estudiantes de la RPDC.

Sr. [redacted]
Coordinador del Panel de Expertos establecido
en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009) del Consejo de Seguridad

En la actualidad, no vinculado al citado Convenio firmado entre ambas instituciones, están matriculados en estudios de pregrado en la Universidad de La Habana cuatro (4) estudiantes nacionales de la RPDC, en las carreras de Licenciatura en Derecho, Comunicación Social, Licenciatura en Lengua Inglesa y Licenciatura en Turismo. Son familiares de diplomáticos de ese país acreditados en Cuba.

Cuba está firmemente comprometida con el cumplimiento de sus obligaciones en virtud de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas y el Derecho Internacional y en ese sentido cumple estrictamente con las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad.

Aprovecho esta ocasión para trasladarle el testimonio de su más alta consideración.



Pedro Luis Pedroso Cuesta
Embajador
Representante Permanente

Source : The Panel

2) Reply from Universitas Indonesia



Kampus Salemba Jl. Salemba Raya No. 4, Jakarta 10430
Kampus Depok Kampus Universitas Indonesia Depok 16424
Tel. 62.21. 7867 222/ 7884 1818 Fax. 62.21. 7884 9060
Email pusadmui@ui.ac.id | www.ui.ac.id

Depok, 22 February 2021

Our Ref. : S - 809 /UN2.SU/OTL.00.01/2021
Subject : Inquiry regarding education cooperation with Kim Il Sung University

[redacted]
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Dear Sir,


1. We have acknowledged the receive of written request from the Panel of Experts (PoE) of the 1874 Sanction Committee with reference numbers of S/AC.49/2020/PE/OC.477 dated 31 December 2020, which was addressed to Universitas Indonesia (UI), requesting information regarding education cooperation with the Kim Il Sung University (KISU).

2. As mentioned in the written request, we would like to inform that there have been **inaccuracies** on the referred university where the correct one should be Universitas Indonesia (UI). Both UI and the Kim Il Sung University (KISU), with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia and according to respective national regulations, have signed a **non-legally binding** and Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) grade Agreement on Educational and Scientific Exchange and Cooperation between KISU and UI ("**the Agreement**"), on 18 March 2015.

3. By its characteristic, the provisions of the Agreement are in general form and stipulate non-binding rights and obligation between the parties, such as implementation plan as well as financing scheme. The scopes of the agreement are limited to joint research and education exchange program; participation in the international symposium, conference, and training organized by the host university; and administrative facilitation, where possible, for the visit of scholars between the two universities.

4. Based on the said scopes, UI and KISU are **not 'sister university'** and, furthermore, **no declaration** has been made from our side in referring such relations between both parties.

5. Under the Agreement, UI and KISU initiated a **socio-cultural program** through a public lecture on North Korean Language and Culture at the Faculty of Cultural Studies of the UI on 17 March 2015. Moreover, the representative of the UI had been participating as a member of delegation of a mission which facilitated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia in May 2015. **Since 2016** until today, **no further program or activities** under the Agreement has been conducted or organized between UI and KISU.



6. Therefore, considering the time of the conclusion of the Agreement in 2015 as well as the scope of the cooperation conducted has been limited to **socio-culture program** and, obviously, **not related** to contribute to the DPRK's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, the education cooperation between UI and KISU **should not be considered as incompliance** against relevant UNSCR, in particular the referred UNSCR 1874 (2009); 2270 (2016); 2321(2016); and 2397 (2017).

7. We would like to reiterate our support to the implementation of relevant UNSC resolutions on DPRK.

Sincerely yours,

[redacted]

CC:

1. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia
2. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations

Source : The Panel

3) Reply from Syria



THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC TO THE UNITED NATIONS
820 Second Ave., 15th Floor, New York, N. Y. 10017
Tel: (212) 661-1313
Fax: (212) 983-4439
E-mail: exesec.syria@gmail.com

PM/2021/ 547

24 February 2021

The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations presents its compliments to The Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) to gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and with reference to Note Verbal No. S/AC.49/2020/PE/OC.476 of 31 December 2020, regarding the request of information on academic exchange between Damascus University and the DPRK's Kim il Sung University,

The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations has the honor to inform you with the following:

- There are four Korean Non Degreed students In the Faculty of Humanities and Arts - Department of English Literature - at Damascus University, and they were accepted under an agreement for scientific cooperation and academic exchange between Damascus University and the DPRK's Kim il Sung University, signed on 04/21/2016.

The agreement includes: exchange of visits for faculty members, exchange of students, publications, scientific documents and scientific research.



- There are four other Korean Non Degreed students, as children of Korean diplomats who are serving at their country's embassy in Damascus, In the Faculty of Humanities and Arts - Department of English Literature - at Damascus University,

The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to The Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) to gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the assurances of its highest esteem and consideration.

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC NEW YORK

Bassam Sabbagh
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

- The Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) to gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

Source : The Panel

4) Reply from Vietnam

[redacted]

From: [redacted]
Sent: Monday, March 8, 2021 7:03 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: FW: Info regarding Hanoi National University

Please register.

From: [redacted]
Sent: Monday, 08 March, 2021 6:53 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: Info regarding Hanoi National University

Dear [redacted]

Ref: Communication S/AC.49/2020/PE/OC.475

We're sorry for this late reply, with which the updated information arrived when PoE Final Report this year was under circulation already:

1. On 1 August 2012, Ha Noi National Universities signed an MoU with Kim Il Sung University.
However, then after, the two Universities did not have any cooperation on education, training, science research, or student and staff exchange.

2. From 2017, Ha Noi National University did not have any cooperation, co-activities, did not receive any teachers, researchers, experts or scientists from the DPRK.
In addition, there was not any sponsorship, finance support, or permit to access to database or information system of Ha Noi National University.

3. Also from 2017, there have been 16 students from DPRK to study in Ha Noi National University, on languages such as Vietnamese, English and Chinese.
These students paid by themselves for their studies.

Sincerely,

[redacted]
Permanent Mission of Viet Nam to the United Nations


1

Source : The Panel

Annex 16: "International Friendship" universities listed on the website of Kim Chaek University

of Technology

Kim Chaek University website



Source: Kim Chaek University of Technology website, ""International Friendship" http://www.kut.edu.kp/index.php/page/index?si=21. (accessed 25 June 2021)

Annex 17: Replies from "International Friendship" universities listed on the website of Kim Chaek University of Technology

1) Reply from Russia on Pacific National University

По информации Тихоокеанского государственного университета, данное высшее учебное заведение не проводит совместных исследований и не осуществляет научно-технического сотрудничества с КНДР в областях, связанных с распространением ОМУ и средств его доставки, а также не имеет трудовых договорных отношений с гражданами КНДР.

Source : The Panel

2) Reply from the University of Trieste (Italy)

Prot. n. 91183 del 06/07/2021

UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI TRIESTE

Rettorato e Direzione Generale
Unità di Staff Comunicazione e Relazioni esterne

Dear
[redacted]
Coordinator of the Panel Established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Subject: your kind request reference S/AC.49/2021/PE/OC.173

Dear [redacted]
in relation to your kind request about the relationships between University of Trieste and the DPRK's Kim Chaek University of Technology we are pleased to inform you as follows:

1. There are no formal relationships between the two universities, by no means of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) nor a Student Exchange Agreement (SEA).
2. We haven't been hosting any student from DPRK, no students are listed in our databases, and we therefore confirm that we have not provided any kind of support to DPRK.
3. The only official contact of a faculty member of the University of Trieste with DPRK was in 2005/2006 when a professor of geographical economy belonging to the Department of Political Sciences received an occasional visa to North Korea, during his research year in Mongolia, and downstream published an article entitled "Interpreting North Korea. Eastern Stalinism and signs of opening to the West" (http://hdl.handle.net/11368/1927488). In any case, this was not related to WMD matters.

Since there are no official relationships, the friendship mentioned in the Kim Chaek University of Technology website, might be probably related to personal relationships of some teachers/researchers (the university of Trieste counts more than 2.000 academic staff) of which we are not aware.

Yours faithfully,
Trieste,

The Rector
[redacted]

Università degli Studi di Trieste
Piazzale Europa, 1
I - 34127 Trieste
www.units.it – [redacted]

[redacted]

Source : The Panel

Annex 18-1: Missile launches by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on 25 March 2021

The reported flight performance noted in paragraph 16 and Table 1 is consistent with the observed features of the newly-tested missile and its new 5-axle wheeled transport erector launcher (TEL) in images[2] published by the DPRK in Rodong Sinmun and KCNA on 26 March 2021 (see figures annex 18-1-1 and annex 18-1-2). This missile and its TEL appear to be the new SRBM and TEL displayed during the Military Parade on 14 January 2021 and identified as a possible modified and enlarged version of the previously displayed and tested SRBM KN-23 (see S/2021/211, para. 18, figure 5 and annexes 11 and 12; S/2020/151, para. 194, Table 3 and annexes 58-1 and 59-1).

Figure Annex 18-1-1: Test launch of the new SRBM – “New-type tactical guided missiles test-fired” (DPRK)

Source: Photographs from Rodong Sinmun – KCNA (from DPRK Central Television) / *Annotation*: The Panel

[2] The DPRK has been shown on some previous launch occasions to modify or falsify photographic images presumably for propaganda purposes.

According to the DPRK authorities the “new-type tactical guided missiles” can carry a warhead of 2.5 tonnes[3]. This could appear to be consistent with analysis of the images published on 14 and 25 March 2021 (see figure annex 18-2). But several Member States assessed that this weight is probably related to the dry mass[4] instead of the warhead weight, which could be less important. According to one Member State, despite this elongated version of KN-23 it is not certain that the new payload could reach 2.5t but it might be loaded with a high explosive “bunker buster” type conventional weapon. While further information is required to reach a conclusion, initial analysis suggests that it would be possible for the SRBM to deliver a nuclear warhead. The Panel has previously noted that the report of the eighth congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea, held in January 2021, declared that DPRK would pursue the development of tactical nuclear weapons (see S/2021/211, para.18). Moreover, according to a Member State, with a lighter payload, the weapon would have a longer range and might qualify as a medium range ballistic missile (MRBM).

Several Member State assess that the range of the 25 March test is around 600 km. The overall shape of the missile suggests that it is built for aerodynamic flight. Its trajectory is semi ballistic with an apogee around 60 km followed by a pull-up maneuver. If the trajectory were a simple parabola, the missile’s range would be 450 km, but with the pull-up maneuver the range would reach 600-620 km.

According to the article and pictures from KCNA[5], Ri Pyong Chol (KPi.076), then a Member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea and Secretary of the Party Central Committee[6], attended the missile launches (see figure annex 18-1-2).


[3] According to a Member State, the weight of the warhead of the missile would be around 1.3 tonnes instead of the 2.7 as announced by the DPRK.

[4] Mass without the solid propellant mass but with the mass of the warhead.

[5] Source: Article “New-type tactical guided missiles test-fired - The Academy of National Defense Science of the Demo-cratic People's Republic of Korea test-fired newly-developed new-type tactical guided missiles on March 25” from KCNA Voice of Korea (EN),26 March 2021, available at https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1616706026-838802969/new-type-tactical-guided-missiles-test-fired/?t=1626294053495

[6] According to media reports, Ri Pyong Chol has subsequently been demoted. https://www.nknews.org/2021/07/top-military-official-confirmed-out-as-kim-jong-un-makes-key-holiday-appearance/

Figure Annex 18-1-2: Comparison between new SRBM (Jan 2021), KN-23 (Jan. 2021, Oct. 2020, May 2019)




Source: Photographs from KCNA, with annotation by the Panel

Annex 18-2: Estimation of the size of the new ICBM, the two new SLBMs (Pukguksong-4 and Pukguksong-5) and the new SRBM:

(*Dimensions are estimated*)


Figure Annex 18-2-1: The new super large ICBM (so far unnamed by the DPRK media)
According to a Member State, the ICBM has a length of 25.8 m; first stage length: 17.3 m; diameter: 2.6-2.9 m; second stage: 4.6 m and the shroud almost of equivalent length. Its mass at take-off would be around 106 tons; mass of first stage around 90 tons (include 84.5 tons of fuel); second stage: 13.3 tons (include 12.2 tons of fuel); shroud: 0.7 tons; payload: 1.7 tons.



Source: Photographs from Rodong Sinmun – KCTV / *Annotation:* The Panel based on a Member State's assessment.


Estimation of the size of the two new SLBMs (Pukguksong-4 and -5)

Figure Annex 18-2-2: The new SLBM Pukguksong-4.



Source: Photographs from Rodong Sinmun – KCTV/ Annotation: The Panel based on a Member State's assessment.


Figure Annex 18-2-3: The new SLBM Pukguksong-5.



Source: Photographs from Rodong Sinmun – KCTV / Annotation: The Panel based on a Member State's assessment.

Estimation of the size the new SRBM

Figure Annex 18-2-4: The new SRBM




Source: Photographs from Rodong Sinmun – KCTV / Annotation: The Panel based on a Member State's assessment.

Annex 19: Activity observed at the Nampo naval shipyard and at the Sinpo south shipyard since February 2021

In November 2020, the submersible missile test stand barge was removed from the secure boat basin (38° 43′ 06″ N 125° 23′ 39″ E) at **Nampo naval shipyard** and relocated in December to a maintenance or construction area 300m away (38° 43′ 08″ N 125° 23′ 28″ E) where it is mounted on a temporary static trolley on rails. (see Figure annex 19-S/2021/211 para. 23, annex 15).

Regular satellite imagery observation of the submersible missile test stand barge at **Nampo naval shipyard** showed that it seemed to have not been moved from its new location (38° 43′ 08″ N 125° 23′ 28″ E) from December 2020 to June 2021. Potential work on the submersible barge could be related to its maintenance or upgrading for the launch of new SLBMs.

Figure Annex 19-1: Submersible missile test stand barge in Nampo undergoing repair or modernisation 300 m away (38° 43′ 08″ N 125° 23′ 28″ E) from the Secure boat basin (38° 43′ 06″ N 125° 23′ 39″ E)



Source: Planet Labs Inc. June 11, 2021, 05 58 UTC; April 28, 2021, 05 12 UTC; December 20, 2020 05 12 UTC

The activity related to the ballistic missile submarine programme continued from March to June 2021 at the **Sinpo south shipyard**, through regular moves of the floating drydock (length 50 m width 12m) (see S/2017/150, para.47 Annex 5-1) as well as the regular movements of another barge (30m x10m) from its initial location to a berth along the new dock at the front of the entrance of the new construction hall, and back again.

Between 17 March and 24 March 2021, the floating drydock (length 50 m width 12m) (see S/2017/150, para.47, Annex 5-13) has moved from the pier (40° 01′ 08″ N 128° 09′ 51″ E) where it was berthed between Dec 2014-Aug 2015 and again between Dec 2015-Mar 2021, to the southwest side of the dock (40° 01′ 20″ N 128° 09′ 47″ E) (see S/2020/151, annex. 60; S/2020/840, para.12; S/2021/211, para.23, annex 15, figure 15-5). This dock is at the front of the entrance of the new construction hall and is dedicated to the launch of the new ballistic missile submarine currently under construction in the hall.

Between 24 March and 30 March, a barge (30m x10m) reached the northeast side of the dock (40° 01′ 21″ N 128° 09′ 50″ E, see figure annex 19-2).

Between 13 April and 9 May the submersible drydock (length 50 m width 12m) stayed at its initial location (40° 01′ 08″ N 128° 09′ 51″ E) along the pier.

From 10 May to 19-24 May the floating drydock (length 50 m width 12m) has moved again from the pier (40° 01′ 08″ N 128° 09′ 51″ E) to the southwest side of the dock (40° 01′ 20″ N 128° 09′ 47″ E) at the front of the entrance of the construction hall (see figure annex 19-3).

Figure Annex 19-2: From March to April 2021, the floating drydock (length 50m width 12m) and a barge (30m x 10m) have regularly moved from their initial location to a berth along the new dock in front of the new construction hall and vice versa



Source: Planet Labs Inc. March 17, 2021; 08 35 UTC – March 24, 2021; 04 55 UTC - March 30, 2021 03 44 UTC - May 9, 2021; 00 46 UTC - May 24, 2021 01 17 UTC - June 7, 2021; 01 55 UTC

Figure Annex 19-3: From April to June 2021, the floating drydock (length 50m width 12m) and a barge (30m x 10m) have regularly moved from their initial location to a berth along the new dock in front of the new construction hall and vice versa



Source: Planet Labs Inc. March 17, 2021; 08 35 UTC – March 24, 2021; 04 55 UTC - March 30, 2021 03 44 UTC - May 9, 2021; 00 46 UTC - May 24, 2021 01 17 UTC - June 7, 2021; 01 55 UTC

Annex 20: Developments at the Pyongsong March 16 factory automotive plant (South Pyongan)

The upgrading of the Pyongsong March 16 Factory automotive plant in Pyongsong (see S/2021/211, para.15, and S/2020/151, para. 198) has continued. The renovation of the western building has continued while the activity of large vehicles continues to be detected (see Figure annex 20-1 and see S/2021/211, para.15, annex 11).

The new construction (Picture: area -1-, 39° 16′ 54″ N 125° 52′ 24″ E) is completed (See S/2021/211, annex 11, figure 11). The renovation of the western building (picture: area -2-, 39° 16′ 52″ N 125° 51′ 58″ E) has continued as well as the earthworks (picture: area -3-, 39° 16′ 51″ N 125° 51′ 52″ E) to probably widen the peripherical track.

The movements of a possible heavy-lift crane with a telescopic boom could be observed on satellite imagery up to 8 November 2020 (see area -4-, 39°16'56.66"N 125°51'39.76"E) in front of a semi-underground vehicle maintenance and storage facility (at 800 m westwards from the building where the Hwasong-15 was assembled in 2017 before the ICBM test launch on 29 November 2017).

Figure Annex 20-1: Activity in Pyongsong March 16 factory automotive plant



Source: Google Earth November 8, 2020 and Planet Labs Inc April 5, 2021 01 57 UTC and June 5, 2021 08 18 UTC


Annex 21: Developments at Kusong tank factory (No. 95 Factory, see S/2021/211, annex 13) and at No. 112 Factory

The overall modernization of the Kusong tank factory (No. 95 Factory) in charge of BM TEL production has continued in the first half of 2021. A new building is also under construction near No. 112 Factory since 2020 where a IRBM Hwasong-12 was launched on 14 May 2017. It marks the trend, already reported, that the infrastructure development of the BM programme continues (see in the report S/2021/211 para.21 annex 13).

A massive range of construction activity is currently underway since August 2020: at the south-west of the complex (40° 03′ 23″ N 125° 13′ 20″ E) and at the northeast (40° 03′ 50″ N 125° 13′ 57″ E) of the "**Kusong Tank Factory**" (aka "Kusong-Taegwan" , "Tank Plant - 95 Factory", "No. 95 Factory"), (see figure annex 21-1) the two areas delimited by dotted yellow lines).

Since 2020, a building has also been under construction at **Plant No. 112** where an IRBM Hwa-song-12 was launched on 14 May 2017. The Plant No. 112 is located less than 3 km west of Plant No. 95 (40° 04′ 07″ N 125° 11′ 52″ E, see figure annex 21-2 areas delimited by dotted yellow lines).

Figure Annex 21-1: The "Kusong tank factory" renovation continues in the first half of 2021



Source: Planet Labs Inc. June 19, 2021 01 37 UTC; February 2, 2021, 08 09 UTC

Figure Annex 21-2: A building under construction in Factory No. 112

Source: Planet Labs Inc. Dec. 4, 2020, 02 56 UTC; Dec. 5, 2020, 02 58 UTC; Feb. 2, 2021, 08 09 UTC

Annex 22: At the Sanum Dong scientific and ballistic missile research complex the canopy and construction were removed from Feb to March 2021

Figure Annex 22: The canopy (length around 50 m width around 6 m, location: 39° 8'29.70"N 125°45'58.96"E, erected between 29 February and 5 March 2020 (see S/2020/840 para.14, annex 10)) has been removed since the beginning of 2021.



Source: Planet Labs Inc. April 5, 2021 01 57 UTC

Annex 23: At the Sinpo south shipyard resumption of the construction of the pier located in front of the buried submarine shelter

The resumption of the construction of the pier (waterbreak/quay, 40° 00′ 32″ N 128° 08′ 50″ E) located in front of the buried submarine shelter has been underway since early May 2021, whereas the construction of this shelter itself still seems to be slowed down (40° 0'42.23"N 128° 8'51.60"E ; see S/2021/211, annex 15, Figure 15-1, and S/2020/151, annex 61, figure 61-2, 61-3, and S/2017/150, annex 5-12, 5-13). Support barges and equipment were detected along the pier which is made up of assembled concrete caissons.

Figure Annex 23: Resumption of the construction (or renovation) of the jetty (breakwater/ quay) in the first half of 2021 while the construction of the buried shelter still seems to have slowed down



Source: Planet Labs Inc. May 9, 2021 00 46 UTC; June 27, 2021 O5 44 UTC

Annex 24: At the Sinpo south shipyard, new buildings are currently under construction at the static test stand area.

In addition of the various submersible barge activity (see figure annex 19-2) in the area between the secure boat basin and the new submarine construction hall in the Sinpo south shipyard, new buildings are under construction near the missile engine test infrastructure since February 2021 (see figure annex 23 and 24).

Figure Annex 24: The construction of the new buildings (40° 01′ 08″ N 128° 09′ 27″ E) in the area of the engine test stand (40° 01′ 05″ N 128° 09′ 25″ E) has continued from February to May 2021.



Source: Planet Labs Inc. May 9, 2021 00 46 UTC, March 30, 2021 0344 UTC; Feb 10, 2021 01 51 UTC

Annex 25: January 18th Factory: possible engine test stand (westside)

The January 18 General Machinery Factory (aka January 18th Factory located 39°33'19.88"N 125°51'20.23"E) was reported to be involved in the manufacture of Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) (see S/2020/151 annex 67). The new design and implementation of a Flexible Manufacturing System (FMS) were implemented there too. The identification of a possible horizontal missile engine test stand (see figure annex 25) could support the assessment that the factory is also involved in the manufacture of ballistic missiles. The analysis of the Panel corroborates a recent think tank[7] assessment.

Figure Annex 25: At Kaechon January 18th Factory, a possible horizontal engine test stand (39° 33′ 09″ N 125° 50′ 20″ E)



Source: Planet Labs Inc. May 22, 2021 02 23 UTC, Google Earth March 20, 2020; Sept. 9, 2017; Sept. 19, 2014

[7] A “Arms Control Wonk” report on 26 May 2021 provided analysis that characterized the site of “the January 18th Factory” as rocket engine production site due to past information and a probable horizontal missile engine test stand see “The Stands they are a Changin”, 26 May 2021, available at https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1211934/the-stands-they-are-a-changin/

Annex 26: Ballistic Missile bases and specific airbase infrastructure activity

Through satellite imagery, the Panel continued to observe work on the infrastructure of ballistic missile operating bases such as “Hoejung-ri missile base” (see figure annex 26-1), “Kumchon-ri missile Base”) (see figure annex 26-2 and a think tank report[8]) and Sangnam-ri Missile operating base (see S/2020/840, para. 13, annex 9, figure 3-4-6) (see figure annex 26-3) as well as airbases such as “Sunchon airbase” (see figure annex 26-4) previously used for BM launch tests. According to a Member State, deception measures are continuously updated at the BM base through the use of underground galleries, bunkers, semi-buried drive-throughs (for refueling the ICBM and MR/IRBM) and various means of concealment and camouflage (see figure annex 26-2) (see the previous report on that issue S/2021/211, para.24, annex 16-18, and S/2020/840 para.13 annex 9).

New launch pads are built in the immediate vicinity of the entrances to the underground galleries where the BM systems are stored. In this context, according to the Member State, the current trend is to use smaller, dispersed galleries with their own camouflaged launch pad. (see figure annex 26-2) In Kumchon-ri missile Base, where the new generation of the solid propellant SRBM such as the KN-23 could be deployed, manual activity and building construction were detected. The same analysis could be made of the activity at the Sangnam-ri Missile operating base (40°50'7.46"N 128°32'47.42"E).


This assessment is consistent with the assessment of another Member State that the DPRK is capable of launch from any place and at any time. So that, the DPRK appears to be seeking to improve its ability to conduct surprise attacks by enhancing secrecy and rapid deployability to make it difficult to detect signs of a launch.

[8] The Center for Strategic and International Studies-Beyond Parallel (CSIS) report on 6 September 2019 provided analysis that characterized the site of the “Kumchon-ni Missile Operating Base” as an MRBM missiles base (see “Undeclared North Korea: The Kumchon-ni Missile Operating Base 6 September 2019, available at https://beyondparallel.csis.org/undeclared-north-korea-the-kumchon-ni-missile-operating-base/)

Activity in "Hoejung-ri missile base" (41°22'44.93"N 126°54'38.16"E)


(see S/2021/211 Para.24 Annex 18) In front of the massive underground facility, the access road and a stabilised platform (10m x 10m) have been built (41°21'56.37"N 126°55'41.91"E). A TEL could easily reach this potential launch platform to fire its missile. According to a Member State, for several months the DPRK has been consolidating stabilised platforms located close to the entrances of the underground galleries where the TELs and BMs are stored, allowing them rapidly to reach this new area for use as a launch pad.

Figure Annex 26-1: The stabilisation of a potential TEL launch pad and delimitation of the access way to the underground entrance, continued from March to June 2021 at the "Hoejung-ri missile base"



Source: Planet Labs Inc. June 21, 2021, 05 15 UTC; June 18, 2021 08 53 UTC; May 17, 2021 05 17 UTC

Figure Annex 26-2: Kumchon-ri Missile Operating Base activity (38°57'52.48"N 127°35'11.98"E) concealment and stabilisation of the potential launch pad close to three underground gallery entrances which are located along the valley at 1st SW 38° 57′ 58″ N 127° 36′ 07″ E – 2nd Middle 38° 57′ 58″ N 127° 36′ 11″ E – 3rd NE 38° 58′ 00″ N 127° 36′ 17″ E



Source: Planet June 04, 2021, 04 57 UTC; January 17, 2021 UTC

Figure Annex 26-3: Sangnam-ri Missile operating base (40°50'7.46"N 128°32'47.42"E)[9]. Concealment and stabilisation of the potential 2 launch pads (at NW 40° 49′ 45″ N 128° 33′ 08″ E, SE 40° 49′ 42″ N 128° 33′ 10″ E) close to underground gallery entrance (at NW 40° 49′ 44″ N 128° 33′ 08″ E and at SE 40° 49′ 43″ N 128° 33′ 09″ E)



Source: Planet Labs Inc. June 8, 2021 00 08 UTC, January 17, 2021 02 09 UTC, Google Earth October 28 2015

[9] See also the CSIS report “Undeclared North Korea: The Sangnam-ni Missile Operating Base”, 15 February 2019, available at https://beyondparallel.csis.org/undeclared-north-korea-sangnam-ni-missile-operating-base/

Infrastructure activity in the Sunchon airbase from April to June 2021

A massive upgrade of Sunchon airbase is under way. Usually the most modern fighters of the DPRK are based on this site (See figure annex 26-4 on 28 November 2019) but this airbase was also used as a launch site for new SRBM KN-25 mobile launches test (launch pad location: 39°24′48″ N, 125°53′18″ E, flight range 370 km, altitude 90 km) on 31 October 2019 (see red dot “L” on Figure below and S/2020/840 para.194 table 3 and annex 7).[10]

Since April 2021, a massive plan of renovation work involving the construction of additional runway area (creation of a concrete surface as apron 260 m x 70 m at NW: 39° 25′ 00″ N 125° 53′ 26″ E, at SE: 39° 24′ 36″ N 125° 53′ 48″ E and 344 m expansion south-eastwards of the runway 39° 24′ 07″ N 125° 54′ 01″ E) has been underway (See figure annex 26-4).

[10] See also the recent CSIS report “North Korea Upgrades Sunchon Airbase”, 24 June 2021, available at https://beyondparallel.csis.org/north-korea-upgrades-sunchon-airbase/

Figure Annex 26-4: Massive expansion and refurbishment works at Sunchon Airbase since April 2021



Source: Planet Labs Inc June 5, 2021 08 18 UTC, February 24, 2021 02 29 UTC, Google Earth November 28, 2019

Annex 27: Procurement of illicit and WMD related commodities through Mr. Kim Jong Dok's network

Specifications of goods ordered by KMGT with third country-based companies (Member State Information)

According to a Member State, below is the list of goods (in Korean) contained in four orders by KMGT (January~February 2021) regarding possible "choke-point" items for DPRK's nuclear and ballistic programmes:

January 2021 :

No	품명	규격	수량	단위	비고
1	저탄망간철	Mn≧75%,C≦0.5%,Si≦2%,P≦0.03,립도50㎜	0.24	t	
2	환강	강45,Φ155 ㎜	11.85	t	80m
3	환강	강35, Φ130㎜	2.5	t	24m
4	환강	강3, Φ50㎜	4.07	t	264m
5	환강	강3, Φ80㎜	2.53	t	64m
6	환강	강3, Φ225㎜	3.74	t	12m
7	불수환강	1Cr18Ni9Ti, Φ30㎜	155	kg	28m
8	불수환강	1Cr18Ni9Ti, Φ65㎜	4.58	t	176m
9	불수환강	1Cr18Ni9Ti, Φ630㎜	652	kg	2m
10	환강	65Mn, Φ35㎜	60	kg	8m
11	강판	강3,≠8㎜	5.77	t	92㎡
12	강판	강3,≠20㎜	8.79	t	56㎡
13	불수강판	1Cr18Ni9Ti,≠4㎜	11	t	352㎡
14	불수강판	1Cr18Ni9Ti, ≠10㎜	11.3	t	144㎡
15	불수강판	1Cr18Ni9Ti, ,≠20㎜	2.5	t	16㎡
16	ㄷ형강	강3,ㄷ120*100*5㎜	1	t	88m
17	ㄴ형강	강3,ㄴ75*5㎜	1.76	t	304m
18	ㄴ형강	강3,ㄴ150*10㎜	1.29	t	560m
19	인발강관	강3,Φ62*6㎜	0.53	t	64m
20	인발강관	강3,Φ150*10㎜	0.69	t	20m
21	인발강관	1Cr18Ni9Ti, Φ30*3㎜	0.6	t	304m
22	인발강관	1Cr18Ni9Ti, Φ100*4㎜	0.27	t	28m
23	용접봉	J422,Φ4㎜	1.04	t	
24	불수강용접봉	A022, Φ4㎜	0.64	t	
25	진공변(자동변)	D671F-16,P:1.6㎫,DN:30㎜ ,남경미월변유한공사(南京美悦阀门有限公司)제품임,구체적인 기술적특성과 사진자료요구	16	개	
26	진공변(자동변)	D671F-16,P:1.6㎫,DN:75㎜ ,남경미월변유한공사(南京美悦阀门有限公司)제품임,구체적인 기술적특성과 사진자료요구	32	개	
27	공기압축기	배기:1㎥/분,압력0.9Mpa,3상,380V/50Hz,이동식,사진자료요구	7	대	
28	내산성뽐프	2㎥/h,양정높이10m, 전동기포함	8	대	
29	가정용물뽐프	4㎥/h,양정높이10m,압력0.1㎫ 단상220V,전동기포함	7	대	
30	물려과기	4㎥/h	8	대	
31	진공압력계	압력0.1㎫,사진자료요구	7	개	
32	고압호수	Φ22*3*1400㎜,압력:0.1㎫,(참고:강선이 있어야함,호수가 쭈그러들지 말아야 [illegible]	11.2	m	8개

33	고압호수	φ22*4.5*6000㎜,압력:0.1㎫ ,고무관,사진자료요구	48	m	8개
34	고압호수	φ38*4*17400㎜,압력:0.1㎫,(참고:강선이 있어야함,호수가 쭈그러들지 말아야 함.사진자료요구)	139.2	m	8개
35	고압호수	φ85*5*5000㎜,압력:0.1㎫,(참고:강선이 있어야함,호수가 쭈그러들지 말아야 함.사진자료요구)	40	m	8개
36	고압호수	φ110*6*4500㎜,압력:0.1㎫,(참고:강선이 있어야함,호수가 쭈그러들지 말아야 함.사진자료요구)	36	m	8개
37	조임띠	불수강Φ22	64	개	
38	조임띠	불수강Φ38	288	개	
39	조임띠	불수강Φ85	64	개	
40	조임띠	불수강Φ110	48	개	
41	웜감속기	웜감200-32-Ⅱ	8	대	
42	원추로라베아링	7315(d75,D160,B37,T40㎜)	16	개	
43	원추로라베아링	7312(d60,D130,B31,T33.5㎜)	16	개	
44	볼트,나트조	불수강,M12*85㎜,용수자리쇠포함	120	조	
45	볼트	불수강,M12*20㎜,용수자리쇠포함	120	개	

February 2021 :

No	품명	규격	수량	단위
1	저탄망간철	Mn≧75%,C≦0.5%,Si≦2%,P≦0.03%,립도50㎜	0.24	t
2	환강	45강,Φ35㎜	1.3	t
3	환강	45강, Φ55㎜	1.4	t
4	환강	45강, Φ80㎜	1.9	t
5	환강	45강, Φ90㎜	1.5	t
6	환강	45강, Φ125㎜	1.15	t
7	환강	45강, Φ155㎜	3	t
8	환강	45강, Φ225㎜	1.25	t
9	내열내산환강	1Cr18Ni9Ti, Φ22㎜	0.5	t
10	내열내산환강	1Cr18Ni9Ti, Φ40㎜	0.85	t
11	합금환강	65Mn, Φ35㎜	0.06	t
12	강판	강3,≠.4㎜	0.3	t
13	강판	강3,≠.8㎜	7.13	t
14	강판	강3,≠.16㎜	1.7	t
15	강판	강3,≠19.5㎜	3	t
16	내열내산강판	1Cr18Ni9Ti,≠4㎜	7.6	t
17	내열내산강판	1Cr18Ni9Ti,≠5㎜	2	t
18	내열내산강판	1Cr18Ni9Ti, ≠8㎜	4.2	t
19	내열내산강판	1Cr18Ni9Ti, ,≠10㎜	0.8	t
20	구형강	강3,⊏120*100*120*5㎜	1	t
21	산형강	강3,∟75*75*5㎜	1.7	t

22	산형강	강3, ㄴ100*100*8㎜	2.8	t
23	산형강	강3, ㄴ140*140*10㎜	5.7	t
24	인발관	강3, Φ63*4㎜	0.4	t
25	인발관	강3, Φ150*10㎜	0.5	t
26	내열내산인발관	1Cr18Ni9Ti, Φ32*3㎜	0.35	t
27	내열내산인발관	1Cr18Ni9Ti, Φ108*4㎜	0.16	t
28	사불화수지봉	Φ220*5000㎜	45	kg
29	용접봉	J422, Φ4㎜	0.8	t
30	불수강용접봉	A102, Φ4㎜	0.48	t
31	원추로라베아링	7315(d75,D160,B37,T40㎜)	16	개
32	원추로라베아링	7312(d60,D130,B31,T33.5㎜)	16	개
33	웜감속기	NMRV200-4-32,AB형,60Hz (전동기포함,축간거리200㎜,전동기출력4 ㎾,감속비32) (참고: 축간거리200,감속비 32,AB형이 기준요구임)	8	대
34	자동발브	D671F-16,P:1.6㎫,DN:40 ㎜,매질:공기,매질:공기(공기에 의하여 열리고 닫겨야 함)	16	개
35	자동발브	D671F-16,P:1.6㎫,DN:80㎜, 매질:공기(공기에 의하여 열리고 닫겨야 함)	32	개
36	고압호스	ϕ22*3*1400㎜,압력:0.1㎫,(강선이 있는 투명비닐관으로써 흡입시 쭈그러들지말것)	8	개
37	고압호스	ϕ22*4.5*6000㎜,압력:0.1㎫,고무관	8	개
38	고압호스	ϕ38*4*17400㎜,압력:0.1㎫,(강선이 있는 투명비닐관으로써 흡입시 쭈그러들지말것)	8	개
39	고압호스	ϕ85*5*5000㎜,압력:0.1㎫, (강선이 있는 투명비닐관으로써 흡입시 쭈그러들지말것)	8	개
40	고압호스	ϕ110*6*4500㎜,압력:0.1㎫, (강선이 있는 투명비닐관으로써 흡입시 쭈그러들지말것)	8	개
41	내산뽐프	耐酸的, 2㎥/h,양정높이5m, 전동기포함,내산성(매질이 초산 또는 질산)	8	대
42	물뽐프	4㎥/h,양정높이10m,압력0.1㎫ 단상220V,전동기포함	8	대
43	물려과기	4㎥/h,Φ100*500㎜정도 임,물뽐프에서 려과된 물이 음료수정도이여야 함.	8	대
44	공기압축기	배기량:0.9㎥/min, 압력0.9Mpa,3상,380V/50Hz,이동식	8	대
45	유면계	Φ20*3-380㎜, 유기유리	8	개

46	[illegible]	압력0.1MPa	8	개
47	관조임띠	불수강Φ22	64	개
48	관조임띠	불수강Φ38	384	개
49	관조임띠	불수강Φ85	64	개
50	관조임띠	불수강Φ110	48	개
51	볼트,나트조	불수강,M12*85mm,용수자리쇠포함	960	조
52	볼트	불수강,M12*20mm,용수자리쇠포함	960	개
53	규소강판	50w470,두께0.5mm,너비1200mm,무방향성, 전동기생산용	3.5	t
54	케블지	두께0.08mm*C,전동기생산용	0.35	t
55	케블지	두께0.05mm*C,전동기생산용	0.28	t
56	폴리에스테르박막	두께 0.05mm,	0.3	t
57	볼베아링	6314(d70mm,D150mm,B35mm)	8	개
58	원통로라베아링	N314(d70mm,D150mm,B35mm,분리형)	8	개
59	알루미늄괴	99.6%	0.2	t

March 2021 :

No	품명	규격	수량	단위	단가	금액
1	저탄망간철	Mn≥75%,C≤0.5%,Si≤2%, P≤0.03%,립도50mm	0.24	t		
2	환강	45강, Φ35mm	1.3	t		
3	환강	45강, Φ55mm	1.4	t		
4	환강	45강, Φ80mm	1.9	t		
5	환강	45강, Φ90mm	1.5	t		
6	환강	45강, Φ125mm	1.15	t		
7	환강	45강, Φ155mm	3	t		
8	환강	45강, Φ225mm	1.25	t		
9	내열내산환강	1Cr18Ni9Ti Φ22mm	0.5	t		
10	내열내산환강	1Cr18Ni9Ti, Φ40mm	0.85	t		
11	합금환강	65Mn, Φ35mm	0.06	t		
12	강판	강3, ≠.4mm	0.3	t		
13	강판	강3, ≠.8mm	7.13	t		
14	강판	강3, ≠.16mm	1.7	t		
15	강판	강3, ≠19.5mm	3	t		
16	내열내산강판	1Cr18Ni9Ti, ≠4mm	7.6	t		
17	내열내산강판	1Cr18Ni9Ti, ≠5mm	2	t		
18	내열내산강판	1Cr18Ni9Ti, ≠8mm	4.2	t		
19	내열내산강판	1Cr18Ni9Ti, ,≠10mm	0.8	t		
20	구형강	강3,ㄷ120*100*120*5mm	1	t		
21	산형강	강3,ㄴ75*75*5mm	1.7	t		
22	산형강	강3,ㄴ100*100*8mm	2.8	t		
23	산형강	강3,ㄴ140*140*10mm	5.7	t		
24	인발관	강3,Φ63*4mm	0.4	t		
25	인발관	강3,Φ150*10mm	0.5	t		
26	내열내산인발관	1Cr18Ni9Ti, Φ32*3mm	0.35	t		
27	내열내산인발관	1Cr18Ni9Ti, Φ108*4mm	0.16	t		

28	[illegible]	Φ220*5000㎜	45	kg		
29	용접봉	J422, Φ4㎜	0.8	t		
30	불수강용접봉	A102, Φ4㎜	0.48	t		
31	원추로라베아링	7315(d75,D160,B37,T40㎜)	16	개		
32	원추로라베아링	7312(d60,D130,B31,T33.5㎜)	16	개		
33	웜감속기	NMRV200-4-32,AB형,60Hz (전동기포함,축간거리200 ㎜,전동기출력4kW,감속비32) (참고: 축간거리200,감속비 32,AB형이 기준요구임)	8	대		
34	자동발브蝶阀	P:1.6㎫,DN:40㎜,	16	개		
35	자동발브蝶阀	P:1.6㎫,DN:80㎜,	32	개		
34-1	자동발브 气动法兰式蝶阀	P:1.6㎫,DN:40㎜,	16	개		
35-2	자동발브 气动法兰式蝶阀	P:1.6㎫,DN:80㎜,	32	개		
36	고압호스	φ22*3*1400㎜,압력:0.1㎫,(강선이 있는 투명비닐관으로써 흡입시 쭈그러들지말것)	8	개		
37	고압호스高压软管	외경φ22,내경φ13*두께4.5*6000mm, 압력:0.1㎫,고무관	8	개		
38	고압호스	φ38*4*17400㎜,압력:0.1㎫,(강선이 있는 투명비닐관으르써 흡입시 쭈그러들지말것)	8	개		
39	고압호스	φ85*5*5000㎜,압력:0.1㎫, (강선이 있는 투명비닐관으로써 흡입시 쭈그러들지말것)	8	개		
40	고압호스	φ110*6*4500㎜,압력:0.1㎫, (강선이 있는 투명비닐관으로써 흡입시 쭈그러들지말것)	8	개		
41	내산뽐프酸泵	耐酸的, 2㎥/h,양정높이5m, 전동기포함,내산성(매질이 초산 또는 질산)	8	대		
42	물뽐프	4㎥/h,양정높이10m,압력0.1㎫ 단상220V,전동기포함	8	대		
43	물려과기	4㎥/h, Φ100*500㎜정도 임,물뽐프에서 려파된 물이 음료수정도이여야 함.	8	대		
44	공기압축기	배기량:0.9㎥/min, 압력0.9Mpa,3상,380V/50Hz,이동식	8	대		
45	유면계	Φ20*3-380㎜, 유기유리	8	개		
46	진공계	압력0.1㎫	8	개		
46-1	진공계耐震压力	압력0.1㎫	8	개		
47	관조임띠	불수강Φ22	64	개		
48	관조임띠	불수강Φ38	384	개		
49	관조임띠	불수강Φ85	64	개		
50	관조임띠	불수강Φ110	48	개		
51	볼트,나트조	불수강,M12*85㎜,용수자리쇠포함	960	조		
52	볼트	불수강,M12*20㎜,용수자리쇠포함	960	개		
53	규소강판	50w470,두께0.5㎜,너비1200㎜ ,무방향성, 전동기생산용	3.5	t		
54	케블지	두께0.08㎜*C,전동기생산용	0.35	t		
[illegible]	[illegible]	두께0.05㎜*C,전동기생산용	0.28	t		

[illegible]	[illegible]	두께 0.05㎜,	0.3	t		
57	볼베아링	6314(d70㎜,D150㎜,B35㎜)	8	개		
58	원통로라베아링	N314(d70㎜,D150㎜,B35㎜,분리형)	8	개		
59	알루미늄괴	99.6%	0.2	t		

April 2021 :

번호	품명	규격	수량	단위	단가
1	저탄망간철	Mn≧75%,C≦0.5%,Si≦2%, P≦0.03%,립도50㎜,GB/T 3795-1996	0.24	t	2160
2	환강	45강,Φ35㎜ ,GB/T699-1999	1.3	t	1185
3	환강	45강, Φ55㎜	1.4	t	910
4	환강	45강, Φ80㎜	1.9	t	1230
5	환강	45강, Φ90㎜	1.5	t	955
6	환강	45강, Φ125㎜	1.15	t	955
7	환강	45강, Φ155㎜	3	t	1275
8	환강	45강, Φ225㎜	1.25	t	1320
9	내열내산환강	1Cr18Ni9Ti,Φ22㎜,SUS304	0.5	t	3165
10	내열내산환강	1Cr18Ni9Ti,Φ40㎜,SUS304	0.85	t	3125
11	합금환강	65Mn,φ6mm ,GB/T 13304	0.07	t	1215
12	강판	강3,≠.4㎜ ,Q235	0.3	t	1165
13	강판	강3,≠.8㎜ ,Q235	7.13	t	1165
14	강판	강3,≠.16㎜,Q235	1.7	t	1150
15	강판	강3,≠19.5㎜,Q235	3	t	1150
16	내열내산강판	1Cr18Ni9Ti,≠4㎜ ,SUS304	7.6	t	3110
17	내열내산강판	1Cr18Ni9Ti,≠5㎜,SUS304	2	t	3110
18	내열내산강판	1Cr18Ni9Ti, ≠8㎜,SUS304	4.2	t	3110
19	내열내산강판	1Cr18Ni9Ti, ,≠10㎜,SUS304	0.8	t	3110
20	구형강	강3,ㄷ120*100*120*5㎜,Q235	1	t	1150
21	산형강	강3,ㄴ75*75*5㎜,Q235	1.7	t	1110
22	산형강	강3,ㄴ100*100*8㎜,Q235	2.8	t	1110
23	산형강	강3,ㄴ140*140*10㎜,Q235	5.7	t	1135
24	인발관	강3,Φ63*4㎜,Q235	0.4	t	1230
25	인발관	강3,Φ150*10㎜,Q235	0.5	t	1210
26	내열내산인발관	1Cr18Ni9Ti,Φ32*3㎜,SUS304	0.5	t	3325
27	내열내산인발관	1Cr18Ni9Ti,Φ108*4㎜,SUS304	0.16	t	3265
28	사불화수지봉	Φ220*5000㎜	0.045	t	
29	용접봉	J422,Φ4㎜	0.8	t	1160
30	불수강용접봉	A102, Φ4㎜	0.48	t	3375
31	원추로라베아링	7315(d75,D160,B37,T40㎜), 30315	16	개	23
32	원추로라베아링	7312(d60,D130,B31,T33.5㎜), 30312	16	개	10
33	감속기 (전동기포함)	NMRV-40-AB-B8-4KW-B3, 감속비 32,전동기4KW포함	8	대	450

34	자동발브	Q641F-16P, P:1.6MPa,DN:40mm, 공기기동식	16	개	210
35	자동발브	Q641F-16P,P:1.6MPa,DN:80mm, 공기기동식	32	개	336
36	고압호스	ф22*3*1400mm,압력:0.1MPa, (강선이 있는 투명비닐관으로써 흡입시 쭈그러들지말것)	8	개	1.3
37	고압호스	외경ф22,내경ф13*두께 4.5*6000mm,압력:0.1MPa,고무관	8	개	1.08
38	고압호스	ф38*4*17400mm,압력:0.1MPa, (강선이 있는 투명비닐관으로써 흡입시 쭈그러들지말것)	8	개	6.6
39	고압호스	ф85*5*5000mm,압력:0.1MPa, (강선이 있는 투명비닐관으로써 흡입시 쭈그러 들지말것)	8	개	15.3
40	고압호스	ф110*6*4500mm,압력:0.1MPa, (강선이 있는 투명비닐관으로써 흡입시 쭈그러 들지말것)	8	개	21.3
41	내산뽐프 (전동기포함)	FS32X25-11, 4m³ /h,양정높이11m, 전동기0.75kw포함,내산성 (매질이 초산 또는 질산)	8	대	195
42	물뽐프(전동기포함)	SL-1100C,4m³/h, 양정높이10m, 압력0.1MPa단상220V,전동기 1.1kw포함 ,DN:40	8	대	250
43	물려과기	SLY-10P 4m³/h,물뽐프에서 려과된 물이 음료수정도이여야 함.DN:40	8	대	350
44	공기압축기	W-0.9/16, 배기량:0.9m³/min, 압력0.9Mpa,3상,380V/50Hz,이동식	8	대	1224
45	유면계	YWZ-350T, Φ20*3-380mm, 유기유리 ф20*3-길이380mm	8	개	10
46	진공계	Y-100, 압력0.1MPa	8	개	5
47	관조임띠	불수강Φ22	64	개	0.05
48	관조임띠	불수강Φ38	384	개	0.08
49	관조임띠	불수강Φ85	64	개	0.15
50	관조임띠	불수강Φ110	48	개	0.2
51	볼트,나트조	SUS304,M12*85mm, 용수자리쇠포함	960	조	0.51
52	볼트	SUS304,M12*20mm, 용수자리쇠포함	960	개	0.123
53	규소강판	50w470,두께0.5mm, 너비1200mm,무방향성, 전동기생산용	3.5	t	1715
54	케블지	두께0.08mm*C, 전동기생산용	0.35	t	2200

55	케블지	두께0.05㎜°C, 전동기생산용	0.28	t	2200
56	폴리에스테르박막	두께 0.05mm, 자호없음	0.3	t	3300
57	볼베아링	6314(d70㎜,D150㎜,B35㎜)	8	개	8
58	원통로라베아링	N314(d70㎜,D150㎜, B35㎜,분리형)	8	개	15
59	알루미늄괴	99.6%, GB/T1196-93	0.2	t	3250

Source: Member State

Annex 28a: *Hai Zhou 168 (fka Smooth Sea 28)*

The *Hai Zhou 168*, formerly known as *Smooth Sea 28* (IMO: 8514045), was docked at a port area in Thailand from December 2016 to September 2018, based on data from a specialised maritime AI platform. During this time, the vessel underwent heavy modification work to its deck and superstructure (see figure annex 28a-1). This was likely in preparation for its transition to becoming the *Smooth Sea 22* (IMO: 9870991), a fraudulent vessel identity.

Figure Annex 28a-1: Smooth Sea 28 undergoing heavy modification work from 2017 to 2019

Source: Google Earth Pro, annotated by the Panel

In August 2018, the vessel changed its name from *Smooth Sea 28* to *Hai Zhou 168* after coming under new ownership. Shortly afterwards, in September 2018, the vessel departed Thailand for a shipyard in Ningde in Fu'an, China (see figure annex 28a-2). This was the same shipyard the *Mouson 328* (IMO: 9021198) was located before it took on the new fraudulent identity of the Dominica-flagged *Cherry 19*.

Figure Annex 28a-2: *Hai Zhou 168's* location voyage from Thailand to China, September 2019




Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

*Coordinates of vessel in inset satellite imagery: 26° 50' 27.6" 119° 41' 20.3994"

The vessel was given a new identity and IMO number as *Smooth Sea 22* (IMO: 9870991) when it sailed back to Thailand, and where it has since sailed a domestic route.

On 2 January 2019, after over three months at the shipyard in Ningde, *Hai Zhou 168* changed its identifiers to *Hang Xin 8* as it sailed out of the Baima river where it was moored. *Hang Xin 8* appeared to update its vessel profile to the 'newly built' Belize-flagged *Cheng Xin 1* (IMO: 9870991) / *Smooth Sea 22* soon after departing the shipyard in Ningde, marking its changeover to a new vessel (see figure annex 28a-3).


Figure Annex 28a-3: January 2019 - *Hai Zhou 168* changed out its identifiers to become the 'newly built' *Cheng Xin 1*



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

By 12 January 2019, the *Cheng Xin 1* aka *Smooth Sea 22* berthed at the same dock the *Hai Zhou 168* was berthed in February 2018, Bangkok, before it sailed towards Ningde, China (see figure annex 28a-4).

Figure Annex 28a-4: *Smooth Sea 22* back in Bangkok, Thailand



Source: Windward, Google Earth, annotated by the Panel

The vessel laundering created an empty AIS identity slot which was subsequently filled occasionally by the *Subblic* (IMO 8126082), based on high resolution satellite imagery. The *Subblic* has been recommended by the Panel for designation for delivering unreported refined petroleum to the DPRK since 2019.

The *Subblic* is known to have used *the Hai Zhou 168's* AIS profile when the *Hai Zhou 168* recorded extended gaps in its AIS transmissions on all but two occasions of the *Subblic's* recorded dates of delivery.

A number of similarities arise when comparing with the Panel's previous investigations into *Mouson 328*. Both the *Mouson 328* and *Hai Zhou 168* were previously owned by the same entity, Smooth Sea Co., Ltd, sailing respectively as *Smooth Sea 29* and *Smooth Sea 28*. In both cases, the same shipyards in Thailand and in China appeared to have been used in the vessel identity

launder process. Both the *Mouson 328* and *Hai Zhou 168* took on a different identity after departing the Ningde shipyard. Maritime records indicated that the vessel *Smooth Sea 22* was recorded launched at Fujian Yihe Shipbuilding Industry Co., Ltd. This was the same shipyard that had reportedly carried out repair and maintenance work on *Rui Hong 916* (IMO: 9058866), following the vessel's acquisition from the Hong Kong incorporated Ruis (HK) Marine Co., Limited in January 2019. The Panel has recommended *Rui Hong 916* (IMO: 9058866) for designation to have conducted a ship-to-ship transfer with the DPRK vessel *Kum Un San* (IMO: 8720436) on 28 May 2019. The Panel is verifying additional information it has received concerning the sale of the *Rui Hong 916*.

Panel investigations indicated that both *Hai Zhou 168* and *Smooth Sea 22* were owned and managed by the Hong Kong-registered Cheng Xin Shipping Co. Ltd (hereafter "Cheng Xin Shipping") from January to March 2019. *Smooth Sea 22* is currently owned and managed by the Thailand-registered. Smooth Sea Co., Ltd, also the former owner and manager of *Hai Zhou 168* when it sailed as *Smooth Sea 28*.

The Panel is awaiting Thailand's response to its enquiries.

Cheng Xin Shipping has yet to respond to the Panel's enquiries.

China responded:

1. Vessels

(1) OC.73, OC.160

On *Diamond 8* transmitting as *Changshun 8*, according to China's investigation, the flag state of *Diamond 8* is Mongolia, while *Changshun 8* is a Honduras vessel previously named as *Honduras/Bonvoy 6*. These two vessels are of different types, therefore it's difficult for them to transmit as each other. Since 2020, neither of the two vessels has entered Chinese ports.

On *Subblic* transmitting as *Hai Zhou 168*, according to China's investigation, neither of the two vessels has entered Chinese ports since 2020.

Source: The Panel

Annex 28b: Note verbale from the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Thailand



No. 56101/104

The Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) and, with reference to the Coordinator's Letter No. S/AC.49/2020/PE/OC.320 dated 10 November 2020, requesting information related to the Panel's investigation on suspected sanctions evasion involving the vessel "Mouson 328", has the honour to transmit the said information herewith for the latter's kind perusal.

The Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009), the assurance of its highest consideration.

PERMANENT MISSION OF THAILAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Permanent Mission of Thailand
to the United Nations, New York
18 February B.E. 2564 (2021)

Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009),
NEW YORK.

Attachment

Information requested by
the Panel of Experts established pursuant to UNSC resolution 1874 (2009)
as per the Panel of Experts' Note No. S/AC.49/2020/PE/OC.320
dated 10 November 2020

The Royal Thai Government investigated the activities involving the vessel(s) *Mouson 328* and *Smooth Sea 29* or *Cherry 19* and wishes to inform the Panel of Experts (POE) as follows:

1. Registry of the *Mouson 328*

There is insufficient evidence to confirm the connection of the vessel *Mouson 328* to either *Cherry 19* or *Smooth Sea 29,* both in terms of IMO numbers or registry.

2. Information on Flag Registry *Smooth Sea 29* is an oil tanker, registered as a Thai vessel with the registry number 630001113 and IMO number 9896945. *Smooth Sea 29* was formerly registered as *Cherry 19* under the Dominica's registry. Further investigation found that the Certificate of Deletion of *Cherry 19* submitted upon its registration to the Thai authorities is suspected to be forged. Presently, the Thai authorities are reexamining the registry of *Smooth Sea 29* with the possibility to revoke its registration.

3. Location of *Smooth Sea 29* from November 2019 to present

Cherry 19 departed Ningde Port, Fujian, China and arrived at Wangchao Port, Bangkok, Thailand on 28 November 2019. On 24 June 2020, *Cherry 19* was registered as a Thai vessel under the name *Smooth Sea 29*. After the registration, on 30 June 2020, *Smooth Sea 29* departed Wangchao Port, Bangkok, and arrived at Samut Songkhram Port, Samut Songkhram Province on 2 July 2020. On 26 November 2020, the vessel departed Samut Songkhram Port and arrived at Chonburi Port, Chonburi Province, on 27 November 2020. The vessel has since then been anchored at Ao Udom Port, Chonburi Province and has submitted the notice on non-usage of vessel to the Thai Marine Department on 21 December 2020.

4. Lost AIS Signal of *Cherry 19* and *Smooth Sea 29*

4.1 From November 2019 - June 2020, *Cherry 19* was docked at Wangchao Port, Bangkok for repair and maintenance at Whanchao Shipyard Co., Ltd. The vessel therefore had been anchored at the Wangchao Port on Chao Phraya River for 7 months.

4.2 From July - October 2020, *Smooth Sea 29* was docked at Ruammitr Dockyard Co., Ltd.'s Port for additional maintenance. During this period, the vessel's engines and electric generators were turned off, causing the lost of AIS signal. Later in October 2020, Brilliant Performance Co., Ltd. was hired to repair the AIS signal system.

4.3 From November 2019 - October 2020 *Cherry 19* or *Smooth Sea 29* has not been used for any shipments.


* * * * * *

Source: Member State

Annex 29a: *Billions No.18 (aka Kingsway)*

The *Billions No.18* (IMO: 9191773) was designated on 28 December 2017 for having conducted a ship-to-ship transfer of refined petroleum with the DPRK tanker *Rye Song Gang* 1 (IMO: 7389704) in October 2017. The Panel had reported that the owner and sole shareholder of *Billions No.18*, (the late) Chen Shih-Hsien, had also sought to supply marine diesel together from other tankers to DPRK tankers[11]. A month later in January 2018, *Billions No.18* re-transmitted briefly as *Kingsway* under the same IMO number (IMO: 9191773) before its AIS transmission disappeared (see figure annex 29a-1). The vessel was listed as de-registered from the Mongolia ship registry in June 2021.

Figure Annex 29a-1: *Billions No.18* briefly transmitting as *Kingsway* following designation, January 2018



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

[11] Chen was reported to be the owner of *Billions No.18* and two other tankers that were contracted to supply an additional 95,000 metric tons of fuel over the course of nine shipments to the same entity that purchased the fuel supplied to the *Rye Song Gang 1*. S/2018/171.

Following its designation, the vessel swapped into a new fraudulent identity as the Mongolia-flagged *Apex* (IMO: 8528864). The Panel obtained evidence of an identity laundering operating in which the entities behind *Kingsway* likely submitted fraudulent IMO number application documentation, modified its physical appearance, and tampered with its AIS transmission in order to disguise *Kingsway* as the *Apex*.

Panel investigations indicated that the vessel's laundering process likely began when the *Apex's* IMO number was created when the vessel changed ownership from the Chinese registered Taizhou Zhesheng Shipping Co Ltd to the Belize-incorporated Better Smart Ltd in mid-2018. The vessel also changed its registry and name from the China-flagged *Zhe Sheng 26* to Mongolia-flagged *Uni Wealth*.


Panel analysis of various photographs of the *Uni Wealth* and *Zhe Sheng 26* taken from online shipping websites show two vessels with very different structures that confirms that the *Uni Wealth* is not the same vessel as *Zhe Sheng 26* as claimed. *Uni Wealth* was therefore a fraudulent identity used as a cover for the *Kingsway*. In late 2018, *Uni Wealth*, still owned and operated by Better Smart Ltd, was re-named *Apex* at Keelung port area (see figures annex 29a-2 and 29a-3).

The Panel wrote to Taizhou Zhesheng Shipping Co Ltd, inter alia, seeking documentation on the vessel's sale. The Panel has yet to receive a response from the company.

Figure Annex 29a-2: *Apex* voyage route and identifiers, July to November 2018



Figure Annex 29a-3: Change of vessel from *Uni Wealth* to *Apex*, 2 November 2018



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

Between 2019 to 2021, *Apex* conducted voyages in the East China Sea and South China Sea. While in waters near the Singapore Strait on 9 November 2019, the vessel transmitted a name change to *Shun Fa*. While maritime databases showed *Apex* transmitting the name *Shun Fa* in November 2019, official records[12] continued to register the vessel sailing as *Apex*. Maritime tracking databases show the *Shun Fa* sailed between the East China Sea and South China Sea between November 2019 till end of 2020 without recording any port calls. The vessel exhibited suspicious behavior with periods of unaccounted dropped AIS transmissions and loitering in mid-sea locations for several days. These signatures indicate that *Shun Fa* had likely conducted ship-to-ship activities with other vessels. Online photographs of the vessel taken in January 2021 show *Shun Fa* painted on the vessel's stern.

Better Smart Ltd, a company incorporated in Belize[13] with a domiciled business address at Kaohsiung, is the entity that owned and operated *Apex* since mid-2018 when the vessel was sailing as the Mongolia-flagged *Uni Wealth*. The sole Director of Better Smart Ltd is Mr Chen Chao-Jung[14]. Information the Panel has reviewed indicates the vessel was likely laundered in mid-2018.

A Malaysia registered entity, Yong An Shipping Sdn Bhd (hereafter "Yong An Shipping") , provided, *inter alia*, corporate registry services to Better Smart Ltd / Mr. Chen. The Panel wrote to Yong An Shipping seeking relevant information and documentation on the ship as well as services rendered to Mr. Chen, as well as the latter's contact information.

Mongolia responded with information and documentation concerning the *Shun Fa (aka Apex*) showing the vessel had changed ownership a few times, with such ownership changes not updated on maritime databases (see also annexes 29b and 29c).

Yong An Shipping has yet to respond to the Panel's enquiries.

Mr. Chen has yet to respond to the Panel's enquiries.

Belize has yet to respond to the Panel's enquiries.

Source: The Panel

[12] IMO website.
[13] Better Smart Ltd is currently listed as inactive based on information from Belize Corporate registry.
[14] IHS Markit.

Annex 29b: Extract of *Shun Fa*'s registration application form showing vessel ownership

CC

CC

MONGOLIA
MONGOLIA MARITIME ADMINISTRATION

Application to Register a Ship
(Form M1)

Chapter 3 of the Regulations for Registration of ship 2003

Mongolia Ship Registry Pte Ltd
133 New Bridge Road
#16-02 Chinatown Point
Tel: (65) 6225 0125
Fax: (65) 6225 0305
Email:
operation@mngship.org
Website: www.mngship.org

A. SHIP'S PARTICULARS

Ship Name (for registration) SHUN FA	Type of Ship OIL TANKER	Year Built 1998	Keel Laid 1998
Place / Country Built CHINA	IMO Number of Ship 8528864	Gross Tonnage 5830	National Gross Tonnage N/A
Net Tonnage 2750	National Net Tonnage N/A	Deadweight -	Hull Material (steel, etc) STEEL
Length of Ship (Metres) ® LOA 108.20 / ITC-69	Breadth (Metres) 15.60	Moulded Depth (Metres) 10.50	Moulded Draught (Metres)
Builder's Name ZHEJIANG HONGGUAN SHIPBUILDING CO LTD, CHINA			Previous Registry MONGOLIA
Previous Owner NEW EAST INVESTMENT INC			Ship Name (in Previous Registry) APEX

B. SHIP VOYAGE INFORMATION

Sea Area A1 + A2 + A3	Trading Area UNLIMITED
For special registration, please fill in the following information.	
Voyage Limitations	
Port of Departure	Port of Arrival
Estimate Date of Departure	Estimate Date of Arrival

C. OWNER'S PARTICULARS

Name JOY WEALTHY TRADING LIMITED	IMO Number of Owner
	Name of Person in Charge EDISON
Address ROOM 05, LEVEL 12, LANDMARK NORTH, 39 LUNG SUM AVENUE, SHEUNG SHUI, HONG KONG	Telephone
	Facsimile
	E-mail

® Length of ship (LOA) – Overall length of the ship.
Length of ship (ITC-69) – Length of the ship as defined under International Tonnage Convention

Page 1 of 3

Source: Member State

Annex 29c: Cancellation Form for the *Shun Fa* issued by the Mongolia Maritime Administration



MONGOLIA
SHIP REGISTRY
MONGOLIA MARITIME ADMINISTRATION

Cancellation Form

Mongolia Maritime Administration
#606 Government Building-11
J Sambuu's Street-11
Chingeltei District, 4th Khoroo
Ulaanbaatar 15141
Tel: 976-11310642
Fax: 976-11310642
Email: info@monmarad.gov.mn
Website: www.monmarad.gov.mn

By this means we inform that all certificates from MONGOLIA SHIP REGISTRY related to

Name of Ship	IMO No.	Official Number
SHUN FA	8525564	47411998

Have been cancelled by Administration; reported by PSCO Korea as using falsified ship details, proved by FSI.

☒ Other reasons:

INVALIDATED CERTIFICATES:

CERTIFICATE	NUMBER
PERMANENT CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRY	47411998
PERMANENT MINIMUM SAFE MANNING CERTIFICATE	47411998
PERMANENT SHIP RADIO STATION LICENCE	47411998

REGISTRAR

MARITIME ADMINISTRATION MONGOLIA

Name: BAZARRAGCHAA ALTAN-OD Signature Date: 2021.06.02

Distribution: ☒ Owner/Manager ☒ Agent ☐ Other

MONGOLIA SHIP REGISTRY

Approved by ... Revised by ... Date of Revision Page 1 of 1

Source: Member State

Annex 30a: *Diamond 8's* (IMO: 9132612) fraudulent transmissions


Satellite imagery obtained by the Panel showed *Diamond 8* in the Ningde anchorage area on 30 April 2021 (UTC) broadcasting as *Chang Shun 8* on a Mongolia-associated MMSI number: 457222000, where the vessel remained in those waters at least into May 2021 (see figure annex 30a-1 and 30a-2).

Figure Annex 30a-1: Satellite Imagery of the *Diamond 8* (IMO: 9132612) as the '*Chang Shun 8*' near Ningde, China, on 30 April 2021 (UTC)



Source: Member State

Figure Annex 30a-2: A specialized maritime AI platform display showing the location of the *Diamond 8* transmitting as *Chang Shun 8* (MMSI: 457222000), May 2021



Source: Windward, *Annotation*: The Panel

Annex 30b: Note verbal from Mongolia on *Chang Shun 8*



MONGOLIA

PERMANENT MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

6 East 77th Street, New York, N.Y. 10075
Tel: (212) 861-9460, Fax: (212) 861-9464

NUB/33/2021

The Permanent Mission of Mongolia to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) and has the honour to transmit information on vessel CHANGSHUN 8 (MMSI:457222000).

The vessel CHANGSHUN 8 was registered to the Mongolian Maritime Administration on 04 September 2020 and excluded from the registration on 24 December 2020 by the reason of possible violation of the relevant resolution of UNSC.

During its registration period CHANGSHUN 8 was using communication number MMSI 457 222 000.

The Permanent Mission of Mongolia avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) the assurances of its highest consideration.

Necessary documentations are enclosed herewith.

19 May 2021

New York

B.Ə.

United Nations Security Council
Panel of Experts established pursuant to the resolution 1874 (2009)
New York



MONGOLIA

SHIP REGISTRY
MONGOLIA MARITIME ADMINISTRATION

Cancellation Form

Mongolia Maritime Administration
#606 Government Building-11
J Sambuu's Street-11
Chingeltei District, 4th Khoroo
Ulaanbaatar 15141
Tel: 976-11310642
Fax: 976-11310642
Email: info@monmarad.gov.mn
Website: www.monmarad.gov.mn

By this means we inform that all certificates from MONGOLIA SHIP REGISTRY related to

Name of Ship	IMO No.	Official Number
CHANG SHUN 8	8682969	48762001

Have been cancelled by Administration: due to ties with DPRK

☒Other reasons:

INVALIDATED CERTIFICATES:

CERTIFICATE	NUMBER
PROVISIONAL CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRY	48762001
PROVISIONAL MINIMUM SAFE MANNING CERTIFICATE	48762001
PROVISIONAL SHIP RADIO STATION LICENCE	48762001
CARVING AND MARKING NOTE	48762001
CONTINUOUS SYNOPSIS RECORD	CSR - 3/48762001
DECLARATION OF MARITIME LABOUR COMPLIANCE PART I	MLC -48762001

REGISTRAR

MARITIME ADMINISTRATION MONGOLIA

Name: BAZARRAGCHAA ALTAN-OD Signature: [redacted] **Date: 2020.12.24**

Distribution: ☒Owner/Manager ☒Agent ☐Other: ____

MONGOLIA SHIP REGISTRY

Approved by: Revised by: Date of Revision: Page 1 of 1

Source: Member State

Annex 31: *Bonvoy 3* (aka *Fu Shun 3*)



MONGOLIA

MONGOLIA MARITIME ADMINISTRATION

PROVISIONAL CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRY

Issued under the provisions of
Chapter 3 of the Regulations for Registration of Ships 2003

Official Number	Call Sign	IMO Ship Number
49112088	JVPK7	8714085

Name of Vessel
FU SHUN 3

Name and Address of Owner	IMO Registered Owner Number	Shares (%)
LU CHANG SHIPPING (HK) CO.,LTD Shop F28 1/F, Cathay Pacific 88 Malls, No.25 Wanchai Rd, Wanchai, Hong Kong.	6177286	100

Description of Vessel			
Type of Vessel Oil Tanker	Year of Built 1988	Hull material Steel	Previous Registry / Name Sierra Leone / BONVOY 3
Gross Tonnage 2385	Length(Metres) LOA - - ITC -- 84.50	Name of Builder Daedong Shipbuilding Co.,Ltd, Busan, Korea	
Net Tonnage 1120	Breadth(Metres) 13.60	Number of Engines 1	Type of Engine / Total Power (KW) Diesel / 1765
Deadweight -	Depth(Metres) 6.80	Speed of Vessel (Knots) 12.00	Engine Make / Model SSHI-Hanshin / 6EL-35

Date of Provisional Registry	Port of Registry	Date of Expiry
06 November 2020	Ulaanbaatar	06 May 2021

Issued at Singapore on 06 November 2020.

The Registrar of the Mongolia Ship Registry, by the powers vested thereupon by the Regulations for Registration of Ships 2003,hereby authorizes this Provisional Registration of Vessel **FU SHUN 3**.



MARITIME ADMIN [redacted]

REGISTRAR

MONGOLIA SHIP REGISTRY

MONGOLIA MARITIME ADMINISTRATION (OPERATIONS)

MONGOLIA SHIP REGISTRY

MSR/PROV CR/REV.3/2010

Source: Member State

Annex 32: *Xing Ming Yang 888's* (IMO: 8410847) fraudulent transmissions and red flag indicators


The *Xing Ming Yang 888* (IMO: 8410847) has been intermittently broadcasting a fraudulent MMSI: 334191000, sailing as the Honduras-flagged *Vi Fin* since 2020. The vessel was previously reported by the Panel with prolonged periods of dark activity as well as transmitting on other fraudulent identifiers[15]. The vessel has been recommended by the Panel for designation for conducting ship-to-sip activity with the DPRK-flagged *Mu Bong 1* (IMO: 8610461) in June 2018[16].

As a further red flag indicator, the *Xing Ming Yang 888* also used a fraudulent call-sign 9LU2843 that was formerly associated with another vessel that delivered refined petroleum to the DPRK, *Vifine* (IMO: 9045962). The *Vifine* was featured in the Panel's report for conducting ship-to-ship transfer with the *New Konk*, another direct delivery vessel. The Panel also highlighted the shared ownership and management links between the two vessels.

In May 2021, the vessel again transmitted as *Vi Fin*, a consistent pattern of deception it has exhibited since 2020 while in Chinese territorial waters (see figure annex 32-1). The *Xing Ming Yang 888* has been sailing stateless without a known registered flag since November 2018, subjecting it to maritime laws of the country whose territorial waters it is located in. These vessels can be investigated, detained or impounded under national law and under operative paragraph 9 of resolution 2397 (2017).

[15] Paragraph 46 (f), S/2021/211.
[16] S/2021/211.

Figure Annex 32-1: *Xing Ming Yang 888* transmitting as *Vi Fin*, in November 2020, December 2020, and May 2021




Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel, Satellite Imagery: Planet Labs and Member State

Annex 33a: Locations frequented by direct delivery vessels

Many of the now de-flagged vessels previously recommended by the Panel for designation for direct delivery of refined petroleum to the DPRK on numerous occasions[17], have been observed in Chinese territorial waters. The following are sample satellite imagery of vessels recommended for designation located in waters in the Ningde, China, between August 2020 and March 2021.

Figure Annex 33a-1: Direct Delivery tankers at Sansha Bay, 11 November 2020



Source: Maxar Technologies and Member State

[17] S/2020/151, S/2020/840, S/2021/211.

<u>Example of Direct Delivery vessels that frequent waters off Ningde</u>

Satellite imagery showing the direct delivery[18] vessel *Bonvoy 3* (IMO: 8714085) anchored in Sansha Bay on 30 January 2021 and another satellite imagery capture of the vessel anchored again in Sansha Bay on 9 March 2021.

Figure Annex 33a-2: *Bonvoy 3* at Sansha Bay, 30 January 2021



Source: Planet Labs

Figure Annex 33a-3: *Bonvoy 3* at Sansha Bay, 9 March 2021




Source: Airbus Defence and Space and Member State

[18] This is a term the Panel has used for non-DPRK flagged vessels that deliver refined petroleum to the DPRK. The refined petroleum is procured including through ship-to-ship transfers.

Satellite imagery on 24 March 2021 showing two direct delivery vessels, *Diamond 8* (IMO: 9132612) and *Rich United* (IMO: 9129213) near Dongyin Island.

Figure Annex 33a-4: *Diamond 8* near Dongyin Island, 24 March 2021



Source: Member State


Figure Annex 33a-5: *Rich United* near Dongyin Island, 24 March 2021



Source: Member State

Bonvoy 3, along with other direct delivery vessels: *New Konk*, *Subblic* and *Xin Hai* near Dongyin Island on 26 August 2020.

Figure Annex 33a-6: Direct Delivery tankers at Dongyin Island, 26 August 2020



Source: Maxar Technologies and Member State

Satellite imagery on 27 March 2021 showing the designated vessel *Yuk Tung* (IMO: 9030591) near Xiyang Island, Ningde. The *Yuk Tung* was designated on 30 March 2018.

Figure Annex 33a-7*: Yuk Tung* near Xiyang Island, 27 March 2021



Source: Member State

Satellite imagery on 16 March 2021 showed the direct delivery vessel *New Konk* (IMO: 9036387) docked at a shipyard at Fu'an, Fujian Province, China. The coordinates show a shipyard in Fujian Province where Fujian Yihe Shipbuilding Industry Co Ltd is located[19]. This was the same coordinates reported by the Panel where both the *Mouson 328* (IMO: 9021198)[20] and *Hai Zhou 168* (IMO: 8514045) (see paragraphs 30 to 34), were located, as vessels that underwent vessel identity swaps.

Figure Annex 33a-8: *New Konk* berthed at Fu'an, 11 March 2021



Source: Member State

[19] Member State.
[20] Paragraphs 21 to 36 and Annex 22, S/2021/211.

Annex 33b: Member State's list of vessels of interest entering China's waters, October 2020 to April 2021

DATE DD/MMM/YY	VOI NAME	PLA VESSEL NAME	LAT/LONG
10/11/2020	AQUAMARINE	N/A	29:39N 122:45E
10/19/2020	MEGA PRINCESS	N/A	31:11N 123:57E
11/1/2020	HOKONG	N/A	28:00N 121:29E
11/9/2020	HAI SHUN	N/A	26:07N 120:32E
11/12/2020	BONVOY 3	N/A	26:19N 120:27E
11/20/2020	XING MING YANG 888	N/A	25:16N 119:52E
11/20/2020	POWER	N/A	27:34N 121:25E
11/29/2020	HENG RONG	N/A	25:15N 119:46E
12/10/2020	MOUSON 328	N/A	2405N 11851E
12/27/2020	XING MING YANG 888	N/A	2408N 11823E
1/1/2021	XING MING YANG 888	N/A	32:45N 122:31E
1/3/2021	PACIFIC PRINCESS	N/A	26:00N 120:00E
1/11/2021	MOUSON 328	N/A	31:05N 122:49E
1/14/2021	JOINT LUCK	N/A	29:00N 121:45E
1/18/2021	HAI ZHOU 168	N/A	26:00N 120:00E
1/20/2021	JOINT LUCK	N/A	26:16N 120:30E
1/21/2021	JOFFA	N/A	26:00N 120:00E
1/26/2021	INFINITE LUCK	N/A	26:16N 120:40E
2/17/2021	XINHAI	N/A	25:00N 119:22E
3/8/2021	HANG YU 8	N/A	27'00N121'30E
3/15/2021	POWER	FUCHI 890	27'00N121'30E
3/19/2021	HANG YU 8	N/A	27'00N121'30E
3/20/2021	PACIFIC PRINCESS	N/A	27'00N121'30E
3/22/2021	SUBBLIC	N/A	25'00N120'00E
3/31/2021	SAM JONG 2	N/A	31'30N123'00E
3/31/2021	SIN PYONG 2	N/A	31'30N123'00E
3/31/2021	AN SAN 1	N/A	31'30N123'00E
4/1/2021	XIN HAI	N/A	2618N 12025E
4/1/2021	JOFFA	N/A	2627N 12000E
4/2/2021	HANG YU 8	N/A	2936N 12145E
4/2/2021	SAM JONG 2	N/A	2818N 12200E
4/2/2021	HAI JUN	N/A	2628N 11959E
4/3/2021	SIN PYONG	N/A	3003N 12333E
4/3/2021	UN HUNG	N/A	2716N 12129E
4/3/2021	DIAMOND 8	N/A	2627N 11959E
4/15/2021	POWER EASY	N/A	2629N 12130E
4/22/2021	CHERRY 168	N/A	3100N 12330E

Unknown or unable to confirm info
StS Associated Vessel of Interest
Non-DPRK Delivery Vehicle
DPRK Tanker

*NOTE:
- The vessels highlighted in yellow along with the vessels highlighted in orange denote non-DPRK vessels that delivered refined petroleum to the DPRK.
- The coordinates in green highlight denote approximate locations.

Source: Member State

To the Panel's enquiry into the *Diamond 8* seeking, *inter alia*, confirmation on the actual identity of the vessel transmitting on the Mongolia-associated MMSI 457222000, dates during which the vessel transmitted under the said MMSI and any actions conducted into the vessel pursuant to the relevant Security Council resolutions, including paragraph 9 of resolution 2397 (2017), China responded:

1. Vessels

(1) OC.73, OC.160

On *Diamond 8* transmitting as *Changshun 8*, according to China's investigation, the flag state of *Diamond 8* is Mongolia, while *Changshun 8* is a Honduras vessel previously named as *Honduras/Bonvoy 6*. These two vessels are of different types, therefore it's difficult for them to transmit as each other. Since 2020, neither of the two vessels has entered Chinese ports.

On *Subblic* transmitting as *Hai Zhou 168*, according to China's investigation, neither of the two vessels has entered Chinese ports since 2020.

To the Panel's enquiry concerning the rest of the vessels sought in the main text and this Annex into information on *inter alia*, on the DPRK vessels' activities, the identifiers on which the vessels were transmitting and the validity of those identifiers, as well as the vessels' dates, origin and destination, and their stated purpose in Chinese waters, China responded:

(5) OC.77, OC.154, OC.155, OC.157, OC.161

According to China's verification, the vessel *Shunkai*, together with most vessels alleged to be delivering coal to China, and vessels suspected to be delivering refined petroleum products to the DPRK including *Sin Phyong 2, An San 1, Aquamarine, Hai Shun* and *Xing Ming Yang 888* have not entered Chinese ports since 2020.

Source: The Panel

Annex 34: DPRK and DPRK-associated vessels transmitting fraudulent AIS identifiers in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters


The Panel has observed on a specialized maritime tracking platform the transmission of fraudulent identifiers over AIS by DPRK and other suspect vessels seeking to evade sanctions that have affected multiple flag registries. The Panel has shared its observations along with supplementary high-resolution satellite imagery from a Member State, with the flag registries in question. The Panel welcomed any additional observations the relevant flag state authorities may have concerning the issue at hand.


The following are sample instances where of DPRK-flagged and DPRK-associated vessels in Chinese territorial waters transmitting identifiers with suspect indicators and therefore subject for further investigations by the relevant Chinese maritime authorities.

Su Ri Bong (IMO: 8605727)

The DPRK-flagged *Su Ri Bong* has delivered DPRK-origin coal on multiple occasions to Ningbo-Zhoushan waters for ship-to-ship transfer and reported in the Panel's past reports. The *Su Ri Bong* was advertised to be sold for scrap back in June 2019 but has continued to return to Chinese waters to deliver its coal. The vessel has been known to transmit fraudulent identifiers. A Member State reported that the *Su Ri Bong* carried coal to Ningbo-Zhoushan waters while transmitting fraudulent identifiers from March to May 2021. These included transmitting variations of a vessel name '*Zhou Shan*' and '*Zoushan*' and transmitting a Panama-associated MMSI number without an IMO number or ship dimensions (see figure annex 34-1).

Figure Annex 34-1: Storyboard of DPRK-vessel *Su Ri Bong* (fka *Pu Zhou* and *Fu Xing 12)* (IMO: 8605727) transmitting identifiable fraudulent identifiers, March to May 2021








Source: Member State

<u>*Lucky Star* (IMO: 9015278)</u>

The DPRK-associated vessel *Lucky Star* was reported by the Panel in its reports as far back as 2019 to have illegally exported DPRK-origin coal. The vessel was issued a national port ban by the Republic of Korea in December 2018. On 10 March 2021, the *Lucky Star* was recorded in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters transmitting fraudulent identifiers without reporting its dimensions (see figure annex 34-2).

Figure Annex 34-2*: Lucky Star* transmitting identifiable fraudulent identifiers, March 2021



Source: Member State

<u>*Chang Phyong* (IMO: 9338981)</u>

The DPRK vessel *Chang Phyong* last transmitted on its AIS profile in May 2017 (MMSI: 44556600). The vessel fraudulently transmitted as the Sri Lanka-flagged *QiuHai* with no reported IMO number on 12 March 2021 near the Shandong peninsula, China, before re-transmitting around 15 March 2021 in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters until at least 28 March 2021 (see figure annex 34-3). In May, elsewhere in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters, the *Chang Phyong* transmitted on its historical Kiribati-associated MMSI with no reported IMO number. The vessel also transmitted its vessel type as a futuristic “wing in Ground-effect”.

Figure Annex 34-3: *Chang Phyong* transmitting identifiable fraudulent identifiers, March 2021


Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel; satellite imagery: Member State

<u>*Un Bong 2* (IMO: 8913186)</u>

The DPRK vessel *Un Bong 2* was reported by the Panel in its reports as far back as 2018 to have illegally transshipped DPRK-origin coal. In 2020, the Panel's recorded the vessel near Huangxing Island in Ningbo-Zhoushan on 29 April 2020 as exporting DPRK-origin coal. In March 2021, *Un Bong 2* was recorded transmitting on its historical identifier sailing as Tanzania-flagged *Jin Long*. Tanzania had de-flagged the vessel in June 2016[21]. It also transmitted as another alleged Tanzania-flagged vessel with an unregistered IMO number (see figure annex 34-4).

Figure Annex 34-4: *Un Bong 2* transmitting identifiable fraudulent identifiers, March 2021





Source: Member State

[21] IMO website.

Tanzania informed the Panel that the DPRK vessels *Un Bong 2* (IMO: 8913186), formerly sailing as *Jin Long* under the Tanzania flag in 2016, had been de-registered on 10 October 2016. Additionally, Tanzania had never registered any vessels with IMO: 9017886 or IMO: 9313186, identifiers under which *Un Bong 2* was fraudulently transmitting. Tanzania stated "If they were found flying Tanzania flag, they are flying it illegally" (see figure annex 34-5).

Figure Annex 34-5: Note verbale and extract of attachment from Tanzania on fraudulent AIS transmissions

THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA
PERMANENT MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Tel: (212) 697-3612
Fax: (212) 697-3618
E-mail: newyork@nje.go.tz
tanzania@un.int



307 East 53rd Street
Suite 500
New York, NY 10022

Ref: No. TZNY/U.10/15 (1)

The Permanent Mission of the United Republic of Tanzania to the United Nations presents its compliments to the United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009) and has the honour to submit to the later response from the Government of Tanzania (Zanzibar Maritime Authority), regarding suspect vessels' on-going broadcast of false AIS information as foreign-flagged vessels to evade sanctions, raised by the later note no. S/AC.49/2021/PE/OC.241 of 29 June 2021

The Mission has further honour to inform the later that the government deregistered MV. UN BONG 2, IMO NO. 8913186 on 10th October 2016. And Tanzania has never registered IMO Numbers 9017886 and 9313186. If they were found flying Tanzania flag, they are flying it illegally.

The Permanent Mission of the United Republic of Tanzania to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009) the assurances of its highest consideration.

New York, 21 July 2021



United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009),

NEW YORK.



ZANZIBAR MARITIME AUTHORITY

PHONE NO: +255 24 2236795
FAX NO: +255 024 2236796
WEBSITE: www.zma.go.tz
E-MAIL: info@zma.go.tz

P. O. BOX 401
ZANZIBAR
TANZANIA

ZMA/RSZ/150/1/VOL.6/1185 **10th October, 2016**

STAR MOON SHIPPING CO., LTD.
TRUST COMPANY COMPLEX, AJELTAKE ROAD,
AJELTAKE ISLAND MAJURO,
MARSHALL ISLANDS MH96960

REF: DEREGISTRATION OF JIN LONG
IMO NO. 8913186

Reference is made to the above subject matter.

Having been notified of the United Nations (UN) sanctions slapped against North Korea, as per United Nations security Council (UNSC) resolution 2270 (2016), adopted on 02 March, 2016, we are compelled to act and execute measures to deregister your above mentioned vessel so as to abide by the relevant provisions of the resolution. This is because the vessel been submitted to our Government as a North Korean Vessel.

This act on our part is in line with the Government directive, and is in conformity with UNSC resolution 2270 (2016) operative paragraph 19 which requires member states to deregister and refrain from registering any vessel that is owned, operated, or crewed by North Korea.

Hence, this is to inform you that our Authority has struck off the vessel from Tanzania Zanzibar International Register of Shipping, effective from the date of this letter. This implies that from the effective date the vessel can no longer legally fly the Tanzania flag in its sailing operation, whatsoever.

We require you to respect and heed this act.

Thank you,

[redacted]

FOR: DIRECTOR GENERAL
ZANZIBAR MARITME AUTHORITY

Source: Member State

China responded:

(5) OC.77, OC.154, OC.155, OC.157, OC.161

According to China's verification, the vessel *Shunkai*, together with most vessels alleged to be delivering coal to China, and vessels suspected to be delivering refined petroleum products to the DPRK including *Sin Phyong 2, An San 1, Aquamarine, Hai Shun* and *Xing Ming Yang 888* have not entered Chinese ports since 2020.


Source: The Panel

Annex 35a: *Gold Star* sanctions evasion methods


Panel investigations, publicly available data and Member State information indicated the *Gold Star* (IMO: 9146247) engaged in ship-to-ship transfers with DPRK-flagged and DPRK-associated vessels on multiple occasions in late 2019 and continuing into 2020 when it was sailing as then Sierra Leone-flagged *Silver Star 1* and subsequently as then Cameroon-flagged *Gold Star*.

According to a media report[22], the *Gold Star* was alleged to have engaged in a ship-to-ship transfer with the DPRK tanker *Yu Son* (IMO: 8691702) in June 2020. Panel research based on AIS tracks from a specialized maritime AI platform into the *Gold Star* and *Yu Son's* May / June 2020 voyages, along with an analysis into the *Gold Star's* ownership and management history, indicated the media information warranted deeper investigations. A Member State subsequently provided information of the *Gold Star* and *Yu Son's* May and June 2020 voyage tracks (see figure annex 35a-1).

Figure Annex 35a-1: Ship-to-ship transfer between the *Gold Star* (IMO: 9146247) and *Yu Son* (IMO: 8691702), May / June 2020



[22] Pyongyang Papers.



Source: Member State

The Member State provided additional information that the vessel had engaged in additional ship-to-ship transfers with DPRK-flagged tankers on multiple occasions over a period of time from late 2019 and continuing into 2020 when it was sailing as the then Sierra Leone-flagged *Silver Star 1* and as the then-Cameroon-flagged *Gold Star* (see table annex 35a). According to the Member State, the suspected transfers with DPRK tankers took place within Chinese territorial waters as well as on the high seas off the east coast of the DPRK. The Member State further assessed that a DPRK entity, Mulgil Trading General Corporation, was also directly involved in hiring the *Gold Star* to engage in the unreported importation of refined petroleum products to the DPRK.


Table Annex 35a: List of suspected ship-to-ship transfers with DPRK vessels

- Late-November to early December 2019: *Silver Star 1* and DPRK tanker *Kum Jin Gang 3* (IMO: 8791667)
- Early February 2020: *Silver Star 1* and DPRK tanker *Pu Ryong* (IMO: 8705539)
- Mid-February 2020: *Silver Star 1* and DPRK tanker *Chil Bo San* (IMO: 8711021)
- Mid-February 2020: *Silver Star 1* and DPRK tanker *Sam Ma 2* (IMO: 8106496)
- Mid-February 2020: *Silver Star 1* and DPRK tanker *Yu Jong 2* (IMO: 8604917)
- Early April 2020: *Silver Star 1* and DPRK tanker *Sam Ma 2* (IMO: 8106496)
- Mid-April 2020: *Silver Star 1* and DPRK tanker *Yu Jong 2* (IMO: 8604917)
- Late May / Early June 2020: *Gold Star* and DPRK tanker *Yu Son* (IMO: 8691702)

Panel investigations conducted into the vessel's history indicated an earlier connection to DPRK illicit activities. The *Gold Star*, sailing as the *Sky Ace 1* has been a subject of past Panel report concerning planned oil transfers between vessels owned or operated by the late Chen Shih-Hsien and his associated company holdings, and DPRK tankers[23]. The *Yu Son* also had a history of conducting illicit ship-to-ship transfers[24].

According to information from a Member State, the *Gold Star*, sailing as then Sierra-Leone flagged *Silver Star 1,* loaded fuel oil from an oil terminal in Yanpu, Hainan Island, and subsequently conducted two ship-to-ship transfers with the DPRK tanker *Kum Jin Gang 3* (IMO: 8791667) in mid-November and in early December 2019. A Chinese entity facilitated the transfer of fuel oil from the oil terminal to the vessel. AIS transmissions on a maritime tracking platform confirmed the location of the vessel in November 2019 (see figure annex 35a-2):

Figure Annex 35a-2: Location of *Gold Star*, then sailing as *Silver Star 1*, Yangpu, China, November 2019



Source: Windward and Google Earth Pro, annotated by the Panel

[23] Paragraph 72 and Annexes 22 to 25 of S/2018/171 of 5 March 2018.
[24] Paragraph 5 and Figure II of S/2019/691 of 30 August 2019.

Both vessels did not transmit AIS signal on commercial maritime databases over the investigative period of interest, with the *Kum Jin Gang 3* stopping transmission since April 2019[25]. The *Kum Jin Gang 3* was the formerly Belize-flagged *Wan Heng 11*, was designated on 30 March 2018 for having itself conducted a ship-to-ship transfer with the DPRK-flagged *Rye Song Gang 1* (IMO: 7389704) on 13 February 2018. Maritime tracking platforms showed the *Gold Star* back at Yangpu port area in Hainan Island from August to November 2020 (see figure annex 35a-3).

Figure Annex 35a-3: Excerpts from specialized commercial maritime platforms showing the *Gold Star's* (IMO: 9146247) location at Yangpu, Hainan Island, August and September 2020

<u>August 2020</u>



<u>September 2020</u>



Source: Windward, Planet Labs, and IHS Markit, annotated by the Panel

[25] Information as of May 2021.

Following the *Gold Star's* departure from a Ningde port in China in November 2020, AIS tracking data showed the vessel remaining in Chinese waters until February 2021. According to the Member State, the vessel, which remained anchored in waters outside Zhanjiang port with limited provisions, need for medical assistance, and the inability to enter another port, transferred the ship's operational control to an unnamed entity in Indonesia. The vessel next appeared in the territorial waters of Timor Leste in May 2021.

China responded:

(2) OC.75

Gold Star left Yangpu, Hainan in late November 2019, it has not entered Chinese ports since then. The Chinese side does not have information regarding the alleged transfer of refined petroleum products by this vessel.

There is no ports-entry request submitted to Chinese ports by *Ocean Star* in November 2020. The port clearance document annexed to the Panel's letter is fake. *Ocean Star* did not enter Chinese ports, and *Gold Star* did not enter Chinese ports under fraudulent identity of *Ocean Star*.

The Hong Kong SAR company J&C Shipping, mentioned in the Panel's letter as the operator of *Gold Star*, was canceled in March 2021. There is no record of this company's import and export trade or its

1

involvement in DPRK-related smuggling activities. China hopes that the Panel does not readily believe information which is inconsistent with facts.

The Russian Federation has yet to respond to the Panel's enquiry.

Timor Leste has yet to respond to the Panel's enquiry.

J&C Shipping Co. Ltd

Information available to the Panel indicates that Cheng Bin, a manager at J&C Shipping, was directly involved in the operation of the *Silver Star 1* / *Gold Star's* illicit activities, including directing the off-loading of refined petroleum to the DPRK and / or DPRK-affiliated vessels. Publicly available information show Cheng Bin appears as Director / Shareholder of a number of companies incorporated in Hong Kong SAR and in mainland China, such as Qingdao SBS International Corporation Limited (China) / 青岛市新公元贸易有限公司.

J&C Shipping has not responded to the Panel's enquiry.
Mr. Cheng Bin has not responded to the Panel's enquiry.

Union Bureau of Shipping

The Panel also investigated the entities and individuals that may have facilitated, directly or indirectly, these illicit refined petroleum transfers. In addition to investigations conducted into J&C Shipping Co. Ltd, the Panel found a China-based entity, Union Bureau of Shipping (hereafter "Union Bureau"), had provided services and / or issued certification to the *Gold Star*. Union Bureau was also listed on a specialized maritime platform as having provided shipping related services including: corporate registry services and / or served as a Document of Compliance holding company for the following de-flagged vessels the Panel had investigated as having violated operative paragraph 5 of resolution 2397[26] (see also annex 35b):

(i) *Hokong* (IMO: 9006758) that delivered refined petroleum products to the DPRK in 2019 and 2020;

(ii) *Unica* (IMO: 8514306) that delivered refined petroleum products to the DPRK in 2019 and 2020;

(iii) *Subblic* (IMO: 8126082) that delivered refined petroleum products to the DPRK in 2019 and 2020;

(iv) *Vifine aka Tealway FV* (IMO: 9045962) that delivered refined petroleum products to the DPRK in 2019; and

(v) *New Konk* (IMO: 9036387) that conducted a ship-to-ship transfer with the *Vifine* in 2019 and delivered refined petroleum products to the DPRK in 2020.

The Panel continues to await a response from Union Bureau.

Source: The Panel

[26] S/2020/151 of 3 March 2020

Annex 35b: Port Clearance document showing fraudulent identifiers used by *Gold Star*, November 2020



国际航行船舶出口岸许可证

No. 200802020037852213

存根				
存	船　名	海洋之星	国　籍	蒙古
根	驶往港	巴淡岛	驶离时间	2020-11-30 16:00

签 发 人

2020 年 11 月 30 日

No. 200802020037852213

中华人民共和国

国际航行船舶出口岸许可证

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA PORT CLEARANCE

船　名 Name of Ship	海洋之星 OCEAN STAR	国　籍 Nationality	蒙古 Mongolia
驶往港 Next Port	巴淡岛 BATAM	驶离时间 Time of Departure	2020-11-30 16:00

签 章: 白马港海事处

Issued by:

时 间:

Date and time: 2020-11-30 16:00:00

备注

Remarks

1、本证自签发时起24小时内有效。

This clearance remains valid within 24 hours from the time issued.

2、本证涂改无效

Correction will render this clearance invalid.

Source: Member State

According to China, this port clearance document is fake. See China’s reply in annex 35a


Annex 36a: Then Sierra Leone-flagged *Ji Yuan's (aka Chang Long*) (IMO: 9044140) voyages, 2019 to 2021

Panel analysis into AIS tracking information of the *Ji Yuan* showed the vessel also transmitting as the *Ataizhouxinluo* (MMSI: 300800121). The *Ji Yuan*, transmitting as the *Ataizhouxinluo*, could be tracked much further sailing towards the DPRK. The vessel last transmitted an AIS signal in February 2021 near Kaohsiung port[27].

Tracking data of the *Ji Yuan* on a specialized commercial maritime database platform showed the vessel exhibited instances of transmitting as another vessel since 2019 through at least 2020, suggesting the possibility of a second transponder carried on board. When the *Ataizhouxinluo's* AIS signal was captured in DPRK waters around 30 September 2019 (EST), an AIS signal jump of the vessel back Southwest around 26 September 2019 after the vessel beginning to sail North-east indicates another vessel, possibly the original *Ataizhouxinluo* operating locally in the Chengjiagang port area, China, that also transmitted the same MMSI. This could indicate a spoofing technique to further obfuscate AIS profiles.

The following are sample instances of a highly likely fraudulent transmission on the MMSI: 300800121, sailing alternatingly as *Ataizhouxinluo* or as *Guanyunyu60203.*


Figure Annex 36a-1: *Ji Yuan* and *Ataizhouxinluo* in the Hong Kong port area showing similar AIS voyage information, September 2019



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

[27] As of May 2021.

Figure Annex 36a-2: 'Meeting' between *Ji Yuan and Ataizhouxinluo* but showing same AIS tracks during the voyage, September 2019



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel


Figure Annex 36a-3: Voyage route of *Ji Yuan / Ataizhouxinluo* in November 2019 showing positional jumps

Example of positional jumps indicate two vessels are operating on the *Ataizhouxinluo* MMSI




Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

Figure Annex 36a-4: ***Ji Yuan*** **was shown on AIS tracking database in July 2020 at Hong Kong port area**



Low resolution satellite imagery showing that the *Ji Yuan* 'meeting' with *Ataizhouxinluo* (which changed its name to *Guanyunyu60203*) is just one vessel.



Source: Windward, Planet Labs, annotated by the Panel

The Panel also sought assistance from the United Kingdom, Sierra Leone, Mongolia and related entities concerning the vessel and its cargo.

Sierra Leone provided the requested documentation to the Panel including shipping documentation (see annex 36b). The *Ji Yuan* was ex-officio cancelled and deleted from the Sierra Leone ship registry on 3 April 2020, with the included reason of the vessel's engagement with activities prohibited by Security Council resolutions related to the DPRK (see annex 36c).

Mongolia provided information and documentation on the *Ji Yuan (aka Chang Long*) (see annexes 36d – 36g) and confirmed the vessel's de-registration on 14 June 2021.

The United Kingdom responded that it was following up on the requested information into the relevant companies and would revert with more details in due course.

Source: The Panel

Annex 36b: Sample of shipping documentation of the Document of Compliance holding company for *Ji Yuan*

JY - 00047



SHORT TERM
DOCUMENT OF COMPLIANCE

Issued under the provisions of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended,

Under the Authority of Government of the

REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE
by
UNION BUREAU OF SHIPPING

Name of the Company : JIYUAN SHIPPING LTD

Address of the Company : UNIT G25 WATERFRONT STUDIOS,
1 DOCK ROAD, E16 1AH LONDON, UNITED
KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN LRELAND

Company Identification Number : **6115715**

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT the safety management system of the Company has been audited and that it complies with the requirements of the International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention (ISM Code) for the types of ships listed below (delete as appropriate):

~~Passenger ship~~
~~Passenger high-speed craft~~
~~Cargo high-speed craft~~
~~Bulk carrier~~
~~Oil tanker~~
~~Chemical tanker~~
~~Gas carrier~~
~~Mobile offshore drilling unit~~
Other cargo ship

This Short Term Document of Compliance remains in force until the Full Term Document of Compliance has been delivered on board, but not later than 24th April 2020.

Issued at DALIAN, CHINA on 25th January, 2020

UNION BUREAU OF SHIPPING (stamp)

FL LIU/UBSH0002
Auditor to
UNION BUREAU OF SHIPPING

Source: Member State


Annex 36c: De-registration certificate of Ji Yuan, 3 April 2020



REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE

CERTIFICATE OF DE-REGISTRATION
REMOVAL FROM REGISTER




Issued in accordance with the Sierra Leone Merchant Shipping Act of 2003,
Part III, Section 20 & 21.

Certificate No. VHQ-200-20-0878

Name of Vessel: JI YUAN	Official No. SLR10399

Call Sign: 9LU 2412	Port of Registry: FREETOWN	IMO No. 9044140
MMSI No: 667 001 600	Type of Vessel: Container Ship	Gross Tonnage: 3986

Owner's Name and Address: JIYUAN SHIPPING LTD., UNIT G25 WATERFRONT STUDIOS, 1 DOCK ROAD, E16 1AH, LONDON, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Owner's IMO No: 6115715

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that:

1. The registration of the vessel described above as Sierra Leonean ship was terminated and on the date given below and an entry was made in the merchant ship Register to this effect.
2. At the time of de-registration the following particulars of encumbrances and rights were registered on the vessel:

The vessel has outstanding dues to the register of Sierra Leone.

3. The reason for de-registration of the vessel is:

Other: Engaged in activities prohibited by UNSC resolutions related to the DPRK

Place and Date of issuance

Freetown, Sierra Leone on 03 April 2020 at 12:26 UTC


[redacted]

This is an electronically generated certificate. It has been digitally signed and stamped.

Rafaella Christofi - Assistant Registrar

To Whom It may Concern: Authenticity of this certificate can be verified through the Flag Administration's website at www.slmarad.com based on the Certificate Number or by contacting directly the Flag Administration through the contact details at the bottom of the certificate.

Source: Member State

Annex 36d: Bill of Sale of vessel *Ji Yuan* (IMO: 9044140), 26 July 2019

Prescribed by the Commissioners of Customs & Excise with the consent of the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

Form No. 10A

X.S. 79A

BILL OF SALE (Body Corporate)

IMO Number	Name of Ship	Number, year and port of registry	Whether a sailing, steam or motor ship	Horse power of engines (if any)
9044160	MV SUNNY CEDAR	Built 1992, DAE SUN SHIPBUILDING & ENGINEERING CO., LTD.	Motor ship	5,320PS

	Meters	CM	Number of tons GRT	Number of tons NRT
Length	107	00	3,980	1,878
Breadth	17	20		
Depth	8	30		

And as described in more detail in the Certificate of the Surveyor and the Register Book.

We, (a) KOREA MARINE TRANSPORT CO., LTD. (hereinafter called "the Transferors") having our principal place of business at 15th Floor, Hanjin Bldg., Namdaemun-ro 63, Jung-gu, Seoul, Republic of Korea, in consideration of the sum of USD 1,100,000 (United States Dollars One Million and One Hundred Thousand) in cash paid to us by (b) GOOD JOB TRADING LIMITED, RMS 05-15 13A/F SOUTH TOWER WORLD FINANCE CTR HARBOUR CITY 17 CANTON ROAD TSIM SHA TSUI KL, HONG KONG (hereinafter called "the Transferee(s)") the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, transfer ALL (100%) shares in the Ship above particularly described, and in her boats and appurtenances, to the said Transferee(s).

Further, we, the said transferors for ourselves and our successors covenant with the said Transferee(s) and (c) THEIR assigns, that we have power to transfer in manner aforesaid the premises hereinbefore expressed to be transferred, and that the same are free from ANY and (d) ALL MORTGAGES, ENCUMBRANCES AND MARITIME LIENS OR ANY OTHER DEBTS WHATSOEVER.

In witness whereof we have hereunto affixed our common seal on 26th July, 2019.

KOREA MARINE TRANSPORT CO., LTD.,

[redacted]

(a) Insert title in FULL of the Body Corporate, (b) Insert name and address in full and description of transferee or transferees. (c) Insert "his", "her", or "their".
(d) If there be any subsisting Mortgage, or outstanding Certificate of Mortgage or Sale, add "save as appears by the Registry of the said Ship".
(e) Description of Witnesses : Directors, Secretary, etc. (as the case may be).

NOTE:- *A purchaser of a registered British Vessel does not obtain a complete title until the Bill of Sale has been recorded at the Port of Registry of the ship; and neglect of this precaution may entail serious consequences.*

NOTE:- *Registered Owners or Mortgagees are reminded of the importance of keeping the Registrar of British Ships informed of any change of residence on their part.*

Sec. F. 2058 (Oct 1971) 1548-934992-1234-7/72-817-NP

*Note: The Panel holds the notarized document for the Bill of Sale.

Source: Member State

Annex 36e: Bill of Sale of vessel *Ji Yuan* (IMO: 9044140), 15 August 2019

Prescribed by the Commissioners of Customs & Excise with the consent of the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

FormNo. 10A

X.S.79A

BILL OF SALE (BodyCorporate)

IMO Number	Name of Ship	Official number, year and port of Registry	Whether a sailing, steam or motorship	Horse power of engines (if any)
9044140	SUNNY CEDAR	JJR-920571 1992/JEJU	Motor ship	5320PS

	Meters	Centimeters	Number of tons: Gross	Number of tons: Net
Length	107	00	3980	1878
Breadth	17	20		
Depth	8	30		

And as described in more detail in the Certificate of the Surveyor and the Register Book.

We, (a) GOOD JOB TRADING LIMITED (hereinafter called "the Vendors") having our principal place of business at RMS 05-15 13A/F SOUTH TOWER WORLD FINANCE CTR HARBOUR CITY 17 CANTON ROAD TSIM SHATSUI KL, HONGKONG, in consideration of the sum of USD 1.00 (ONE UNITED STATES DOLLARS ONLY) or other valuable consideration paid to us by (b) JIYUAN SHIPPING LTD, with registered address at UNIT G25 WATERFRONT STUDIOS, 1 DOCK ROAD, LONDON, UNITED KINGDOM, E16 1AH (hereinafter called "the Purchaser(s)") the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, transfer ALL(100%)shares in the Ship above particularly described, and in her boats and appurtenances, to the said Transferee(s).

Further, we, the said transferors for ourselves and our successors covenant with the said Transferee(s)and(c) THEIR assigns, that we have power to transfer in manner aforesaid the premises hereinbefore expressed to be transferred, and that the same are free from ANY ENCUMBRANCES (d) ALL DEBTS, MORTGAGES, TAXES AND MARITIME LIENS ANDCLAIMS.

In witness whereof we have hereunto executed this bill of sale on 15 AUG 2019

For & on behalf of GOOD JOB TRADING LIMITED.

[redacted]

By : [redacted]
Title :Attorney in fact

(a) Insert title in FULL of the Body Corporate, (b) Insert name and address in full and description of transferee or transferees. (c) Insert "his", "her", or "their"
(d) If there be any subsisting Mortgage, or outstanding Certificate of Mortgage or Sale, add "save as appears by the Registry of the said Ship"
(e) Description of Witnesses : Directors, Secretary, etc. (as the case maybe)

NOTE:- A purchaser of a registered British Vessel does not obtain a complete title until the Bill of Sale has been recorded at the Port of Registry of the ship; and neglect of this precaution may entail serious consequences.

NOTE:- Registered Owners or Mortgagees are reminded of the importance of keeping the Registrar of British Ships informed of any change of residence on their part

Sec F 2058(Oct 1971)

1548-934992-1234-7/72-817-NP

*Note: The Panel holds the notarized document for the Bill of Sale.

Source: Member State

Annex 36f: De-registration and Statement of Withdrawal of Certificates of Chang Long (fka *Ji Yuan*)

Statement For Withdraw the Statutory Certificates

To whom it may concern,

This is to declare that: All the following statutory certificates of M/V CHANG LONG (IMO9044140) issued by this RO International Marine Survey Association under the Authority of the Government of Mongolia have been withdrawn due to she was de-registration by MSR on 14 June 2021. And this RO will not be responsible for the ship's condition covered by following certificates from the date of issuing this statement.

1. International tonnage certificate (ITC) IM-20-01-222
2. Cargo ship safety construction certificate (CSSC) IM-20-01-223
3. Cargo ship safety equipment certificate (CSSE) IM-20-01-224
4. Cargo ship safety radio certificate (CSSR) IM-20-01-225
5. International load line certificate (ILLC) IM-20-01-226
6. International oil pollution prevention certificate (IOPP) IM-20-01-227
7. International air pollution prevention certificate (IAPP) IM-20-01-228
8. International sewage pollution prevention certificate (ISPP) IM-20-01-229
9. International energy efficiency certificate (IEEC) IM-20-01-230
10. International ballast water management certificate (IBWMC) IM-20-01-231
11. International anti-fouling system certificate (AFS) IM-20-01-232
12. Safe management certificate (SMC) IM-20-01-235
13. International ship security certificate (ISSC) IM-20-01-236
14. Maritime labor certificate (MLC) IM-20-01-237

INTERNATIONAL MARINE IMSA SURVEY ASSOCIATION

Issued By: **International Marine Survey Association**

On 15 June 2021.

Source: Member State

Annex 36g: Mongolia Ship Circular



MONGOLIA SHIP REGISTRY
MONGOLIA MARITIME ADMINISTRATION

Circular No. 03-19

03 May 2019

TO: SHIP-OWNERS/ OPERATORS MANAGERS, AND INDIVIDUALS

SUBJECT: REGISTRATION AND DE-REGISTRATION PROCEDURE

PURPOSE

This Maritime Circular is to provide guidelines for the registration and cancellation of vessels who is presumable to breach a Mongolia laws and UN Sanctions.

REGISTRATION AND APPLICATION

1. The Mongolia registrar will check the vessels background and previous history.
2. The Shipowners and the managers must submit all the documents required by Mongolia Ship registry.
3. Mongolia Ship Registry has right to reject the vessel's application if consider as suspicious.
4. Mongolia Ship Registry has right to require "Letter of Undertaking" additionally from owner (The letter sample enclosed in Annex 1)

DE-REGISTRATION AND CANCELLATION OF CERTIFICATES

The Mongolia Ship Registry has right to cancel the vessels' registration in such cases:

1. Violation of Mongolia Laws and Regulations
2. Violation of UN and EU sanctions.
3. Violation of MLC and its requirements
4. Transportation of prohibited and banned cargoes.
5. High number of PSC detentions

This circular will enter into effect as of 01st June 2019.

For any inquiries, please contact us.

Mongolia Ship Registry
[redacted]

Source: Member State

Annex 37a: *Wol Bong San (fka Xin Hai*) (IMO: 7636638)

The unknown-flagged tanker *Xin Hai* (IMO: 7636638) came under the DPRK fleet and was renamed *Wol Bong San* in March 2020. The vessel's history is indicative of other vessels the Panel investigated that transitioned to become DPRK-flagged. Indicators included: not updating ownership information and DPRK-associated ties in the vessels' management history.

The *Xin Hai* was formerly Sierra Leone-flagged from October 2017 to November 2019. The vessel was de-registered with the provided reason to the ship registry that it was "sold and transferred" (see annex 37b). However, maritime databases have not registered an updated sale nor new flag registry since then till the vessel was flagged under the DPRK and renamed *Wol Bong San*, in March 2020[28]. A satellite imagery captured showed the *Xin Hai* docked at Nampo, DPRK, in November 2020 (figure annex 37a). The vessel has not transmitted an AIS signal since October 2019[29].

Figure Annex 37a: *Xin Hai* (nka as *Wol Bong San*), Nampo, DPRK, 10 November 2020



Source: Member State

[28] The information was updated some time in 2021, with its DPRK-flagged status backdated to March 2020.
[29] Windward.

The *Xin Hai'*s registered owner, BVI-registered Zong Heng Ltd, listed Baili Shipping & Trading Ltd (hereafter "Baili Shipping")[30], a Hong Kong incorporated entity[31] that also served as the vessel's manager and operator, as its care of address. Baili Shipping, however, according to Hong Kong corporate registry records, was dissolved in March 2018, indicating that the vessel ownership was not updated with the IMO. This is consistent with the Panel's past reporting of vessels that had conducted sanctionable activity that continued to list former owners or managers as an added layer of obfuscation, while conducting sanctions evasion activities.

The Panel notes that the facilitators behind entities that operate suspect vessels that have gone on to the flagged under the DPRK have links with other vessels that are DPRK-linked.

For instance, information provided to the Panel by an entity associated with the designated vessel *Yuk Tung* (IMO:9030891) lists the *Ocean Explorer* (IMO: 9388792) has having conduced a ship-to-ship transfer on 28 October 2018 with the *Xin Hai*. The *Ocean Explorer* conducted a ship-to-ship transfer with the *Yuk Tung* sailing as "*Maika*" a day later on 29 October 2019[32].

Baili Shipping's sole Director and shareholder lists a Chinese national named Zhang Qiao. The Panel listed Zhang Qiao as associated with the designated *Jie Shun* (IMO: 8518780), a vessel that was interdicted in 2019 while sailing *enroute* from the DPRK towards the Suez Canal, transporting DPRK ammunition and iron ore on board[33].

Baili Shipping was also listed as the Document of Compliance holder for the then Mongolia-flagged *Tian Tong* (IMO: 8712348) from January 2016 to November 2017 prior to the vessel being re-flagged under the DPRK. It served in a similar capacity with other DPRK vessels prior to their coming under the DPRK fleet, including DPRK-flagged: *Myong Sin* (IMO: 9045182) and *Ever Glory* (IMO: 8909915) that were mentioned in Panel reports exporting DPRK-origin coal.

Source: The Panel

30 *百利船舶貿易有限公司*

31 Room 2105, DL 1374, Trend Center, 29-31, Cheung Lee Street, Chai Wan, Hong Kong, China.

32 S/2019/171

33 S/2017/150.


Annex 37b: Certificate of De-Registration, *Xin Hai* (IMO: 7636638)



REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE

CERTIFICATE OF DE-REGISTRATION
REMOVAL FROM REGISTER




Issued in accordance with the Sierra Leone Merchant Shipping Act of 2003, Part III, Section 20 & 21.

Certificate No. VHQ-200-19-2949

Name of Vessel: XIN HAI		Official No.: SLR10485
Call Sign: 9LU 2498	Port of Registry: FREETOWN	IMO No.: 7636638
MMSI No: 667 001 695	Type of Vessel: OIL TANKER	Gross Tonnage: 5105
Owner's Name and Address: ZONG HENG LIMITED, Vistra Corporate Services Centre, Wickhams Cay II, Road Town, Tortola, VG1110, Virgin Islands (British)		Owner's IMO No: 6011341

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that:

1. The registration of the vessel described above as Sierra Leonean ship was terminated and on the date given below and an entry was made in the merchant ship Register to this effect.
2. At the time of de-registration the following particulars of encumbrances and rights were registered on the vessel:

The vessel is free from all registered Encumbrances and Mortgages on the register of Sierra Leone.

3. The reason for de-registration of the vessel is:

Sold and transferred:

Place and Date of issuance

Freetown, Sierra Leone on 13 November 2019 at 08:53 UTC

This is an electronically generated certificate. It has been digitally signed and stamped.

[redacted] SLMARAD

Assistant Registrar

To Whom it may Concern: Authenticity of this certificate can be verified through the Flag Administration's website at www.slmarad.com based on the Certificate Number or by contacting directly the Flag Administration through the contact details at the bottom of the certificate.

Sierra Leone Maritime Administration SLMARAD
info@slmarad.com www.slmarad.com


VHQ-200-19-2949 Page 1 of 1

Source: The Panel

Annex 38a: *Sin Phyong 5 (fka Woo Jeong)* (IMO: 8865121)

The *Woo Jeong* was ROK-flagged from May 2010 to September 2019[34]. Sometime in 2021, the vessel was updated as DPRK-flagged. The *Woo Jeong* last transmitted an AIS signal around 27 July 2019 (EST) off Shidao, China (see figure annex 38a). Prior to this, the vessel sailed a domestic route. ROK authorities confirmed the dates the vessel sailed under its ship registry and provided documentation on the vessel.

Figure Annex 38a: Excerpt from a specialized maritime database platform showing voyage details of the *Woo Jeong,* July 2019



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

[34] Member State.

Maritime database information[55] listed the vessel was owned and operated by the ROK-incorporated Young Sung Global Co Ltd (hereafter "Young Sung Global") from June 2012 until July 2019. In October 2020, the vessel was reported to have come under the DPRK ownership of Korea Myongryu Trading Co.

According to Young Sung Global, it signed a ship brokerage agreement on 1 July 2019 with a Busan-based ship brokering entity that "carried out the overseas sale of *Woo Jung* [sic]". A Chinese broker for the buyer was identified via a Seoul-based ship brokering entity. The buyer was seeking to purchase the vessel "where fast delivery was possible". A Memorandum of Agreement for the ship sale (see annex 38b) was signed on 8 July 2019, with the transfer of the vessel to the buyer, Deepika Shipping and Trading Ltd, within the same month (see annex 38c). Young Sung Global provided other documentation related to the vessel's sale.

Investigations continue.

Source: The Panel

[35] Ibid.

Annex 38b: Excerpts : Addendum to the Memorandum of Agreement of sale for *Woo Jeong*

Addendum No. 1

to the MOA dated 8th July 2019

made between

JY SNP CO., LTD
on behalf of the Owners (YOUNG SUNG GLOBAL CO., LTD)
(as Sellers)

And

DEEPIKA SHIPPING AND TRADING LTD or their nominee
(as Buyers)

for MT "WOO JEONG" (The "Vessel")

It is hereby mutually agreed by the Sellers and the Buyers that:

A) In exchange for payment of the Purchase Price, the Sellers shall furnish the Buyers with the following documents:

1. (1) One original notarized **Bill of Sale**, (Form No. 10A) in favor of the Buyers certifying that the vessel is free from all encumbrances, mortgages, maritime liens, taxes and/or any other debt or claims whatsoever duly signed by the director or the Sellers or their duly appointed Attorney and dated. The full name and designation of the signatory to the Bill of Sale to be clearly specified on the Bill of Sale.

2. Original **Transcript of Registry** issued by Korean Ship Registry stating that the vessel's register is free from registered encumbrances, mortgages. This certificate must not be dated more than 3 working days prior to Sellers tendering the Notice of Readiness and must not reference any mortgages, maritime liens, debts, taxes, financial liabilities/obligations whatsoever on the vessel. (If its not in English, the English translation to be notarized). The Sellers and Buyers agreed that the Sellers provide the "Real Estate Register in Korean language + translated in English which should be duly notarized.

3. **Minutes of the Resolutions of the Board of Directors** of the Sellers signed by the Directors of the Sellers resolving the sale of the Vessel in accordance with the terms and conditions of the MOA, approving same and appointing/authorizing the Attorney(s)-in-Fact to, inter alia, execute and deliver the Bill of Sale, the Protocol of Delivery and Acceptance and any other documents required for the legal and physical delivery of the Vessel, and to agree on the quantity of the remaining bunkers, unused lubricating oils

1


[redacted]


[redacted]

2. Original <u>Power of Attorney</u> authorizing person to execute the MOA and its Addenda, to execute the delivery documents. To execute the "Protocol of Delivery and Acceptance" with the Sellers, authorize representatives and to complete all formalities of the documentary closing of the vessel for and on behalf of the Buyers

C). Documents to be executed by Sellers and Buyers:

1. Protocol of Delivery and Acceptance to be executed in 3 original copies by Sellers and Buyers authorized representatives at the place of closing and the place of physical delivery stating the date, time and place of the physical delivery of the Vessel.

This addendum No.1 to be deemed as an integrated part of the MOA.

For and on behalf of Buyers:

[redacted]

Name: [redacted]

Title: bb [redacted]

For and on behalf of Sellers:

For and on behalf of
Deepika Shipping and \Trading Ltd

[redacted]

Authorized Signature(s)

Name:

Title:

Addendum No. 2

Vessel: **MT "WOO JEONG" (IMO No.8865121)** (hereinafter called the "Vessel")
Sellers: **JY SNP CO., LTD**
Buyers: **DEEPIKA SHIPPING AND TRADING LTD**
New Buyers : **ZHANG RUSHENG**


With reference to the Memorandum of Agreement made on 8th July 2019 by and between the Sellers and the Buyers on the sale of the Vessel (the MOA), it is mutually agreed by both parties as follows:-

DEEPIKA SHIPPING AND TRADING LTD hereby nominate **ZHANG RUSHENG, PASSPORT NO. E38277026** as Buyers of the Vessel and **JY SNP CO., LTD** acknowledge this nomination which is accepted by the Nominee.

1) The Nominee's performance of the MOA is fully guaranteed by **DEEPIKA SHIPPING AND TRADING LTD**

All other terms, conditions and exceptions of the MOA, Addendum No.1 shall remain unchanged and effective in full force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have signed and executed this Addendum No.2 in duplicate this 10th day of July, 2019.



For **JY SNP CO., LTD**

[redacted]

Name:
Title : Attorney – In - Fact

For **DEEPIKA SHIPPING AND TRADING LTD** For and on behalf of
Deepika Shipping and Trading Ltd

Name: [redacted] rized Signature(s)
Title : Representative Director

For **ZHANG RUSHENG**

[redacted]

Name:
Title : Director

Source: The Panel

Annex 38c: Export Declaration Certificate



USD 1165.43
USD 1165.43

수출신고필증(수출이행, 갑지)

※ 처리기간 : 즉시

신고자 관세법인 사인 서정남	신고번호 43052-19-070665X	세관.과 030-15	신고일자 2019-07-18	신고구분 H 일반P/L신고	C/S구분 A

수출대행자 주식회사 제이와이엣센피
(통관고유부호) 제이와이-1-18-E-01-9 수출자구분 B
수출화주 (주)영성글로벌
(통관고유부호) 영성글로-1-96-1-01-7
(주소) 부산광역시 중구 대청로 148 (중앙동 2가)
(대표자) [redacted] (소재지) 48957
(사업자등록번호) 604-81-31662

거래구분 11 일반형태	종류 A 일반수출	결제방법 TT 단순송금방식
목적국 CN PR.CHNA	적재항 KRPUS 부산항	선박회사 (항공사)
선박명(항공편명)	출항예정일자	적재예정보세구역 03046000
운송형태 10 BU	검사희망일 2019/07/18	
물품소재지 49000 월드씨포트 부산 영도구 해양로 33-52 03899999 /		

제조자 미상
(통관고유부호) 제조미상-9-99-9-00-0
제조장소 48957 산업단지부호 999

L/C번호 | 물품상태 0
사전임시개청통보여부 N | 반송 사유

구매자 ZHANG RUSHENG(ON BEHALF OF DEEPIKA SHIPPING ANG TRADING
(구매자부호) CNZHANGR0015R

환급신청인 (1:수출대행자/수출화주, 2:제조자)
자동간이정액환급 NO

• 품명 · 규격 (란번호/총란수 : 001/001)

품명 USED TANKER
거래품명 USED OIL TANKER
상표명

모델 · 규격	성분	수량(단위)	단가(USD)	금액(USD)
	1 란 울지	계속		

세번부호	8901.20-0000	순중량	1,579,000.0 (KG)	수량	1 (U)	신고가격(FOB)	$510,000 ₩594,369,300
송품장부호	JY-CI-190715	수입신고번호		원산지	JP---N	포장갯수(종류)	1(GT)
수출요건확인 (발급서류명)							
총중량	1,579,000.0 (KG)	총포장갯수	1(GT)	총신고가격 (FOB)			$510,000 ₩ 594,369,300
운임(₩)	0	보험료(₩)	0	결제금액			FOB-USD-510,000.00
수입화물 관리번호				컨테이너번호			N

※신고인기재란 | 세관기재란

BUSAN MAIN CUSTOMS 부산세관 THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

운송(신고)인 기간 부터 까지	적재의무기한	2019/08/17	담당자		신고수리일자	2019/07/18

발행번호 : 2019843317192(2019.07.24) Page : 1/2

(1) 수출신고수리일로부터 30일내에 적재하지 아니한 때에는 수출신고수리가 취소됨과 아울러 과태료가 부과될 수 있으므로 적재사실을 확인하시기 바랍니다.
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Source: The Panel

Annex 39: *Tae Phyong 2 (fka Ming Zhou 6)* (IMO number: 8602763)

Updated information confirmed the *Ming Zhou 6* was acquired by the DPRK and re-named *Tae Phyong 2* in July 2020. Since then, a Member State reported the *Tae Phyong 2* had returned to deliver DPRK-origin coal in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters and proceeded to load bagged cargo of unknown origin at Longkou port, China. China informed the Panel that " … *Tae Phyong 2* entered Longkou port empty-loaded, and sailed to Nampo port after loading the fertilizers and pesticides".

The Panel reported that the DPRK was suspected to have acquired the formerly China-flagged vessel *Ming Zhou 6* through a joint venture between China and DPRK entities set up to transfer the vessel (IMO: 8602763)[36]. Publicly available information reported the vessel sold around May 2019 for demolition by its owner and operator, Ningbo Marine Co. Ltd. (hereafter, Ningbo Marine). According to a commercial maritime database, the *Ming Zhou* 6 was then recorded as 'broken up'[37].


The vessel was reported sold with a 'scrap ship sale contract'[38] and a May 2019 delivery at Wenzhou Anchorage to Chinese national: Su Jianpo[39]. Two other individuals Chen Jinbao and Weng Mingguo were also reported by the Member State to have been directly involved in the delivery of *Ming Zhou 6* to the DPRK. Information provided by a Member State indicates that the DPRK acquired the vessel by late May 2020 following a joint venture agreement the DPRK-based Jinmyong Trading Corporation (hereafter "Jinmyong Trading") and the China-based Dandong Economic Cooperation Border Maritime Processing Company in November 2019, with Jinmyong Trading acquiring the *Ming Zhou 6* by late May 2020. A second DPRK-based company, Mulgil Trading General Corporation, which has overseas offices in Dandong, China according to the same Member State, helped to facilitate the acquisition.

A specialized maritime AI platform showed the *Ming Zhou 6* with an AIS transmission in May 2019 in Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province before ceasing transmission. A vessel transmitting its identification with the IMO number 8602763 and with the registered owner given as Ningbo Marine was recorded on the same commercial maritime database transmitting AIS on 1 October 2019 (EST) off Pingtan Island, Fujian Province.

China replied that the *Ming Zhou 6's* registration was cancelled in May 2019, with no records of the vessel entering or leaving Chinese ports. The vessel is one of the largest acquired cargo vessels. The vessel was captured on satellite imagery laden with DPRK-origin coal at Nampo in July 2020 (see figure annex 39-1). In March 2021, the vessel was recorded loading bagged cargo of unknown origin at Longkou port, China (see figure annex 39-2).

36 Paragraph 71-72, S/2021/211.
37 IHS Markit
38 *Source*: http://nbmc.com.cn/download.jsp?id=832
39 苏建坡

Figure Annex 39-1: Storyboard of *Ming Zhou 6* ending up in the DPRK, 2019-2020




Source: Member State

Figure Annex 39-2: *Tae P(h)yong 2* (fka *Ming Zhou 6*) loading bagged cargo of unknown origin, Longkou, China, March 2021



Source: Member State

Figure Annex 39-3: *Tae P(h)yong 2* (fka *Ming Zhou 6*) voyage, March 2021




Source: Windward, Planet Labs, annotated by the Panel
Note: Inset imagery is for location purpose and not reflective of the actual date of capture per the AIS transmission overlay.

Annex 40: *Enterprise* (IMO: 9153331)

The DPRK-associated *Enterprise* has continued to sail and export DPRK-origin coal despite it being suspended from the Togo ship registry since June 2020[40]. In 2021, the *Enterprise* returned to Ningbo-Zhoushan waters (see figures annex 40-1 and 40-2).


Figure Annex 40-1: *Enterprise* alongside other DPRK vessels, Ningbo-Zhoushan, China, 25 March 2021



Source: Member State

[40] S/2021/211.

Figure Annex 40-2: *Enterprise* alongside other DPRK vessels, Ningbo-Zhoushan, China, 5 April 2021



Source: Member State

Panel investigations show a connection between the owners and operators of the *Enterprise* with those of the designated *Jie Shun* (IMO: 8518780).[41]

Networks

The Panel reported that about four months prior to the *Enterprise*'s arrival at Nampo, DPRK, the vessel's ownership and management was transferred to entities with listed addresses in China. Tai Yuan Shipping Co Ltd (hereafter "*Tai Yuan*") was recorded as the vessel's group owner since June 2019, with the vessel's registered owner as Blue Sky Shipping Co Ltd (hereafter "Blue Sky"). Blue Sky is listed in the care of Dalian Taiyuan International Shipping Agency Co Ltd (hereafter "Dalian Taiyuan")[42]. Dalian Taiyuan, the vessel's operator and manager since June 2019, lists an address in Dalian, Liaoning Province[43].

[41] Vessel was designated in October 2017.
[42] IMO website.
[43] Room 2112B , World Trade Center, 25 Tongxing Jie, Zhongshan Qu, Dalian, Liaoning, 116001, China.

Shipping records obtained by the Panel show the managers of *Enterprise* as Dalian Taiyuan with a different address: #32, Wuwu Road, Zhongshan District, in Dalian (see figure annex 40-3). This address has the same co-located building address as Vast Win Trading Limited, the former owner of the designated *Jie Shun*. The *Enterprise's* former owner and operator when it was sailing as *Blue Sky*, Jitsu Limited, also lists the same associated address (see figure annex 40-4), indicating a continued management association despite a change in the names of the entities. Sale documentation of *Blue Sky* when it was purchased by Jitsu Limited, lists a Gu Min as the Jitsu Limited's sole Director (see figure annex 40-5). A "Ms Gu Min" was listed by the Panel has the Director of Bene Star, along with Mr Pan Wei Chao, Director of Pantech Shipping Ltd.; and Mr Li Qi, vice-president of Dalian Shenghao International Trade Ltd, as involved in the export of coal and iron ore from the DPRK[44]. Investigations continue.

Figure Annex 40-3: Last listed operator of *Enterprise* Dalian Taiyuan International Shipping Agency Co Ltd's address



REPUBLIQUE TOGOLAISE
TRAVAIL – LIBERTE – PATRIE

TOGOLESE MARITIME AUTHORITY
INTERNATIONAL SHIP REGISTRY

PROVISIONAL MINIMUM SAFE MANNING CERTIFICATE

Certificate Number: TG/MSM/139-38512/134/FE

TYPE OF SHIP : GENERAL CARGO — OFFICIAL NUMBER : TG-01341L
IMO NUMBER : 8153331 — CALL SIGN : 5 V F X 6

NAME OF SHIP	GROSS TONNAGE	MAIN ENGINE'S PROPULSION
ENTERPRISE	4743	2427 KW

It is here by confirmed that having regard the provisions of the regulation V/14(2) of SOLAS 1974 as amended, taking into account the Principles of Safe Manning as contained in IMO Resolution A.1047 (27) related to the Safe Manning and the national requirement of the Togolese Republic, the above mentioned ship is considered safely manned, if whenever proceeds to sea, carries not less than the number and grades of personnel shown in this document, taking into account any special condition stated herein :

DECK AND ENGINE MANNING

GRADE / CAPACITY	STCW REG.	NR.	GRADE / CAPACITY	STCW REG.	NR.
Master	II/2	1	Chief Engineer	III/3	1
Chief Mate	II/2	1	Second Engineer	III/3	1
Deck Officer(s)	II/1	1	Engineer Officer(s)	III/1	1
Deck Rating(s)-watch or Able seafarer Deck	II/4 or II/5	2	Electro-Technical Officer		
Deck Rating(s)	VI/1	1	Engine Rating(s) watch or Able Seafarer Engine	III/4 or III/5	1
			Electro –Technical Rating	III/7	1
			Engine Rating(s)	VI/1	1

CONDITIONS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT

1. A minimum of Two (2) Watch keeping deck Officers or one dedicated radio Officer are required to have the appropriate GMDSS Radio operator certificate, General or Restricted, depending upon the ship's intended Area of Operation.
2. Trading area : UNRESTRICTED VOYAGE
3. Periodically unattended machinery space (Yes / No) : No
4. Operating Company: DALIAN TAIYUAN INT'L SHIPPING AGENCY CO., LTD.
5. ADDRESS: ROOM 409, ANDA BUSINESS BUILDING, NO.32 WUWU ROAD, HAIJUN SQUARE STREET, ZHONGSHAN DISTRICT, DALIAN CITY, LIAONING PROVINCE, CHINA

This certificate is issued on the 14th day of the month JUNE of the year 2019 under the authority of the Directorate of Maritime Affairs of the Government of the Togolese Republic and it remains [illegible] day of the month DECEMBER of the year 2019.

For the International Ship Registry of Togo

[redacted]

Deputy Registrar

Source: Member State

[44] Paragraphs 66-69 and Annex 7, S/2017/150.

Figure Annex 40-4: Former owner and operator of *Enterprise* (sailing as *Blue Sky*), Jitsu Ltd, with a co-located building address with last listed operator of Enterprise, Dalian Tai-yuan International Shipping Agency Co Ltd

REPUBLIQUE TOGOLAISE
TRAVAIL – LIBERTE – PATRIE

TOGOLESE MARITIME AUTHORITY
INTERNATIONAL SHIP REGISTRY

FORM 1
CONTINUOUS SYNOPSIS RECORD (CSR)
DOCUMENT NUMBER 08 FOR THE SHIP WITH IMO NUMBER: 9153331

Dates should be in format yyyy/mm/dd.

		Information
1	This document applies from (date):	2018/JULY/20
2	Flag State:	REPUBLIC OF TOGO
3	Date of Registration with the State indicated in 2:	2018/JUNE/20
4	Name of Ship:	BLUE SKY
5	Port of registration:	LOME
6	Name of current registered owner(s): Registered address(es):	JISU LIMITED (100%) UNIT 5, 27/F.,RICHMOND COMM.BLDG.,109 ARGYLE STREET,MONGKOK,KOWLOON,HONG KONG
7	Registered owner Identification Number	5968851
8	If applicable, name of current registered bareboat chatterer(s): Registered address(es):	N/A
9	Name of Company (International Safety Management): Registered address (es): Address(es) of its safety management activities:	JISU LIMITED UNIT 5, 27/F.,RICHMOND COMM.BLDG.,109 ARGYLE STREET,MONGKOK,KOWLOON,HONG KONG #32 WUWU ROAD , ZHONGSHAN DISTRICT,DALIAN,CHINA
10	Company Identification Number	5968851
11	Name of all Classification Societies with which the ship is classed:	UNIVERSAL MARITIME BUREAU CO.,LTD.
12	Administration/Government/Recognized Organization which issued Document of Compliance: Body which carried out audit (if different):	UNIVERSAL MARITIME BUREAU CO.,LTD.
13	Administration/Government/Recognized Organization which issued Safety Management Certificate: Body which carried out audit (if different):	UNIVERSAL MARITIME BUREAU CO.,LTD.
14	Administration/Government/Recognized Organization which issued International Ship Security Certificate: Body which carried out verification (if different):	UNIVERSAL MARITIME BUREAU CO.,LTD.
15	Date on which the ship ceased to be registered with the State indicated in 2:	N/A
16	Remarks	N/A

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT this record is correct in all respects

Issued by the Ship Registrar of the Togolese Directorate of Maritime Affairs

Date of issue: 2018/JULY/20

For the International Ship Registry of Togo
Vera N. Medawar
Registrar

[redacted]

This document was received by the ship and attached to the ship's CSR file on the following date
Date: ______________ Signature: ______________

Source: Member State

Figure Annex 40-5: Documentation of Jitsu Limited's purchase of *Blue Sky (nka Enterprise)*

BILL OF SALE (Body Corporate)

Form No. 10A

No. 79 A (Sale)

Official Number	Name of Ship	year and port of registry	Whether a sailing, steam or motor ship	Horse power of engines (if any)
IMO: 9153331	DADE DUNHUA	1996, NIL	MOTOR VESSEL	2,427 KW

	Meters	Centimeters	Number of Tons	
			Gross	Net
Length from fore part of stem, to the aft side of the head of the stem post/fore side of the rudder stock(ITC)	84	90		
Main breadth to outside of plating	17	70	4743	2763
Depth in hold from tonnage deck to ceiling amidships	12	00		

and as described in more detail in the Certificate of the Surveyor and the Register Book

We (a) CHINA SHUANGMUFENG SHIPPING CO., LTD (hereinafter called the "Transferors") having our principal place of business at Trust Company Complex, Ajeltake Road, Ajeltake Island, Majuro, Marshall Islands MH96960 in consideration of the sum of US$600,000 (Saying United States Dollars Six Hundred Thousand only) paid to us by (hereinafter called the "Transferees") the Receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, transfer ALL shares in the Ship above particularly described, and in her boats to the Transferees (b) JISU LIMITED with address Unit5, 27/F., Richmond Comm. Bldg., 109 Argyle Street, Mongkok, Kowloon, Hong Kong.

Further, we, the said Transferors for ourselves and our successors covenant with the said Transferees and (c) their assigns, that we have power to transfer in manner aforesaid the premises hereinbefore expressed to be transferred, and that the same are free of all encumbrances, maritime liens, mortgages, arrests, taxes and any other claims whatsoever.
In witness whereof we have hereunto affixed our common seal this......day of June of the year 2018.

For and behalf of the Transferors :

For and on behalf of CHINA SHUANGMUFENG SHIPPING CO., LTD

CHINA SHUANGMUFENG SHIPPING CO., LTD

By: [redacted]
Title: Director

Authorized Signature(s)

(a) Insert title in FULL of the Body Corporate. (b) Insert Name and address in full and description of transferee or transferees. (c) Insert "his", "her" or "their".
(d) If there are subsisting Mortgage, or outstanding Certificate of Mortgage or Sale, add "save as appears by the Registry of the said Ship".
(e) Description of Witnesses: Directors, Secretary, etc. (as the case may be)

NOTE: - A purchaser of a registered British Vessel does not obtain a complete title until the Bill of Sale has been recorded at the Port of Registry of the ship; and neglect of this precaution may entail serious consequences
NOTE: - Registered Owners or Mortgagees are reminded of the importance of keeping the Registrar of British Ships informed of any case of residence on their part

ACCEPTANCE OF SALE

PARTICULARS OF THE VESSEL		
Registration No: 48800-17		Name of Vessel: DADE DUNHUA
Port of Registry: PANAMA		Type of Vessel: GENERAL CARGO SHIP
HP of Engine if any: 2427KW		Length: 84.90
Recorded in	Tonnage	Breadth: 17.70
Book	Gross: 4743	Depth: 12.00
Page	Net: 2763	*and as described in more details in the certificate of the surveyor and Register Book*
Entry	Underdeck	

ACCEPTANCE OF SALE

The undersigned GU MIN on behalf of and representing the Corporation named **JISU LIMITED** In the above Bill of Sale, in my position as DIRECOTR of the said Corporation. HEREBY ACCEPT for all legal purposes the sale and transfer effected by the said Bill of Sale to the said corporation by **CHINA SHUANGMUFENG SHIPPING CO., LTD** of the VESSEL **M/V DADE DUNHUA (TBN: M/V BLUE SKY)** referred to in the attached Bill of Sale.

Dated the 14TH *day of* JUNE, 2018

GU MIN AS DIRECTOR [redacted]

Name & Signature of PURCHASERS

*Remark : Applicant should record with ship's actual corresponding data.

Source: The Panel

Annex 41: DPRK documents related to Fishing Rights Transfer

According to information provided by a Member State, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) continues to sell fishing rights to a third country. Investigations carried out by the relevant authorities of that Member State on separate deployments of third country fishing fleets to and from the DPRK waters have revealed the following:

DPRK issued Fishing Rights Certificate and Insurance Policy

In January 2020, the Member State’s Coast Guard conducted inspections on fishing fleets moving southward from DPRK waters and obtained several official documents, including a fishing rights certificate and insurance policy issued by the Korea National Insurance Corporation of DPRK, a United Nations-designated entity (KPe.048).


물고기잡이허가증


조선민족보험총회사
Korea National Insurance Corporation
P&I INSURANCE POLICY

Fishing Rights Certificate ***Insurance Policy***


Source: Member State

It is stipulated in the fishing rights certificate that the initial “Term of fishing fill”, the period for permitted fishing, was May to December 2019. An additional period for permitted fishing, January 1 to 15 2020, was added by handwriting. The insurance policy was issued in May 2019.


In May 2020, the Member State’s Coast Guard was informed by radio from a fishing fleet heading towards DPRK waters that approximately 200 fishing vessels were engaged in fishing in DPRK waters. Some crew members of these fishing vessels mentioned that they would receive DPRK fishing rights certificates and fuel upon arrival in DPRK waters at a spot designated by DPRK officials.

"Punishment Work Area" and Guidelines for Fishing in the Area

In November 2020, inspections were carried out on several fishing vessels leaving southwards from DPRK waters due to deteriorating weather conditions. During these inspections, the Member State's Coast Guard obtained a DPRK map illustrating what was literally called a "punishment work area"[45], which included several inspection points and routes to enter/exit the area, and a guideline [46] for fishing activities in the area. These documents were issued by DPRK's Coast Guard and Emergency Disinfection Unit[47].







Map of the "Area" with Coordinates ***Issued Guideline***

Source : Member State

The first paragraph of the guideline reads "In respect to the dangers posed by (a third country's fishing vessels) to the DPRK regarding the <<New Coronavirus>> which is the gravest threat to the whole world and humanity, the (third country's) fishing vessels, who undergo punishment activities under the strict surveillance of the DPRK Coast Guard and Emergency Disinfection Unit, should strictly abide by the following administrative rules."

[45] 처벌작업구역 (in Korean)

[46] The guideline appears to be administrative rules for the third country's fishing fleets to follow when fishing in DPRK waters.

[47] 조선민주주의인민공화국 해양경비대, 조선민주주의인민공화국 비상방역대 (in Korean)

The crew members of the inspected fishing vessels mentioned that fishing was allowed in that area only when it was permitted by the DPRK authorities. The Member State assessed that due to COVID-19, the fishing vessels and their crew members were seemingly required to undergo disinfection measures as a precondition to fishing under the strict surveillance of the DPRK authorities.

The Panel has reviewed the Korean language guidelines and finds it difficult to conclude why the area is called a “punishment work area”. However, fishing activity appears to be strictly restricted to this area and fishing vessels may only enter the area to fish with DPRK permission and some form of COVID-19 disinfection measures. There would be consequences – including as a form of “punishiment”, seizure of vessels, confiscation of fishing gear and the vessels’ catch, imposition of fines, and deportation – for fishing vessels which did not follow these strict guidelines.

Annex 42: China's reply to the Panel

2. Fishing rights (OC.175)

China's fishing authority and relevant coastal provinces have taken measures to strengthen management and demand the fishing companies and fishermen to strictly follow the Security Council resolutions. China's position on illegal acquiring fishing rights is clear, that is, such activities, once verified, will be dealt with in accordance with laws and regulations.

According to China's investigation, no substantial evidence was found on the alleged involvement of General Association of Koreans in China and Weihai Peninsula Vessel Fuel Co., Ltd.. The information provided by the Panel, which is based solely on fragmented reports from certain media, could not serve as basis for us to carry out in-depth investigation. China hopes the Panel does not include relevant information in its report.

Source : Member State

Annex 43: Coal exports by DPRK vessels in 2020[48]

In 2020, a Member State reported at least 4.8 million metric tons of coal and possibly other sanctioned minerals in 636 shipments to China, using a mix of ship-to-ship transfers in Chinese territorial waters and direct shipments aboard China-flagged coastal barges. DPRK-flagged and controlled vessels accounted for 58% of exports by volume, with these vessels offloading 96% of their coal via ship-to-ship transfer at Ningbo-Zhoushan Port, China. The remaining ship-to-ship transfer area took place in Chinese waters in the Lianyungang area. 42% of exported DPRK-origin coal were directly delivered by China-flagged coastal barges that picked up coal at DPRK ports and delivered the coal to Chinese ports primarily along the Yangtze River.

Table Annex 43: Shipment breakdown of the DPRK's maritime coal exports in 2020.

Vessel Type	Number of Shipments	Metric Tons Exported	Percentage
DPRK-controlled fleet	441	2,770,000	58%
China-flagged coastal barges	195	2,037,000	42%
Total	**636**	**4,807,000**	100%

Source: Member State


[48] Two experts expressed the view that the data in this annex needs to be further verified.

Annex 44: Ship-to-ship transfers of coal by DPRK vessels, Ningbo-Zhoushan, China

The 26 DPRK-flagged and DPRK associated vessels in the Ningbo-Zhoushan area on 5 April 2021 referenced in the Panel's report at paragraph 89, figure 12, were assessed by a Member State to have offloaded DPRK-origin coal via ship-to-ship transfers in Chinese territorial waters. Many of these vessels that have been featured in the Panel's past reports illicitly exporting coal to China since at least 2018.

The Panel's reports have also referenced the presence of DPRK vessels and of DPRK-origin coal transfers assessed to have taken place near or at a number of Chinese port jurisdictions, including near the Ningbo-Zhoushan area. figure annex 44 shows the various anchorages where DPRK vessels congregated between February and May 2021, with the higher density clusters near: Ma'an Liedao, Maji Shan, Qushan Dao, Daxizhai Dao, the Zhoushan Archipelago, and Zhujiajian Dao. These located waters have been highlighted in previous Panel reports[49] for the DPRK's export of its coal through ship-to-ship transfers to local vessels.

Figure Annex 44: DPRK vessels and DPRK associated vessels at anchor in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters, February to May 2021



Source: Member State

49 S/2020/840 and S/2021/211.

The Panel wrote to China requesting information on the DPRK vessels present in Chinese waters, the identifiers they were transmitting under, these vessels' cargo, any ship-to-ship transfers conducted in Chinese waters with the type and amount of cargo offloaded, information on the receiving vessels' identities along with the entities and individuals that operated the receiving vessels and the offloaded coal cargo's end destination.

China responded:

(6) OC.74

The Panel's letter claimed that 26 DPRK-flagged and DPRK-associated vessels appeared in the Ningbo-Zhoushan area on 5

,

April, 2021. Relevant Chinese authorities conducted investigation accordingly. The 10 vessels with IMO number did not enter Chinese ports around 5 April 2021. Among these 10 vessels, *Kum Jing Gang* and *Un Bong 2* submitted port-entry requests to Dalian and Yantai respectively, but in fact they did not enter ports. Regarding the other 16 vessels without IMO number, China could not check their information as China is not the flag state of these vessels.

China attaches great importance to DPRK-related smuggling activities through ship-to-ship transfers. Relevant Chinese authorities have overcome numerous difficulties including the pandemic-related restrictions, done a great deal of job, and conducted careful investigation and verification on every single letter from the Panel. China hopes the Panel treats China's feedback in a prudent manner, and does not include in its report information which is unverified or inconsistent with the facts.

Source: Member State

Annex 45: Imagery of DPRK vessels in patrolled waters

This annex is confidential.

Annex 46: DPRK vessels exporting prohibited coal and importing humanitarian cargo in a single voyage

Of the 26 DPRK-associated cargo vessels that were anchored outside of Nampo Lock Gate as on 11 May 2021 (see figure 14, paragraph 99 of this report's maritime section), several of the vessels returned from Ningbo-Zhoushan empty after delivering North Korea-origin coal, according to a Member State. Half of the vessels returned from other Chinese ports, mostly Longkou Port, possibly with humanitarian aid such as fertilizer and foodstuffs. Some of those vessels, such as the DPRK-flagged *Tae Phyong 2* (IMO: 8602763), delivered coal to Ningbo-Zhoushan before transiting to Longkou. Most of these vessels will likely continue to wait before being allowed to offload cargo at Nampo or other ports along the Taedong River[51].

DPRK-flagged *Ko San* (IMO: 9110236)

Based on data sourced from maritime databases and Member State information, the DPRK vessel *Ko San* (IMO: 9110236) departed Chongjin, DPRK, by 29 May 2020. The *Ko San* dropped its AIS transmission around 3 June 2020 whilst east of Jeju Island, Republic of Korea, before re-transmitting around 28 June 2020 as it approached Dalian, China. According to a Member State, the *Ko San* arrived at Ningbo-Zhoushan waters by 7 June 2020 and offloaded its coal cargo by 18 June 2020. Figure annex 46-1 showed the *Ko San* at anchor in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters alongside other DPRK vessels on 17 June 2020.

Figure Annex 46-1: *Ko San* in Ningbo-Zhoushan, China, 17 June 2020

Source: Member State


[51] For instance, the DPRK-flagged *Mi Yang 5* (IMO: 8620454) was reported to have waited outside of Nampo lock gate for around 100 days before entering to offload cargo on 11 May. The DPRK-flagged *Yon Pung 3* (IMO: 8314811) waited for 124 days before entering the lock gate with cargo it loaded at Longkou Port.

According to a Member State, humanitarian aid cargo for delivery to DPRK was loaded onto the *Ko San* at Dalian, China, on and around 1 July 2020. Information on commercial maritime database platforms show the *Ko San* arrived at Dalian port by 3 July 2020, with a draft change that indicated cargo was loaded onto the vessel. The vessel last transmitted an AIS signal in July 2020. In 5 April 2021, the vessel was back in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters by 5 April 2021 carrying DPRK-origin coal.

DPRK-flagged *Min Hae* (IMO: 8672897)

In the first week of March 2021, the DPRK-flagged *Min Hae* (IMO: 8672897) departed the DPRK with coal cargo for Ningbo-Zhoushan waters and then proceeded to call at Longkou Port before returning to the DPRK (see figure annex 46-2). The port information and tracking data from Longkou available to the Panel is at figure annex 46-3.

Figure Annex 46-2: Storyboard of DPRK-flagged *Min Hae's* (IMO: 8672897) voyage to export DPRK-origin coal and import humanitarian aid cargo in a single voyage, March to April 2021



Source: Member State

Figure Annex 46-3: ***Min Hae*** **at Longkou port area, China, 23 April 2021**



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel; Google Earth (insert satellite imagery as representative of the port location not by actual date; AIS signal overlay as on 23 April 2021)


<u>DPRK-flagged *Thae Song 8* (IMO: 9003653)</u>

The DPRK-flagged *Thae Song 8* (IMO: 9003653) was another vessel located outside Nampo Lockgate as on 11 May 2021 that exported DPRK-origin coal to Ningbo-Zhoushan waters and returned with humanitarian aid cargo. The Panel had reported the *Thae Song 8*, then sailing as *Forever Lucky*, exporting illicit DPRK-origin coal as far back as 2017.

The Panel's tracking records of the vessel indicated that prior to its arrival at Ningbo-Zhoushan waters, *Thae Song 8* had not transmitted on its AIS for at least seven months since August 2020. On 15 March 2021, the vessel was recorded on satellite imagery near Zhujiajian Dao, China, with coal in its holds, and within vicinity of other DPRK and DPRK-associated vessels (see figure annex 46-4). *Thae Song 8* was again located around a week later in another part of Ningbo-Zhoushan waters near Daxizhai Dao, China (see figure annex 46-5). A day earlier, the Chinese coast guard patrol craft was recorded transiting close by, along with eight other DPRK vessels located within vicinity. By 6 April 2021, *Thae Song 8* appeared berthed at the Longkou Terminal based on its AIS transmissions on a specialized commercial maritime tracking platform. By mid-April 2021, the vessel was back in the DPRK outside of Nampo Lockgate[52] (see figure annex 46-6).


[52] The vessel last transmitted on 21 April 2021, information as of 30 June 2021.

Figure Annex 46-4: *Thae Song 8* near Zhujiajian Dao, Ningbo-Zhoushan, 15 March 2021



Source: Member State

Figure Annex 46-5: *Thae Song 8* near Daxizhai Dao, Ningbo-Zhoushan, 23 March 2021



Source: Member State

Figure Annex 46-6: ***Thae Song 8*** **located at Longkou Terminal, China, 6 April 2021**



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel; Google Earth (insert satellite imagery as representative of the port location not by actual date; AIS signal overlay as on 6 April 2021

The Panel sought China's assistance on information of the activity of each of 26 DPRK vessel at figure 14, information on which of these vessels had off-loaded DPRK-origin coal or other banned commodities through ship-to-ship transfers in Chinese territorial waters in 2021, information on which vessels were involved in the transportation of DPRK-origin coal that also picked up humanitarian cargo at Chinese ports, as well as information on any barter trade in sanctioned DPRK coal exports in exchange for grain or other imports from China.

China responded:


(3) OC.76, OC.156

Thae Song 8, Min Hae, and *Tae Phyong 2* entered Longkou port empty-loaded, and sailed to Nampo port after loading fertilizers and pesticide. *Ko San* entered Dalian Beiliang port empty-loaded and left after loading rice. China did not find these vessels smuggling coal within Chinese territorial waters and had no reason for prohibiting them from entering ports empty-loaded and loading humanitarian cargo.

Source : Member State

Source : the Panel

Annex 47: DPRK-flagged vessels laden with coal, Taean Port, DPRK, 4 April 2021



Source : Member State

Annex 48: ITC Trade Map Data on DPRK Trade Statistics by Commodity (HS Code) (2020)

Source : ITC Trade Map / Unit : thousand USD

Total Exports : 156,867

HS CODE	Commodity type	Export Value
85	Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles	50,148
72	Iron and steel	21,805
27	Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; mineral waxes	11,993
39	Plastics and articles thereof	9,847
84	Machinery, mechanical appliances, nuclear reactors, boilers; parts thereof	7,390
91	Clocks and watches and parts thereof	6,817
87	Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof	6,371
26	Ores, slag and ash	5,624
38	Miscellaneous chemical products	5,242
30	Pharmaceutical products	4,387
99	Commodities not elsewhere specified	3,842
90	Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus; parts and accessories thereof	2,851
67	Prepared feathers and down and articles made of feathers or of down; artificial flowers; articles of human hair	2,480
76	Aluminium and articles thereof	2,192

Total Imports : 558,071

HS CODE	Commodity Type	Import Value
15	Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products; prepared edible fats; animal or vegetable waxes	84,343
24	Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes	39943
11	Products of the milling industry; malt; starches; inulin; wheat gluten	38,720
39	Plastics and articles thereof	36,041
17	Sugars and sugar confectionery	35,106
30	Pharmaceutical products	25,351
40	Rubber and articles thereof	24,478
29	Organic chemicals	18,076
27	Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; mineral waxes	17,877
54	Man-made filaments; strip and the like of man-made textile materials	17,283
10	Cereals	16,679
48	Paper and paperboard; articles of paper pulp, of paper or of paperboard	15,825
28	Inorganic chemicals; organic or inorganic compounds of precious metals, of rare-earth metals, of radioactive elements or of isotopes	15,500
55	Man-made staple fibres	10,368

[yellow box] : may include restricted HS Code commodities

HS CODE	Commodity type	Export Value
29	Organic chemicals	1,906
40	Rubber and articles thereof	1,244
28	Inorganic chemicals; organic or inorganic compounds of precious metals, of rare-earth metals, of radioactive elements or of isotopes	1,167
22	Beverages, spirits and vinegar	1,046
95	Toys, games and sports requisites; parts and accessories thereof	786
64	Footwear, gaiters and the like; parts of such articles	702
48	Paper and paperboard; articles of paper pulp, of paper or of paperboard	660
79	Zinc and articles thereof	641
73	Articles of iron or steel	636
96	Miscellaneous manufactured articles	584
31	Fertilisers	515
92	Musical instruments; parts and accessories of such articles	453
59	Impregnated, coated, covered or laminated textile fabrics; textile articles of a kind suitable for industrial use	448
61	Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted	390

HS CODE	Commodity Type	Import Value
91	Clocks and watches and parts thereof	8,875
8	Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or melons	8,266
94	Furniture; bedding, mattresses, mattress supports, cushions and similar stuffed furnishings; lamps and lighting fittings, not elsewhere specified or included; illuminated signs, illuminated nameplates and the like; prefabricated buildings	8,002
56	Wadding, felt and nonwovens; special yarns; twine, cordage, ropes and cables and articles thereof	7,600
34	Soap, organic surface-active agents, washing preparations, lubricating preparations, artificial waxes, prepare waxes, polishing or scouring preparations, candles and similar articles, modelling pastes, 'dental waxes' and dental preparations with a basis of plaster	7,063
69	Ceramic products	6,934
21	Miscellaneous edible preparations	6,158
90	Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus; parts and accessories thereof	6,051
60	Knitted or crocheted fabrics	5,855
64	Footwear, gaiters and the like; parts of such articles	5,700
31	Fertilisers	5,471
3	Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates	5,137
61	Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted	4,759
22	Beverages, spirits and vinegar	4,545

: may include restricted HS Code commodities

HS CODE	Commodity type	Export Value
3	Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates	364
33	Essential oils and resinoids; perfumery, cosmetic or toilet preparations	341
70	Glass and glassware	330
49	Printed books, newspapers, pictures and other products of the printing industry; manuscripts, typescripts and plans	319
24	Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes	255
34	Soap, organic surface-active agents, washing preparations, lubricating preparations, artificial waxes, prepared waxes, polishing or scouring preparations, candles and similar articles, modelling pastes, 'dental waxes' and dental preparations with a basis of plaster	228
94	Furniture; bedding, mattresses, mattress supports, cushions and similar stuffed furnishings; lamps and lighting fittings, not elsewhere specified or included; illuminated signs, illuminated nameplates and the like; prefabricated buildings	221
83	Miscellaneous articles of base metal	200
63	Other made-up textile articles; sets; worn clothing and worn textile articles; rags	199
74	Copper and articles thereof	185
56	Wadding, felt and nonwovens; special yarns; twine, cordage, ropes and cables and articles thereof	184
16	Preparations of meat, of fish or of crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates	175
55	Man-made staple fibres	147

HS CODE	Commodity Type	Import Value
96	Miscellaneous manufactured articles	4,025
32	Tanning or dyeing extracts; tannins and their derivatives; dyes, pigments and other colouring matter; paints and varnishes; putty and other mastics; inks	3,836
38	Miscellaneous chemical products	3,729
4	Dairy produce; birds' eggs; natural honey; edible products of animal origin, not elsewhere specified or included	3,725
63	Other made-up textile articles; sets; worn clothing and worn textile articles; rags	3,578
44	Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal	3,512
35	Albuminoidal substances; modified starches; glues; enzymes	3,425
59	Impregnated, coated, covered or laminated textile fabrics; textile articles of a kind suitable for industrial use	3,225
16	Preparations of meat, of fish or of crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates	2,964
67	Prepared feathers and down and articles made of feathers or of down; artificial flowers; articles of human hair	2,919
70	Glass and glassware	2,870
'33	Essential oils and resinoids; perfumery, cosmetic or toilet preparations	2,547
'23	Residues and waste from the food industries; prepared animal fodder	2,317

: may include restricted HS Code commodities

HS CODE	Commodity type	Export Value
82	Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks, of base metal; parts thereof of base metal	137
60	Knitted or crocheted fabrics	136
32	Tanning or dyeing extracts; tannins and their derivatives; dyes, pigments and other colouring matter; paints and varnishes; putty and other mastics; inks	134
69	Ceramic products	114
17	Sugars and sugar confectionery	112
54	Man-made filaments; strip and the like of man-made textile materials	107
46	Manufactures of straw, of esparto or of other plaiting materials; basketware and wickerwork	92
21	Miscellaneous edible preparations	91
19	Preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk; pastrycooks' products	67
68	Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica or similar materials	67
42	Articles of leather; saddlery and harness; travel goods, handbags and similar containers; articles of animal gut (other than silkworm gut)	59
86	Railway or tramway locomotives, rolling stock and parts thereof; railway or tramway track fixtures and fittings and parts thereof; mechanical (including electromechanical) traffic signalling equipment of all kinds	54
41	Raw hides and skins (other than furskins) and leather	45
65	Headgear and parts thereof	44
52	Cotton	39
7	Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers	31
62	Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted	28

HS CODE	Commodity Type	Import Value
'52	Cotton	2,170
'95	Toys, games and sports requisites; parts and accessories thereof	2,153
'19	Preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk; pastrycooks' products	2,016
26	Ores, slag and ash	1,942
58	Special woven fabrics; tufted textile fabrics; lace; tapestries; trimmings; embroidery	1,723
62	Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted	1,598
9	Coffee, tea, maté and spices	1,503
68	Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica or similar materials	1,460
7	Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers	1,423
2	Meat and edible meat offal	1,377
84	Machinery, mechanical appliances, nuclear reactors, boilers; parts thereof	1,344
51	Wool, fine or coarse animal hair; horsehair yarn and woven fabric	1,237
99	Commodities not elsewhere specified	1,142
47	Pulp of wood or of other fibrous cellulosic material; recovered (waste and scrap) paper or paperboard	1,090
18	Cocoa and cocoa preparations	977
20	Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts or other parts of plants	668
87	Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof	537

: may include restricted HS Code commodities

HS CODE	Commodity type	Export Value
66	Umbrellas, sun umbrellas, walking sticks, seat-sticks, whips, riding-crops and parts thereof	27
71	Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, precious metals, metals clad with precious metal, and articles thereof; imitation jewellery; coin	20
8	Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or melons	19
5	Products of animal origin, not elsewhere specified or included	14
58	Special woven fabrics; tufted textile fabrics; lace; tapestries; trimmings; embroidery	14
47	Pulp of wood or of other fibrous cellulosic material; recovered (waste and scrap) paper or paperboard	14
12	Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruit; industrial or medicinal plants; straw and fodder	13
35	Albuminoidal substances; modified starches; glues; enzymes	12
20	Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts or other parts of plants	10
15	Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products; prepared edible fats; animal or vegetable waxes	9
6	Live trees and other plants; bulbs, roots and the like; cut flowers and ornamental foliage	8
89	Ships, boats and floating structures	8
36	Explosives; pyrotechnic products; matches; pyrophoric alloys; certain combustible preparations	5
53	Other vegetable textile fibres; paper yarn and woven fabrics of paper yarn	5

HS CODE	Commodity Type	Import Value
85	Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles	495
74	Copper and articles thereof	462
25	Salt; sulphur; earths and stone; plastering materials, lime and cement	399
66	Umbrellas, sun umbrellas, walking sticks, seat-sticks, whips, riding-crops and parts thereof	394
71	Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, precious metals, metals clad with precious metal, and articles thereof; imitation jewellery; coin	360
92	Musical instruments; parts and accessories of such articles	359
78	Lead and articles thereof	350
42	Articles of leather; saddlery and harness; travel goods, handbags and similar containers; articles of animal gut (other than silkworm gut)	330
53	Other vegetable textile fibres; paper yarn and woven fabrics of paper yarn	293
57	Carpets and other textile floor coverings	220
5	Products of animal origin, not elsewhere specified or included	175
12	Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruit; industrial or medicinal plants; straw and fodder	153
14	Vegetable plaiting materials; vegetable products not elsewhere specified or included	153
65	Headgear and parts thereof	133

: may include restricted HS Code commodities

HS CODE	Commodity type	Export Value
25	Salt; sulphur; earths and stone, plastering materials, lime and cement	2
9	Coffee, tea, maté and spices	2

HS CODE	Commodity Type	Import Value
41	Raw hides and skins (other than furskins) and leather	121
37	Photographic or cinematographic goods	120
76	Aluminium and articles thereof	108
73	Articles of iron or steel	93
72	Iron and steel	61
6	Live trees and other plants; bulbs, roots and the like; cut flowers and ornamental foliage	51
43	Furskins and artificial fur; manufactures thereof	49
1	Live animals	37
82	Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks, of base metal; parts thereof of base metal	30
97	Works of art, collectors' pieces and antiques	25
46	Manufactures of straw, of esparto or of other plaiting materials; basketware and wickerwork	18
13	Lac; gums, resins and other vegetable saps and extracts	13
49	Printed books, newspapers, pictures and other products of the printing industry; manuscripts, typescripts and plans	8
36	Explosives; pyrotechnic products; matches; pyrophoric alloys; certain combustible preparations	6
86	Railway or tramway locomotives, rolling stock and parts thereof; railway or tramway track fixtures and fittings and parts thereof; mechanical (including electromechanical) traffic signalling equipment of all kinds	5
83	Miscellaneous articles of base metal	3

: may include restricted HS Code commodities

Source : ITC Trade Map, annotated by the Panel

Annex 49: The Panel's template of enquiry for trade and customs

The Panel is writing to you with regard to the implementation of sanctions measures in the area of trade, including the export to and import from the DPRK, as stipulated in the above resolutions. Through them, the Security Council decided that the DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft certain items and that all States shall prohibit the procurement from the DPRK of certain items by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK (see Annexes x, x and x). The Security Council furthermore requires all States to inspect all cargo to and from the DPRK, and stipulates that all prohibited items should be seized and disposed of when identified in inspections, in paragraph 18 of resolution 2270 (2016) and paragraph 20 of resolution 2397 (2017), respectively.

The Panel notes that Member States, while dutifully carrying out their obligations under the relevant resolutions, may occasionally face the challenge of having to determine whether certain items are prohibited from transfer to and/or from the DPRK by relevant resolutions, resulting in different practices in sanctions implementation among Member States.

In its effort to gather accurate trade data, especially in view of frequently observed discrepancies between the original national trade data and information published through open source trade databases such as ITC Trade Map, and to promote the best practices in the implementation of the relevant resolutions across Member States, the Panel would like to request relevant authorities of your country to provide the following information for the period of 2020 and 2021(1st quarter):

1) Integrated national data on trade with the DPRK, including the number of deliveries, commodities and their HS codes, as well as involved entities and individuals;
2) Please stipulate separately the recorded transactions in case they do not correspond to the standards set in the above-mentioned resolutions (please use the commodity list in the Annexes with the guidance to appropriately determine the cases of prohibited HS codes) with special attention to country codes;
3) Information regarding any cases of rejection of customs clearance or seizure of goods with the DPRK as a country of destination/consignment or transit;
4) Information regarding any cases of rejection of customs clearance or seizure of goods originating from the DPRK as a country of origin or manufacture;
5) For each of the above, please include the description of the goods, where possible as per contracts for delivery and other relevant documentation, HS codes of commodities, their quantity, prices and, where possible, copies of such documents;
6) The names, addresses and contact information of all entities and individuals involved in these transactions, and information on possible prior exports and imports involving the same entities; and
7) Any other relevant information and/or action taken by your customs authorities pursuant to obligations stemming from the above-mentioned resolutions.

The Panel would welcome any other information that you might consider relevant to its work as mandated by the Security Council in this regard. In addition, the Panel would like to assure you that any information you may consider confidential can be handled accordingly and used solely for the information of the Security Council and the 1718 Committee.

Source: the Panel

Annex 50: Comparison table of International Trade Statistics (2020) and replies provided by Members States on trade with the DPRK

** Note: DPRK Trade Statistics cover the period of 2020, while Member State's reply may cover not only 2020 but also 1st quarter of 2021.

* Unit : Thousand US$

No.	Member State(MS)	Trade Volume w/ DPRK(2020)		Restricted HS Code Trade w/ DPRK		MS's Reply
		Export to	Import from	Export to	Import from	
1	Armenia, Republic of	0	42		1(HS Code 59) 9(HS Code 84) 4(HS Code 85)	
2	Austria, Republic of	186	1			Nothing Applicable / No cases / Exports granted by the 1718 Comm. upon request of IFRC
3	Barbados	118	825		8(HS Code 56) 18(HS Code 61) 55(HS Code 84) 523(HS Code 85) 5(HS Code 89)	
4	Belize	0	6			Nothing Applicable / No cases
5	Bermuda	1	154		2(HS Code 84) 90(HS Code 85)	
6	Bolivia, Plurinational State of	679	389		147(HS Code 72) 27(HS Code 84) 37(HS Code 85)	
7	Bosnia and Herzegovina	0	88		13(HS Code 84) 2(HS Code 85)	
8	Botswana, Republic of	0	1		1(HS Code 84)	
9	Brazil, Federative Republic of	93	16	1(HS Code 85) 1(HS Code 72)	2(HS Code 58) 13(HS Code 84)	
10	Brunei Darussalam, Negara	0	462		5(HS Code 72) 1(HS Code 73) 38(HS Code 52) 1(HS Code 54) 15(HS Code 8) 9(HS Code 84) 236(HS Code 85) 2(HS Code 25)	
11	Bulgaria, Republic of	674	29			Nothing Applicable / No cases / relevant goods were nutritional additives
12	Cambodia, Kingdom of	47	78		14(HS Code 73) 16(HS Code 84)	
13	Canada	0	87		9(HS Code 74) 1(HS Code 61) 2(HS Code 63) 16(HS Code 84) 6(HS Code 85)	Nothing Applicable / No cases / Previous correspondence on July 2, 2020 regarding miscoding by Canadian statistical agencies
14	China, People's Republic of	491,059	48,001	2,559(HS Code 2710) 1,772(HS Code 2713) 31(HS Code 2712) 14(HS Code 2711) 316(HS Code 84) 122(HS Code 85) 468(HS Code 87) 19(HS Code 73) 17(HS Code 82)	11,499(HS Code 72) 14(HS Code 73) 5(HS Code 53) 2(HS Code 62) 6(HS Code 63)	ITC statistics are different from China's official figure mainly because ITC regards commodities produced in China and exported to 3rd party and then transferred to the DPRK as Chinese export to the DPRK / This is inconsistent with facts and the ITC does not update and correct their data in a timely manner

No.	Member State(MS)	Trade Volume w/ DPRK(2020)		Restricted HS Code Trade w/ DPRK		MS's Reply
		Export to	Import from	Export to	Import from	
15	Colombia, Republic of	761	630		7(HS Code 73) 118(HS Code 84) 38(HS Code 85)	Imports (HS Code 73, 84, 85) fall under restricted category / made additional enquiry and waiting of reply
16	Costa Rica, Republic of	0	2,361		11(HS Code 61)	Typing Error of Numerical Country Code
17	Czech Republic	0	87		1(HS Code 72) 2(HS Code 63) 1(HS Code 84) 6(HS Code 85)	
18	Denmark, Kingdom of	16	62		1(HS Code 73) 2(HS Code 84)	
19	Democratic Republic of Congo	7,079	516		33(HS Code 73) 9(HS Code 84)	
20	Egypt, Arab Republic of	133	0			Nothing Applicable / No cases No items that fall under the prohibited customs classification were traded with DPRK
21	El Salvador, Republic of	0	192		2(HS Code 63) 64(HS Code 84)	Trade was with ROK where mistake was made by the companies when reporting to customs systems / has not carried out trade with DPRK
22	Estonia, Republic of	0	17		17(HS Code 85)	Nothing Applicable / No cases
23	Ethiopia, Federal Democratic Republic of	8	3,637		1,827(HS Code 72) 100(HS Code 79) 509(HS Code 84) 158(HS Code 85)	
24	Finland, Republic of	0	1			Nothing Applicable / No cases
25	Gambia, Islamic Republic of the	0	61		3(HS Code 8) 2(HS Code 84)	
26	Georgia	463	726	344(HS Code 74)	49(HS Code 2710) 87(HS Code 72) 13(HS Code 73) 39(HS Code 3) 230(HS Code 84) 46(HS Code 85)	No trade conducted with the DPRK / referred to country code of DPRK instead of ROK
27	Germany, Federal Republic of	1,083	798	10(HS Code 84)	5(HS Code 59) 205(HS Code 61) 5(HS Code 62) 1(HS Code 63) 23(HS Code 7) 2(HS Code 84) 20(HS Code 85)	Individual actors erroneously referred to DPRK although the country of origin was ROK
28	Greece (Hellenic Republic)	19	0			Nothing Applicable / No cases
29	Guatemala, Republic of	0	21		3(HS Code 59) 4(HS Code 84)	Goods purchased by the importer were from ROK not from DPRK (erroneous input of country code)

No.	Member State(MS)	Trade Volume w/ DPRK(2020)		Restricted HS Code Trade w/ DPRK		MS's Reply
		Export to	Import from	Export to	Import from	
30	Guyana, Republic of	69	1,264	27(HS Code 72)	63(HS Code 72) 27(HS Code 73) 1,106(HS Code 84) 20(HS Code 85)	No trade with DPRK / erroneous record due to logging errors / competent authorities are introducing a Risk Profiel System in the ASYCUDA World System
31	Hungary	2	5		3(HS Code 84)	Export and Imports with DPRK were medicine ingredients and dental instruments respectively / No trade with DPRK on restricted commodities
32	India, Republic of	4,337	1,926	15(HS Code 2712) 37(HS Code 84) 34(HS Code 87) 33(HS Code 72)	166(HS Code 72) 12(HS Code 73) 115(HS Code 74) 47(HS Code 56) 34(HS Code 59) 3(HS Code 62) 7(HS Code 63) 684(HS Code 84) 132(HS Code 85)	
33	Indonesia, Republic of	1	770		18(HS Code 72) 2(HS Code 73) 319(HS Code 79) 5(HS Code 59) 29(HS Code 84) 1(HS Code 85)	Undergoing internal investigations and will provide more information
34	Italy, Republic of	167	63	139(HS Code 84) 26(HS Code 76)	2(HS Code 72)	
35	Kazakhstan, Republic of	0	3			Nothing Applicable / No cases
36	Kyrgyz Republic	0	39		7(HS Code 73) 28(HS Code 84) 1(HS Code 85)	Data is inaccurate / As a result of audit, assigned DPRK country code instead of ROK
37	Luxembourg, Grand Duchy of	2	5,127	2(HS Code 85)	4(HS Code 3) 6(HS Code 1604) 1(HS Code 59) 7(HS Code 7) 1(HS Code 8) 427(HS Code 84) 4,605(HS Code 85)	No registered trade with the DPRK / cases of erroneous encoding
38	Madagascar, Republic of	0	959		24(HS Code 63) 54(HS Code 84)	
39	Moldova, Republic of	0	21		17(HS Code 72) 2(HS Code 84)	
40	Mozambique, Republic of	350	4,365	350(HS Code 78)	1(HS Code 2710) 1(HS Code 72) 1(HS Code 73) 221(HS Code 79) 312(HS Code 3) 27(HS Code 54) 85(HS Code 55) 30(HS Code 63) 154(HS Code 84) 37(HS Code 85)	
41	Myanmar, Republic of the Union of	0	24,190		853(HS Code 72) 23,314(HS Code 85)	

No.	Member State(MS)	Trade Volume w/ DPRK(2020)		Restricted HS Code Trade w/ DPRK		MS's Reply
		Export to	Import from	Export to	Import from	
42	Namibia, Republic of	0	28		2(HS Code 84) 20(HS Code 85)	
43	Netherlands, Kingdom of the	269	558		40(HS Code 84)	Had exports from and imports to DPRK but none of these goods fell under the (restricted) HS codes of relevant resolutions
44	Nigeria, Federal Republic of	0	6,609		21(HS Code 73) 32(HS Code 59) 59(HS Code 63) 996(HS Code 84) 589(HS Code 85)	
45	North Macedonia, Republic of	0	546		31(HS Code 72) 1(HS Code 74) 7(HS Code 54) 18(HS Code 84) 9(HS Code 85)	
46	Pakistan, Islamic Republic of	0	175		5(HS Code 72) 15(HS Code 73) 10(HS Code 59) 3(HS Code 63) 58(HS Code 84) 16(HS Code 85)	Official import data corroborates that imports were legitimate and originated from other countries and not from DPRK / no trade with DPRK
47	Peru, Republic of	1,226	521		4(HS Code 63) 437(HS Code 84)	
48	Poland, Republic of	305	20,928		16(HS Code 72) 69(HS Code 73) 26(HS Code 74) 9(HS Code 3) 77(HS Code 56) 63(HS Code 61) 1(HS Code 7) 235(HS Code 84) 18,307(HS Code 85)	
49	Russian Federation	41,954	702	9,474(HS Code 2710) 1,519(HS Code 2711) 801(HS Code 84) 67(HS Code 85) 5(HS Code 86) 34(HS Code 87) 55(HS Code 73) 6(HS Code 74) 13(HS Code 76) 13(HS Code 82) 2(HS Code 83)	1(HS Code 72) 1(HS Code 73) 1(HS Code 61) 6(HS Code 62) 14(HS Code 84) 16(HS Code 85)	Cases of exports to DPRK where recepient was the Embassy of the Russian Federation to DPRK and Maintenance of Civil Aircraft / Wating for additional reply
50	Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of	135	526	108(HS Code 74) 26(HS Code 76)	81(HS Code 61) 7(HS Code 62) 81(HS Code 84) 43(HS Code 85)	Concernig both exports to and imports from DPRK, internal statistics revealed that targeted items were all related to different countries not DPRK
51	Senegal, Republic of	179	689	3(HS Code 74)	261(HS Code 73) 11(HS Code 54) 42(HS Code 84) 2(HS Code 85)	
52	Serbia, Republic of	0	2		1(HS Code 54)	No trade exchange has been carried out with the DPRK

No.	Member State(MS)	Trade Volume w/ DPRK(2020)		Restricted HS Code Trade w/ DPRK		MS's Reply
		Export to	Import from	Export to	Import from	
53	Singapore, Republic of	123	0			Forfeit shipment of wine on August 25, 2020 / informed Panel on September 15, 2020 / Other than above nothing applicable / No cases
54	Slovak Republic	0	406		85(HS Code 72) 261(HS Code 73) 1(HS Code 59) 101(HS Code 84) 6(HS Code 85)	
55	Slovenia, Republic of	0	1,065		1(HS Code 2712) 5(HS Code 73) 4(HS Code 59) 2(HS Code 61) 1(HS Code 63) 13(HS Code 12) 73(HS Code 84) 277(HS Code 85)	
56	South Africa, Republic of	456	1,099	8(HS Code 84) 251(HS Code 85) 1(HS Code 87) 8(HS Code 73) 18(HS Code 76)	2(HS Code 73) 8(HS Code 54) 12(HS Code 84) 1,054(HS Code 85)	No relevant cases of transactions relating to any goods or technologies with the DPRK
57	Spain, Kingdom of	167	387	5(HS Code 84) 4(HS Code 73)	2(HS Code 72) 1(HS Code 73) 1(HS Code 54) 3(HS Code 61) 13(HS Code 84) 118(HS Code 85) 3(HS Code 89)	
58	Sweden, Kingdom of	0	6		4(HS Code 73)	Nothing Applicable / No cases
59	Swiss Confederation	2,677	0			Nothing Applicable / No cases
60	Tajikistan, Republic of	0	109			Nothing Applicable / No cases
61	Thailand, Kingdom of	1,743	166	4(HS Code 84)	3(HS Code 73) 3(HS Code 84) 29(HS Code 85)	Entries mentioning the DPRK as the country of destination had subsequently been withdrawn, with the goods returned
62	Turkey, Republic of	331	93	323(HS Code 2710)	2(HS Code 73) 5(HS Code 84) 14(HS Code 85)	
63	Uganda, Republic of	255	4,388		31(HS Code 74) 62(HS Code 55) 16(HS Code 84)	
64	Ukraine	0	21		3(HS Code 61) 3(HS Code 62) 3(HS Code 85)	
65	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	38	12		1(HS Code 84) 8(HS Code 85)	Incorrect country code provided with shipping documentation
66	Uruguay, Oriental Republic of	0	12		1(HS Code 74) 1(HS Code 84) 6(HS Code 85)	Several customs operations were declared as originating from DPRK, but they were actually ROK

No.	Member State(MS)	Trade Volume w/ DPRK(2020)		Restricted HS Code Trade w/ DPRK		MS's Reply
		Export to	Import from	Export to	Import from	
67	Uzbekistan, Republic of	0	1			Nothing Applicable / No cases
68	Zambia, Republic of	2	765		37(HS Code 63) 51(HS Code 84) 94(HS Code 85)	
69	Zimbabwe, Republic of	23	681		1(HS Code 52) 28(HS Code 54) 6(HS Code 84)	

Source : ITC Trade Map, annotated by the Panel

Annex 51: List of HS Codes the Panel applies to monitor the sectoral ban

Below is the list of HS codes assigned for each category of goods under sectoral ban by relevant UN Security Council resolutions. This list superseds S/2018/171 annex 4 as amended by S/2018/171/Corr.1. See https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/prohibited-items for the complete list of prohibited goods and Implement Assistance Notes.

a. Items prohibited from being exported to the DPRK

Item	HS Codes	Description	Resolutions
Condensates and natural gas liquids	**2709**	Oils; petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals	Para. 13 of . 2375 (2017)
	2711	Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons	
Industrial machinery	**84**	Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof	Para. 7 of 2397 (2017)
	85	Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers; television image and sound recorders and reproducers, parts and accessories of such articles	
Transportation vehicles [53]	**86**	Railway, tramway locomotives, rolling-stock and parts thereof; railway or tramway track fixtures and fittings and parts thereof; mechanical (including electro-mechanical) traffic signaling equipment of all kinds	Para. 7 of 2397 (2017)
	87	Vehicles; other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof	
	88	Aircraft, spacecraft and parts thereof [54]	
	89	Ships, boats and floating structures	
Iron, steel and other metals	**Chapters 72-83**		Para. 7 of 2397 (2017)
	72	Iron and steel	
	73	Articles of iron or steel	
	74	Copper and articles thereof	
	75	Nickel and articles thereof	
	76	Aluminum and articles thereof	
	77	Reserved for possible future use	
	78	Lead and articles thereof	
	79	Zinc and articles thereof	
	80	Tin and articles thereof	
	81	Other base metals; cermets; articles thereof	
	82	Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks, of base metal; parts thereof of base metal	
	83	Miscellaneous articles of base metal	

[53] Pursuant to paragraph 30 of resolution 2321 (2016) and paragraph 14 of resolution 2397 (2017), States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of new helicopters, new and used vessels, except as approved in advance by the Committee on a case-by-case basis.

[54] Shall not apply with respect to the provision of spare parts needed to maintain the safe operation of DPRK commercial civilian passenger aircraft (currently consisting of the following aircraft models and types: An-24R/RV, An-148-100B, Il-18D, Il-62M, Tu-134B-3, Tu-154B, Tu-204-100B, and Tu-204-300).

b. Items prohibited from being imported from the DPRK

Item	HS Codes	Description	Resolutions
Coal	**2701**	Coal; briquettes, ovoids and similar solid fuels manufactured from coal	Para. 8 of 2371 (2017)
Iron Ore	**2601**	Iron ores and concentrates, including roasted iron pyrites	
Iron	**Chapter 72**	Iron and steel products (**7201-7229**)	
Iron and Steel products	**Chapter 73**	Iron and steel products (**7301-7326)**	
Gold	**261690**	Gold ores and concentrates	Para. 30 of 2270 (2016)
	7108	Gold (incl. put plated), unwrought, semi-manufactured forms or powder	
	710811	Gold powder, unwrought	
	710812	Gold in other unwrought forms	
	710813	Gold in other semi-manufactured forms	
	710820	Monetary gold	
Titanium	**2614**	Titanium ores and concentrates	
Vanadium	**2615**	Vanadium ores and concentrates	
Rare Earth Minerals	**2612**	Uranium or thorium ores and concentrates [**261210** and **261220**]	
	2617	Ores and concentrates, [Nesoi code **261790** - Other Ores and Concentrates]	
	2805	Alkali metals etc., rare-earth metals etc., mercury	
	2844	Radioactive chemical elements & isotopes etc.	
Copper	**Chapter 74**	Copper and articles thereof (**7401-7419**)	Para. 28 of 2321 (2016)
	2603	Copper ores and concentrates	
Zinc	**Chapter 79**	Zinc and articles thereof (**7901-7907**)	
	2608	Zinc ores and concentrates	
Nickel	**Chapter 75**	Nickel and articles thereof (**7501-7508)**	
	2604	Nickel ores and concentrates	
Silver	**2616100** **7106, 7107**	Silver ores and concentrates Silver unwrought or semi manufactured forms, or in powdered forms; base metals clad with silver, not further worked than semi-manufactured	
	7114	Articles of goldsmiths or silversmiths' wares or parts thereof, of silver, whether or not plated or clad with other precious metal	
Seafood (incl fish, crustaceans, mollusks, and other aquatic invertebrates in all forms)	**Chapter 3**	Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates (**0301-0308)**	Para. 9 of 2371 (2017)
	1603	Extracts and juices of meat, fish or crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates)	
	1604	Prepared or preserved fish; caviar and caviar substitutes prepared from fish eggs	
	1605	Crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates, prepared or preserved	
Lead	**Chapter 78**	Lead and articles thereof (**7801-7806**)	Para. 10 of 2371 (2017)
Lead ore	**2607**	Lead ores and concentrates	

Textiles (including but not limited to fabrics and partially or fully completed apparel products)	**Chapters 50-63**		Para. 16 of 2375 (2017)
	50	Silk, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof	
	51	Wool, fine or coarse animal hair, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof; Horsehair yarn and woven fabric	
	52	Cotton, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof	
	53	Vegetable textile tibers nesoi; Yarns and woven fabrics of vegetable textile fibers nesoi and paper	
	54	Manmade filaments, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof	
	55	Manmade staple fibers, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof	
	56	Wadding, felt and nonwovens; Special yarns; Twine, cordage, ropes and cables and articles thereof	
	57	Carpets and other textile floor covering	
	58	Fabrics; special woven fabrics, tufted textile fabrics, lace, tapestries, trimmings, embroidery	
	59	Textile fabrics; impregnated, coated, covered or laminated; Textile articles of a kind suitable for industrial use;	
	61	Apparel and clothing accessories; knitted or crocheted;	
	62	Apparel and clothing accessories; *not* knitted or crocheted;	
	63	Textiles, made up articles; sets; worn clothing and worn textile articles; rags	
Agricultural products	**07**	Vegetables and certain roots and tubers; edible	Para. 6 of resolution 2397 (2017)
	08	Fruit and nuts, edible; peel of citrus fruit or melons	
	12	Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruit, industrial or medicinal plants; straw and fodder	
Machinery	**84**	Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof	Para. 6 of resolution 2397 (2017)
Electrical equipment	**85**	Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; Sound recorders and reproducers; television image and sound recorders and reproducers, parts and accessories of such articles	
Earth and stone including magnesite and magnesia	**25**	Salt; sulphur; earths, stone; plastering materials, lime and cement	
Wood	**44**	Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal	
Vessels	**89**	Ships, boats and floating structures	

c. For paragraphs 4 and 5 of resolution 2397 (2017), the Panel uses the following HS codes. The Panel notes that annual caps are placed for the two items below.

- HS 2709 : crude oil [cap: 4 million barrels or 525,000 tons]
- HS 2710, HS 2712 and HS 2713 : refined petroleum products [cap: 500,000 barrels]

Source : the Panel

Annex 52: Correspondence with Thailand



No. 56101/206

The Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) and, with reference to the communication from Mr. Georgy Toloraya, member of the Panel of Experts, requesting additional information to supplement the former's note no. 56101/18 dated 15 January 2021 on the implementation of customs measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) for the period of 2018-2020, has the honour to transmit the said information herewith for the latter's kind perusal.

The Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) the assurances of its highest consideration.

Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Thailand
to the United Nations, New York
26 March B.E. 2564 (2021)

Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009),
New York.

1

Attachment

Additional information of 12 cases of goods withdrawn from delivery to the DPRK

No.	Export Entry	HS Code	Description of Goods	Export agent	Quantity	Date
1.	A002-1610208716	85411000	DIODE BZG03-C36-R-EIC	EIC SEMICONDUCTOR COMPANY LIMITED	1 Carton	2018/02/02
2.	A006-1610810538	32041900	MOMIJI FOUNDATION HD MAKE UP NO.1 (40ml.)	ORIENTAL ORCHID TRADING COMPANY LIMITED	10 Cartons	2028/08/06
	A006-1610810538	33049930	DERLISE BRIGHT SMOOTH SUN SCREEN CREAM 15g.	ORIENTAL ORCHID TRADING COMPANY LIMITED		
	A006-1610810538	33049930	DERLISE BRIGHT & CUTE WHITE CREAM 15g.	ORIENTAL ORCHID TRADING COMPANY LIMITED		
	A006-1610810538	33049930	ANTI-ACNE 5g. BRIGHTENING 5g. MELASMA 5g. SUNSCREEN 5g.	ORIENTAL ORCHID TRADING COMPANY LIMITED		
	A006-1610810538	33049930	DERLISE WHITE SERUM 30g.	ORIENTAL ORCHID TRADING COMPANY LIMITED		
	A006-1610810538	33049930	DERLISE AQUA TONER 100g.	ORIENTAL ORCHID TRADING COMPANY LIMITED		
	A006-1610810538	33049930	DERLISE MOUSSE 150g.	ORIENTAL ORCHID TRADING COMPANY LIMITED		
	A006-1610810538	33069000	DERRICH ORAL HERBAL TOOTHPASTE 25g.	ORIENTAL ORCHID TRADING COMPANY LIMITED		
3.	A017-1610701164	85119090	TRANSFORMER	KEIC THAI COMPANY LIMITED	6 Cartons	2018/07/17

2

No.	Export Entry	HS Code	Description of Goods	Export agent	Quantity	Date
4.	A022-1610114592	12079990	SACHA LN LNCHI NUT UNSALTED	ASIA STAR OMEGA (THAILAND) COMPANY LIMITED	1 Pallet	2018/01/22
5.	A025-1610908321	33049930	MOMIJI SIXTY-SIXANTI-ACNE 5g. BRIGHTENING 5g.	ORIENTAL ORCHID TRADING COMPANY LIMITED	6 Cartons	2018/09/25
	A025-1610908321	33049930	MOMIJI SIXTY- BRIGHTENING 5g.	ORIENTAL ORCHID TRADING COMPANY LIMITED		
	A025-1610908321	33049930	MOMIJI SIXTY-SIXMELASMA 5g.	ORIENTAL ORCHID TRADING COMPANY LIMITED		
	A025-1610908321	33049930	DERLISEWHITE SERUM 30g.	ORIENTAL ORCHID TRADING COMPANY LIMITED		
	A025-1610908321	33049930	MOMIJI SIXTY-SIXBRIGHTENING 5g. MELASMA 5g.	ORIENTAL ORCHID TRADING COMPANY LIMITED		
	A025-1610908321	33049930	LOTION (SAMPLE FREE OF CHARGE)	ORIENTAL ORCHID TRADING COMPANY LIMITED		
6.	A027-1611206861	21069019	NUTRITION DRINK	WINTHAI TRANS INTERNATIONAL COMPANY LIMITED	2 Cartons	2018/12/27
7.	A028-1611203712	30045099	NUTRITION DRINK	MR. KI SONG HAN	2 Cartons	2018/12/28
8.	A019-1621216780	84439100	AccuStar UltraFilm BNK19-12-70005 7114764	ROTOMETRICS (SE ASIA) COMPANY LIMITED	1 Carton	2019/12/19
	A019-1621216780	84439100	AccuPrime BNK19-12-69970 7114764	ROTOMETRICS (SE ASIA) COMPANY LIMITED		
	A019-1621216780	84439100	AccuStar UltraFilm BNK19-12-69971 7114730	ROTOMETRICS (SE ASIA) COMPANY LIMITED		

3

No.	Export Entry	HS Code	Description of Goods	Export agent	Quantity	Date
9.	A012-1630309810	85340090	FLEXIBLE PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARD	FUJIKURA ELECTRONICS (THAILAND) COMPANY LIMITED	12 Cartons	2020/03/12
10.	A017-1630812078	40151900	LATEX GLOVES	PHOENIX RUBBER PRODUCTS COMPANY LIMITED	25 Cartons	2020/08/18
11.	A020-1630101270	20081999	BLACK SESAME PASTE	FLOWER FOOD COMPANY LIMITED	1 Pallet	2020/01/20
12.	A023-1630405508	85340090	FLEXIBLE PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARD	FUJIKURA ELECTRONICS (THAILAND) COMPANY LIMITED	9 Cartons	2020/04/23

****

Source : the Panel

Annex 53: Correspondence with Bulgaria



PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF
BULGARIA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

11 East 84th Street, New York, NY 10028, Tel: (212) 737 4790, Fax: (212) 472 9865, e-mail: bulgaria@un.int

№ 44

New York, 6 July 2021

Dear [redacted]

I am writing with regard to your letter ref. № S/AC.49/2021/PE/OC.92 of 28 May 2021, and have the honor to communicate the following information, as provided by the competent Bulgarian authorities:

According to the National Customs Agency's database, in the period 1st January 2020 – 31 March 2021 10 (ten) exports of nutritional additives were made to the DPRK as declared country of destination. The goods were exported by „DSM NUTRITIONAL PRODUCTS EUROPE, address: Wurmisweg 576, 4303, Kaiseraugst, Switzerland, to "UNICEF DPR KOREA UNICEF REPRESENTAT", address: P.O. box 90, Pyongyang, the DPRK. The export declarations were lodged with the Sofia West Customs Office by the Bulgarian company "KENDY LTD", address: 101 Sofia Str., 1320 Bankya, Bulgaria. The goods were classified under the EU Combined Nomenclature and the Common Customs Tariff with tariff code 21069092 and left the customs territory of the European Union through the Port of Thessaloniki, Greece. Details about the customs declarations (CD) are as follows:

- CD 20BG005807AA913100 of 17 January 2020;
- CD 20BG005807AA913019 of 17 January 2020;
- CD 20BG005807AB055481 of 31 July 2020;
- CD 20BG005807AB055414 of 31 July 2020;
- CD 20BG005807AB055580 of 31 July 2020;
- CD 20BG005807AB055599 of 31 July 2020;
- CD 20BG005807AB056949 of 3 August 2020;
- CD 20BG005807AB056957 of 3 August 2020;
- CD 20BG005807AB057108 of 3 August 2020;
- CD 20BG005807AB057116 of 3 August 2020.

During the above-mentioned period there have been no cases of rejection of customs clearance or seizure of goods with the DPRK as a country of destination/ consignment, transit, origin or manufacture.

I take this opportunity to assure the Panel of Experts that the competent Bulgarian authorities take all necessary measures to ensure the strict implementation of all sanctions imposed on the DPRK as per relevant UNSC resolutions.

Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

Lachezara Stoeva
Ambassador, Permanent Representative

M[redacted]
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)
United Nations
New York

Source : the Panel

Annex 54: Correspondence with Singapore



PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE
UNITED NATIONS I NEW YORK

24 June 2021

[redacted]
Coordinator
United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)

Dear [redacted]

I refer to your letter (S /AC.49/2021/PE/OC.134) dated 28 May 2021 requesting information on any cases of rejection of customs clearance or seizure of goods with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as a country of destination, consignment, transit, origin, or manufacture, as well as integrated national data on trade with the DPRK, for the period of 2020 through the first quarter of 2021.

During the aforementioned period, Singapore forfeited a shipment of wine that was transhipped through Singapore and allegedly bound for the DPRK on 25 August 2020. This forfeiture fulfilled the obligation for Member States under Paragraph 20 of UNSC Resolution 2397 (2017) to seize and dispose of items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by the relevant UNSC resolutions. The Panel was informed of this case in our letter to the Panel dated 15 September 2020, which we enclose again for the Panel's ease of reference.

Apart from the case mentioned in our letter dated 15 September 2020, there are no other cases of rejection of customs clearance or seizure of goods with the DPRK as a country of destination, consignment or transit, origin, or manufacture during the relevant period.

A general prohibition on all commercially traded goods that are imported, exported, transhipped, or brought in transit from or to the DPRK has also been in force since 8 November 2017.

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Singapore reiterates our commitment to upholding our obligations under the relevant UNSC resolutions, and will continue to be of assistance to the Panel where possible.

Yours sincerely,

JOPHIE TANG
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

Enc.



PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE
UNITED NATIONS | NEW YORK

15 September 2020

Mr [redacted]
Coordinator
United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)

Dear [redacted]

I write to inform you of the Singapore Government's forfeiture of a shipment of wine allegedly bound for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

Singapore received information from a Member State in January 2020 concerning an allegedly DPRK-bound shipment of alcohol that transhipped in Singapore from 7 to 10 January 2020. The shipment was held for checks while in Singapore, and was seized by Singapore authorities on 31 January 2020.

According to the invoice and packing list submitted by the shipping agent, the shipment of wine was supplied to Sangmyong General Trading Corporation ("Sangmyong"). The hygiene certificate submitted by the shipping agent identified Sangmyong as the importer. The Panel would recall that Sangmyong had previously been identified as an entity that had actively violated Japan's ban on luxury goods trade with the DPRK in the Panel's reports S/2012/422 (2012) and S/2013/337 (2013). Sangmyong is also listed by the Dow Jones Risk Center as an "entity fully owned by the OFAC comprehensively sanctioned government of North Korea via the Korean Worker's party".

Under Regulation 5(a) of Singapore's United Nations (Sanctions – Democratic People's Republic of Korea) Regulations 2010, "no person in Singapore and no citizen of Singapore outside Singapore shall supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, any designated export item or designated luxury item to any person in the DPRK, whether or not the item originated in Singapore".

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ANNEX



APPLICATION PURSUANT TO REGULATION 17(1) OF THE UNITED NATIONS (SANCTIONS – DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA) REGULATIONS 2010

Third Report of Deputy Chief Superintendent of Customs [redacted], made in support of the application of the Attorney-General under Regulation 17(1) of the United Nations (Sanctions – Democratic People's Republic of Korea) Regulations 2010 ("**UN DPRK Regulations**"), before the undersigned District Judge, State Courts of the Republic of Singapore, on **25 August 2020**.

Items seized vide Report/Case No.: C2003520/IP/01

2. As stated in the First Report of DCSC [redacted] filed on 11 August 2020 (the "**First Report**"), Singapore Customs seized the following goods on 31 January 2020 in exercise of its powers under Regulation 14A of the UN DPRK Regulations read with Sections 34 and 35 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap. 68) ("**Seized Goods**"):

(a) 1158 cases x 4 boxes x 3 litres of Dry Red Wine;
(b) 50 cases x 12 packets x 1 litre of Orange Juice;
(c) 25 cases x 12 packets x 1 litre of Summer Pine Juice;
(d) 25 cases x 12 packets x 1 litre of Medly of Fruit Juice;
(e) 49 cases x 12 packets x 1 litre of Mango Juice; and
(f) 25 cases x 12 packets x 1 litre of Secrets of the Valley Juice.

Reports filed by Singapore Customs on 11 August 2020 and 21 August 2020

3. The background facts and outcome of Singapore Customs' investigations are set out in detail in the First Report. To summarise, shipping documents revealed that Sangmyong General Trading Corp ("**SGTC**") was the client / receiver of the Seized Goods. Korea Sangmyong General Trading Corporation (also known to Singapore Customs as SGTC) was flagged by the United Nations Panel of Experts as a "DPRK end-user" in its 2013 Report[1] and its 2012 Report[2] for its involvement in the smuggling of luxury goods into the DPRK.

4. As stated in the Second Report of DCSC [redacted] filed on 21 August 2020 (the "**Second Report**"), Singapore Customs gave notice of the application to five parties that appeared to have an interest in the Seized Goods, pursuant to Regulation 17(3) of the UN DPRK Regulations. As at 20 August 2020, two parties had indicated that they would not be contesting the forfeiture of the Seized Goods. As at 25 August 2020, there

[1] Report of the Panel of Experts (S/2013/337).
[2] Report of the Panel of Experts (S/2012/422).

1

was no response received from the remaining three parties. Singapore Customs' correspondence with the five parties are set out in detail in the Second Report.

<u>Mention on 25 August 2020, at 10:00 am, Court 7A of the State Courts, Republic of Singapore</u>

5. State Counsel [redacted] and [redacted], on behalf of the Attorney-General of the Republic of Singapore, applied for the forfeiture of the Seized Goods under Regulation 17(1) of the UN DPRK Regulations. The Seized Goods were proved to be designated export items (i.e. items listed in paragraph 2(a) to 2(f) above)[3] and designated luxury items (i.e. items listed in paragraph 2(a) above)[4]. The Seized Goods were also proved to be the subject of a contravention of Regulation 5(a) of the UN DPRK Regulations which reads:

> "A person in Singapore and no citizen of Singapore outside Singapore shall – (a) supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, any designated export item or designated luxury item to any person in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, whether or not the item originated in Singapore".

6. Upon the application of the Attorney-General, and upon reading the First and Second Reports, the learned District Judge [redacted] was satisfied that forfeiture of the Seized Goods under Regulation 17(1) of the UN DPRK Regulation was made out.

7. In view of the above, may I seek a court order for the Seized Goods to be forfeited to Singapore Customs, and either destroyed or otherwise dealt with.

[redacted]

[redacted] (DCSC)
Assistant Head
Trade Investigation Branch
Singapore Customs

for Director-General of Singapore Customs

[3] Regulation of Imports and Exports Regulations, Seventh Schedule (Prohibited imports from and exports to (including transhipped goods and goods in transit originating from or bound for) country or territory, Third Column, DPRK, (18) Any goods that are for the purposes of trade with any person in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

[4] Regulation of Imports and Exports Regulations, Seventh Schedule (Prohibited imports from and exports to (including transhipped goods and goods in transit originating from or bound for) country or territory, Third Column, DPRK, (5)(t) wines and spirits.

2

Source: the Panel

Annex 55: Correspondence with Guatemala



PS/11.3.14/806

La Misión Permanente de Guatemala ante las Naciones Unidas saluda atentamente al Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009) del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas y se permite hacer referencia a su nota no. S/AC.49/2020/PE/OC.110, en relación a los esfuerzos de dicho Grupo de Expertos por reunir, examinar y analizar información respecto a la implementación de las medidas impuestas a la República Popular Democrática de Corea (RPDC).

La Misión Permanente de Guatemala ante las Naciones Unidas se permite informar que la República de Guatemala como Estado fundador de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas reconoce la importancia del mantenimiento de la paz y la seguridad internacionales, y con tal fin está comprometido en cumplir todas y cada una de las medidas colectivas eficaces para prevenir y eliminar las amenazas a la paz, y para suprimir actos de agresión u otros quebrantamientos de la paz; y lograr por medios pacíficos, y de conformidad con los principios de la justicia y del derecho internacional, el ajuste o arreglo de controversias o situaciones internacionales susceptibles de conducir a quebrantamientos de la paz.

Es así que en virtud de la solicitud realizada por el Grupo de Expertos al Gobierno de la República de Guatemala y en reconocimiento al sentido obligatorio de cumplir con el artículo 25, de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas respecto a aceptar y cumplir las decisiones del Consejo de Seguridad, se permite informar lo siguiente:

- *El Estado de Guatemala en apego a su marco jurídico interno ha dispuesto la investigación pertinente del caso reportado por el Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009) del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas;*

Honorable señor
[redacted]
Coordinador del Grupo de Expertos
establecido en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009)
del Consejo de Seguridad

c.c.: [redacted] *Miembro del Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009)*

57 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016 - Teléfonos: 001212-6794760 - Ext. 210, 220
Correo electrónico: onunewyork@minex.gob.gt / www.guatemalaun.com Twitter: @GuatemalaONU
Síguenos en:  



- *El Estado de Guatemala, se permite informar al Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009) del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas que la entidad estatal encargada de administrar el sistema aduanero, establecer mecanismos de verificación de origen de meercancias, de organizar y administrar el sistema de fiscalización y de mantener y controlar los registros een el territorio de la República de Guatemala es la Superintendencia de Administración Tributaria (SAT).*

- *Dicha institución, mediante su Nota con registro No. OFI-SAT-IAD-0471-2021[1], informó que se han realizado una serie de acciones para contrarrestar los errores suscitados anteriormente con la base de datos de los agentes aduaneros. Para información del Grupo de Expertos, se adjunta la copia de dicha Nota y sus respectivos anexos.*

- *Sin prejuicio de lo anterior, se reitera el compromiso del Estado de Guatemala hacia la completa implementación de las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas sobre las sanciones impuestas a la República Popular Democrática de Corea, siendo las siguientes: 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) y 2397 (2017).*

La Misión Permanente de Guatemala ante las Naciones Unidas aprovecha esta oportunidad para expresarle al Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009) del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas, las seguridades de su más alta consideración.



Nueva York, 9 de julio de 2021.

[1] Ver Anexo I.

57 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016 - Teléfonos: 001212-6794760 - Ext. 210, 220
Correo electrónico: onunewyork@minex.gob.gt / www.guatemalaun.com Twitter: @GuatemalaONU
Síguenos en:



Source: the Panel

2109720E 1

Translated from Spanish

Permanent Mission of Guatemala to the United Nations

PS/11.3.14/806

The Permanent Mission of Guatemala to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) and has the honour to refer to its note No. S/AC.49/2020/PE/OC.110 relating to its efforts to gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of the sanctions imposed against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The Permanent Mission of Guatemala to the United Nations wishes to report that the Republic of Guatemala, as a founding Member of the United Nations, recognizes the importance of maintaining international peace and security, and to that end is committed to taking all effective collective measures to prevent and remove threats to the peace, and to suppress acts of aggression and other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

Thus, pursuant to the request made by the Panel of Experts to the Government of the Republic of Guatemala, and in recognition of the obligation to comply with Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations, namely, to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council, the Permanent Mission wishes to provide the following information:

- The Government of Guatemala, in accordance with its domestic laws, has ordered an investigation into the cases reported by the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009).

[redacted]

Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009)

cc: [redacted], member of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009)

- The Government of Guatemala has the honour to inform the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) that the State entity responsible for administering the customs system, establishing mechanisms for verifying the origin of goods, organizing and administering the control system and maintaining and monitoring records in Guatemala is the Tax Administration Superintendency.
- That entity, in its note No. OFI-SAT-IAD-0471-2021,[1] has indicated that it has taken a series of steps to address the errors that previously arose in the database maintained by customs agents. For the information of the Panel of Experts, a copy of that note and the annexes thereto are attached.
- Notwithstanding the above, the Government of Guatemala reiterates its commitment to the full implementation of the following Security Council resolutions on sanctions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017).

The Permanent Mission of Guatemala to the United Nations takes this opportunity to convey to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) the assurances of its highest consideration.

New York, 9 July 2021

[1] See annex I.

OFI-SAT-IAD-0471-2021

Guatemala City, 17 June 2021

Madam,

I am writing in response to note No. SUBONU-487-2021-2020 of 3 June 2021, transmitting letter No. S/AC.49/2021/PE/OC.110 of 28 May 2021, signed by [redacted] Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009), referring to the implementation of sanctions measures in the area of trade, including the export to and import from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in accordance with Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017).

On the basis of the aforementioned resolutions and in order to promote best practices in their implementation in all Member States, the Panel has requested that information be provided in response to seven points relating to the first quarter of 2020 and 2021, as set out in letter No. S/AC.49/2021/PE/OC.110. The relevant information is provided below.

With regard to points 1 and 2:

In letters Nos. OFI-SAT-IAD-1276-2020 of 12 November 2020 and OFI-SAT-IAD-1411-2020 of 18 December 2020, the Customs Administration stated that, from January to March 2020 (first quarter), it fulfilled the requirement relating to external trade operations carried out under the code KP (Democratic People's Republic of Korea), indicating that, after reviewing the relevant documentation, it determined that the importer in Guatemala purchased from El Salvador goods originating from the Republic of Korea (South Korea), and that it incorrectly declared them under the code KP instead

[redacted]

Ambassador
Director-General for Multilateral and Economic International Relations
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Guatemala

of the correct code, KR, corresponding to the Republic of Korea (South Korea).

The Customs Administration also clarified declarations relating to goods arriving in Guatemala are transmitted by customs agents who, according to regional laws, are auxiliaries to the public customs service and may transmit electronically customs declarations and supplementary information relating to acts, operations or customs regimes in which they participate, pursuant to Chapter II, "Auxiliaries to the public customs service", articles 19 and 21 (d), of the Central American Uniform Customs Code and its implementing regulation.

After consulting the computer system of the Tax Administration Superintendency, the Customs Administration has determined that no imports under the code KP were recorded from January to March 2021.

With regard to points 3 and 4 contained in letter No. S/AC.49/2021/PE/OC.110, the Customs Administration has consulted the various customs offices in Guatemala and wishes to report the following information:

- No cases of rejection of customs clearance or seizure of goods with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a country of destination/consignment or transit have been recorded by any customs office.

- No cases of rejection of customs clearance or seizure of goods with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a country of origin or manufacture have been recorded by any customs office. Since no cases related to points 3 and 4 have been recorded by any customs office, it is not possible to provide the information solicited in the subsequent points set out in your request.

In letter No. OFI-SAT-IAD-1390-2020 of 11 December 2020, the Customs Administration indicated that its Regulatory Department made improvements to the Central American Single Customs Declaration (DUCA) platform by prohibiting the validation of DUCA-D and low-value import declarations containing the code KP (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea). The Customs Administration has also taken the following steps to address the errors that occurred:

- Disseminating information internally and externally, through news digests and *Aduana Moderna* (Modern Customs) bulletins, indicating that the code KP should not be used in declarations of goods, in order to ensure compliance with United Nations resolutions.

2109720E 5

- Prohibiting the use of the code KP in the Single Customs Declaration system.

Accept, Madam, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.


(s[redacted]

Superintendent of Customs

Tax Administration Superintendency

Source: the Panel

Annex 56 : Correspondence with Guyana



PERMANENT MISSION OF THE CO-OPERATIVE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
801 Second Avenue, 5th Floor, New York, NY 10017
Telephone: 212-573-5828/29 Fax: 212-573-6225
E-mail: guyana@un.int

19 July 2021

H.E. [redacted]
Coordinator of the United Nations Security Council
Panel of Experts established pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Excellency,

I have the honour to refer to your letter, dated 28 May 2021, informing of the efforts of the Panel of Experts to gather, examine and analyze information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) , 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016) , 2356 (2017) , 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017), in particular incidents of non-compliance and requesting relevant information from the appropriate authorities of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana on trade with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

In this regard, I have the further honour to advise that:

i. No trade took place between Guyana and the DPRK for the period 2020 and 2021 (1st quarter).

ii. Trade between the DPRK and Guyana was erroneously recorded during the period in question but this was due to logging errors. Certified true copies of the supporting shipping documents will be provided, in short order, to substantiate this.

iii. To reduce the possibility of trade being erroneously recorded between Guyana and countries under United Nations Security Council (UNSC) trade sanctions, the competent Guyanese authority (the Guyana Revenue Authority) is introducing a Risk Profile System in the ASYCUDA World System to flag trade transactions involving countries under a UNSC sanctions regime, including the DPRK.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

C R Birkett

Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana
to the United Nations

Source : the Panel

Annex 57 : Correspondence with Bulgaria



PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF
BULGARIA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

11 East 84[th] Street, New York, NY 10028, Tel: (212) 737 4790, Fax: (212) 472 9865, e-mail: bulgaria@un.int

№ 44

New York, 22 February 2021

[redacted]

I am writing with regard to your letter Ref. № S/AC.49/2020/PE/OC.19 of 16 March 2020, and have the honor to communicate the following information, as provided by the competent Bulgarian authorities:

The property relations between the Republic of Bulgaria and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) are regulated by an Agreement of 30 June 1982 between the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the reciprocal assignment of the right to build and the right to use plots of land for the construction of embassy buildings, and the Protocol of 30 December 1986 amending the 1982 Agreement.

Pursuant to the above-described international agreements, the buildings that have been built on these plots are property of the DPRK, according to Art. 6, para 1 of the Agreement of 30 June 1982. The plots on which the properties are built belong to the Republic of Bulgaria.

According to Art. 6 of the 1982 Agreement, the plots and the buildings built on them may not be sold or transferred to a third party without the consent of the other contracting party. In regard of the fact that the above-mentioned Agreement has been concluded between the governments of the two countries, the granting of consent in the context of Art. 6 of the Agreement is within the competence of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria.

In light of the above, the building located on 56 Andrei Sakharov Blvd., Sofia – "Terra" Residence, is owned by the DPRK.

In February 2017, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria informed the DPRK Embassy about the restrictions imposed with UNSC resolution 2321 (2016) - prohibition of use of real estate property owned by the DPRK Embassy for any purpose other than diplomatic and consular activities. The Embassy was urged to cease any such activities immediately.

At that time two Bulgarian companies were registered at two of the properties belonging to the DPRK Embassy, namely "Terra Group" and "Technologica". The companies were strongly advised to terminate their rental agreements and to comply with the sanctions regime. According to the relevant Bulgarian authorities, no rental payments have been made by the companies to the DPRK Embassy ever since.

I take this opportunity to assure the Panel of Experts that the competent Bulgarian authorities take all necessary measures to ensure the strict implementation of all sanctions imposed on the DPRK as per relevant UNSC resolutions.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,


Lachezara Stoeva
Ambassador, Permanent Representative

[redacted]
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)
United Nations
New York

Source : the Panel

Annex 58: Images of a grand piano in DPRK in June 2021





Source: NK news, KCTV

Annex 59 : An excerpt from a cybersecurity firm (Kaspersky) report on the cyberattacks against the Russian defence industry


(Available on-line at: https://ics-cert.kaspersky.com/media/Kaspersky-ICS-CERT-Lazarus-targets-defense-industry-with-Threatneedle-En.pdf)

Kaspersky ICS CERT kaspersky

Initial infection

In this attack, spear phishing was used as the initial infection vector. Before launching the attack, the group studied publicly available information about the targeted organization and identified email addresses belonging to various departments of the company.

Email addresses in those departments received phishing emails that either had a malicious Word document attached or a link to one hosted on a remote server. The phishing emails claimed to have urgent updates on today's hottest topic – COVID-19 infections. The phishing emails were carefully crafted and written on behalf of a medical center that is part of the organization under attack.


[redacted] <med[redacted]@mail.ru>
[Срочность] Коронавирусной Инфекции
[redacted]

Уважаемые работники Общества,

У двух человек из числа руководства [redacted] выявили новую коронавирусную инфекцию COVID-19.

Поэтому мы анонсировали новые обновленные инструкции по профилактике и диагностике коронавирусной инфекции.

Мы просим вас внимательно прочитать и тщательно следовать инструкциям.

Памятка о коронавирусной инфекции
Профилактика гриппа и коронавирусной инфекции

Берегите свое здоровье!

--
С уважением,


[redacted]
Заместитель главного врача по лечебной работе
ОАО [redacted]
Tel. +7[redacted]

Phishing email with links to malicious documents

The attackers registered accounts with a public email service, making sure the sender's email addresses looked similar to the medical center's real email address. The signature shown in the phishing emails included the actual personal data of the deputy head doctor of the attacked organization's medical center. The attackers were able to find this information on the medical center's public website.

A macro in the Microsoft Word document contained the malicious code designed to download and execute additional malicious software on the infected system.

The document contains information on the population health assessment program and is not directly related to the subject of the phishing email (COVID-19), suggesting the attackers may not completely understand the meaning of the contents they used.



Что такое профилактический осмотр и диспансеризация?

Профилактический осмотр и диспансеризация – это бесплатное медицинское обследование, цель которого раннее выявление хронических неинфекционных заболеваний, являющихся основной причиной инвалидности и преждевременной смертности населения Российской Федерации (сердечно-сосудистых, онкологических, хронических заболеваний органов дыхания, сахарного диабета). Не менее важно, что в процессе этих мероприятий выявляются факторы риска их развития. Среди них повышенный уровень артериального давления, повышенный уровень холестерина и глюкозы в крови натощак, курение табака, риск пагубного потребления алкоголя, нерациональное питание, низкую физическую активность, избыточную массу тела или ожирение.

Диспансеризация - это визит к врачу пока ничего не болит.


В случае выявления признаков заболевания это шанс вовремя начать лечение, что всегда эффективнее и позволяет добиться не только длительной ремиссии, но и полного выздоровления. При наличии поведенческих, устранимых факторов риска заболеваний своевременная их коррекция способна предотвратить заболевание.

По сути, это шаг к медицине будущего – медицине профилактической!

Contents of malicious document

The content of the lure document was copied from an online post by a health clinic.

Our investigation showed that the initial spear-phishing attempt was unsuccessful due to macros being disabled in the Microsoft Office installation of the targeted systems. In order to persuade the target to allow the malicious macro, the attacker sent another email showing how to enable macros in Microsoft Office.



[redacted]

Re[2]: Коронавирусной Инфекции

[redacted]

Это зависит от совместимости просмотра документов.

Пожалуйста, нажмите кнопку «Включить содержимое» на желтой кнопке в верхней части страницы, чтобы правильно настроить содержимое.

FYI.

Если вы все еще не видите содержимое, я перешлю документ.

--

С уважением,

[redacted]


Заместитель главного врача по лечебной работе

ОАО [redacted]

Tel. +7[redacted]

Email with instructions on enabling macros #1

After sending the above email with explanations, the attackers realized that the target was using a different version of Microsoft Office and therefore required a different procedure for enabling macros. The attackers subsequently sent another email showing the correct procedure in a screenshot with a Russian language pack.



Email with instructions on enabling macros #2

The content in the spear-phishing emails sent by the attackers from May 21 to May 26, 2020, did not contain any grammatical mistakes. However, in subsequent emails the attackers made numerous errors, suggesting they may not be native Russian speakers and were using translation tools.

Kaspersky ICS CERT kaspersky

Мы обслуживаем слишком много людей в день.

Мы стараемся любезно служить всем, но иногда эти проблемы возникают.

Я отправлю вложение напрямую, пожалуйста, найдите мое вложение.

--
С уважением,

[redacted]
Заместитель главного врача по лечебной работе
ОАО [redacted]
Tel. +7 [redacted]

Email containing several grammatical mistakes

On June 3, 2020, one of the malicious attachments was opened by employees and at 9:30 am local time the attackers gained remote control of the infected system.

This group also utilized different types of spear-phishing attack. One of the compromised hosts received several spear-phishing documents on May 19, 2020. The malicious file that was delivered, named Boeing_AERO_GS.docx, fetches a template from a remote server.

However, no payload created by this malicious document could be discovered. We speculate that the infection from this malicious document failed for a reason unknown to us. A few days later, the same host opened a different malicious document. The threat actor wiped these files from disk after the initial infection meaning they could not be obtained.

Nonetheless a related malicious document with this malware was retrieved based on our telemetry. It creates a payload and shortcut file and then continues executing the payload by using the following command line parameters.

- Payload path: `%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\lconcaches.db`
- Shortcut path: `%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\OneDrives.lnk`
- Command Line; please note that the string at the end is hard-coded, but different for each sample:
  - `rundll32.exe [dllpath],Dispatch n2UmQ9McxUds2b29`

The content of the decoy document depicts the job description of a generator/power industry engineer.

LAZARUS TARGETS DEFENSE INDUSTRY
WITH THREATNEEDLE

6

Source: the Panel

Annex 60: Reply from Ecuador



Misión Permanente del Ecuador ante las
Naciones Unidas en Nueva York

New York, 8 July 2021

Mr. Coordinator,

I have the honour to refer to your letter dated 11 November 2020, with regard the ongoing efforts to examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017).

I further wish to inform that in response to the request made to the Government of Ecuador, and in compliance with the obligations arising from the relevant resolutions of the Security Council on this matter, the Government of Ecuador undertook the applicable measures for the termination of the contractual relationship between the Decentralized Autonomous Government of the Province of Pichincha and the nationals from de DPRK, and for the repatriation to their country of origin.

I remain at your disposal should the Panel need additional information.

Please accept Mr. Coordinator the assurances of my highest consideration.


Ambassador Cristian Espinosa,
Permanent Representative of Ecuador to the United Nations

[redacted]
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts
Established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009)
United Nations Security Council,

Cc. dppa-poe1874@un.org

Source : Member State

Annex 61: Purported Contract Signing with KCC Representative



永翔国贸与朝鲜KCC会社签署POS机采购合同

发布日期：2021-1-4

近期，由永翔国际贸易有限公司与朝鲜知名公司KCC会社就POS机采购一事签署重要的商业合同。

KCC会社是朝鲜国家财税省下属企业，从事为国家银行金融机构进行软硬件的开发采购事宜，为永翔国际的长期友好合作伙伴。

为了本次POS机的采购订单，我司业务经理多次南下深圳，与国内知名的设备生产商进行业务洽谈，深入制造车间探究产品生产和质量，力求向朝方提供国内最为优质的设备产品。同时，在与朝方多次意见交流后，将客户个性化意见反馈至厂家，为客户满意的订制了其要求的软硬件产品。由于现今朝鲜还没有POS机使用的先例，所以仅此一项弥补了朝方金融领域一大空缺，真正迈进了多功能交易终端和非现金结算的时代！

本次与KCC会社的驻华代表通过友好的洽谈，达成了战略合作意向，签署了大批量的采购合同，首批POS机已完成生产运抵大连，即将发往朝鲜，后期多批次机器也正在按合同要求有计划的生产制造中。永翔国际本着质量第一、客户至上的原则，严格把控产品质量，追踪产品使用情况，力求为客户提供最为优质的服务。KCC代表对此次采购非常满意，并表示将与永翔在多领域继续开展友好合作！

上一篇：刘军董事长会晤朝鲜海运省代表团　下一篇：刘军董事长考察延边自治州

Source: The Panel, *website (address on file) accessed 17 March 2021*.

Unofficial Translation:

"Recently, the Yongxiang International Trading Company Limited [hereinafter referred to as Yongxiang International] signed an important commercial contract with the KCC Corporation, a well-known North Korean company, on the purchase of POS [Point of Sale] machines.

The KCC Corporation is an enterprise under the North Korean Ministry of Finance and Taxation and is engaged in the development and procurement of software and hardware for national banks and financial institutions. It is also a long term friendly cooperative partner of the Yongxiang International.

For this purchase order of POS machines, Yongxiang International's business manager went south to Shenzhen [in Guangdong Province] for many times to discuss business with China's well-known equipment manufacturers and delved into the production and quality of products at manufacturing workshops to strive to provide the North Korean side with the most high-quality equipment products in China. At the same time, after several exchanges of opinions with the North Korean side, the customer's personalized opinions were fed back to the manufacturers, and the required software and hardware products were customized to the satisfaction of the customer. Since there is no precedent for the use of POS machines in North Korea at present, this alone has helped North Korea to fill a major gap in the financial field and truly enter the era of multi-functional transaction terminals and non-cash settlements.

Through friendly negotiations with KCC representatives in China, a strategic cooperation intention was reached, and a large number of procurement contracts were signed. Also, the first batch of POS machines had completed production, arrived in Dalian, and would be shipped to North Korea soon. In the later stage, many batches of machines would be manufactured in a planned way according to the contract requirements. Based on the principle of quality first and customer first, the Yongxiang International strictly controls the quality of products, tracks the use of products, and strives to provide the best service for customers. KCC representatives were very satisfied with the purchase and said that they would continue to carry out friendly cooperation with Yongxiang in many fields."

公司介绍

1. 永翔国际贸易实业有限公司，注册地为香港。公司主要业务范围：综合国际贸易，进出口业务，公司成立至今，与欧美亚多地都有合作和贸易往来，享有良好的国际声誉。

公司于2017年，在平壤与朝鲜中央银行合作成立金融银行，2018年在朝鲜江原道设立金融银行分行，业务范围：外国投资企业和外国企业，外国人的外汇汇款，外汇贷款及投资业务，活期户头超额支付，外汇票据折扣，对外汇债务及合同义务履行的保证，外汇汇款，进出口货物嗲款结算，信用调查及洽谈，信托，对客户的信用卡发行，在非居民之间的交易工作。

公司长年以来致力于经营管理国内外大型船舶，研制和开发先进的船舶技术，以及国际航线和集装箱运输的运营管理，业务卓有成效，名声享誉海内外。在元山葛麻旅游休闲开发区，独资开发建设四星级国际酒店、外国人国际公寓，独家经营开发区的游艇及码头等相关设施。今年来公司勇于业务范围，覆盖软件开发、银行系统设备研制、一线电子产品、服装产业、家装建材、文化影视业、劳务人员培训输出、大宗商品进出口贸易、国际一流品牌产品销售代理和新型合作模式的创新。

公司秉承"客户至上，海纳百川，求实创新，互惠互利"的经营宗旨，加强与各界的联系与合作，通过联手国内外知名品牌厂家，开拓国际贸易市场，为客户与品牌企业构建合作平台，实现资源互补，互利双赢。

公司贯彻"以人为本"的管理理念，积极建设"团结进取，争创效益"的企业文化。注重提高管理效率，重视人才储备战略。努力培养各级人才的思想品质、政治素质、集体观念以及奉献精神。从而保证企业动力充足，沿着健康的方向不断发展，创造美好的未来。

Source: The Panel, *website (address on file) accessed 17 March 2021*

Unofficial Translation:

"Yongxiang International Trade Industrial Co., Ltd. is registered in Hong Kong. The company's main business scope: comprehensive international trade, import and export business. Since its establishment, the company has cooperated and traded with many places in Europe, America and Asia, and enjoys a good international reputation.

In 2017, the company established a financial bank in Pyongyang in cooperation with the Central Bank of North Korea. In 2018, it set up a financial bank branch in Gangwon-do, North Korea. Its business scope: foreign investment companies and foreign companies, foreign exchange remittances, foreign exchange loans and investment business, current demand Account overpayment, discounts on foreign exchange bills, guarantees for foreign exchange debts and contract obligations, foreign exchange remittances, settlement of import and export goods, credit investigations and negotiations, trusts, credit card issuances to customers, and transactions between non-residents."

Annex 62: Letter to China and Reply

Figure Annex 62-1: Letter to China



UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL PANEL OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1874 (2009)

REFERENCE: S/AC.49/2021/PE/OC.68

10 May 2021

Excellency,

I have the honour to write to you with regard to ongoing efforts of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) to gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017), in particular incidents of non-compliance.

Based on publicly available information, the Panel is investigating an alleged sale of payment processing systems, known as point-of-sale (PoS) machines, to the "Korea Computer Center" (KCC), which is part of the DPRK's Ministry of Finance and Taxation. The Panel is investigating this matter as a possible violation of, inter alia, paragraph 18 of resolution 2375 (2017) which prohibited joint ventures or cooperative entities with DPRK individuals and entities and paragraph 11 of resolution 2094 (2013) which prohibit the provision of financial services or transfer of financial or other assets or resources that could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes. According to a 4 January 2021 post on the "Dalian Shengbin Crew Service Company Limited" website (annex), the Yongxiang International Trading Company Limited[1] signed a commercial contract with KCC to supply PoS machines. In its efforts to gather reliable and verifiable information, the Panel would be grateful for your assistance in supplying the following information:

- A copy of the previously referenced contract;
- A full description of the PoS machines;
- Copies of all purchase-orders, invoices, pro-forma invoices related to the sale of PoS machines to KCC;
- Any shipping records, to include customs declarations and inspection reports; and
- Records of any financial transactions between KCC and Dalian Shengbin Crew Service Company Limited, including account numbers, bank names, and all relevant transaction details.

Paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 2569 (2021) urges all Member States and other interested parties to cooperate fully with the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal. The Panel would welcome any other information that you might consider relevant to its work as mandated by the Security Council in this regard. In addition, the Panel would

[1] According to information provided on the website, Yongxinag International Trading Company Limited is a subsidiary or affiliate of Dalian Shengbin Crew Service Company Limited.

His Excellency
Mr. Zhang Jun
Permanent Mission of China to the United Nations
New York

like to assure you that any information you may consider confidential can be handled accordingly and used solely for the Security Council and the 1718 Committee.

Given the importance the Panel attaches to this investigation, we would be most grateful for any information to be supplied within six weeks of the date of this letter. Please reply by email to the Panel at [redacted]. Should you wish to discuss this request, or any follow-up matters, please [redacted]

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.


[redacted]

Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Annex: Photographs of purported contract signing with KCC representative

Source : the Panel

Figure Annex 62-2: China's Reply

6. POS machine (OC.68)

China's relevant authorities have not yet completed the verification and investigation accordingly. China has always been faithfully fulfilling the relevant provisions of the Security Council resolutions on imports from and exports to the DPRK. To ensure the validity of Security Council resolutions, any items that are prohibited to export to the DPRK will not be released by the Chinese customs even relevant contracts are signed.

We hope that the Panel will not expand the interpretation of the Security Council resolutions, which have clear provisions on providing financial services to the DPRK.

Source : Member State

Annex 63: Records from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce[55]



商务部业务系统统一平台

全国外商投资企业年度投资经营信息联合报告信息公示

[redacted]

企　业　报告日期:	2017-05-04	出　具回执部门:	大连市中山区外经贸局	出具回执日期:	2017-05-09
统一社会信用代码:	91210200716964630X	进出口企业代码:	2102716964630	法　定代表人:	马东赫

一 企业基本情况 | 二 投资情况 | 三 经营情况 | 四 境内外投资及分支机构情况

投资情况

投资总额（万美元）	12
注册资本（万美元）	10.0
其中：中方认缴（万美元）	4.0
外方认缴（万美元）	6.0
实收资本（万美元）	10
其中：中方实缴（万美元）	4
外方实缴（万美元）	6

境内投资者

姓名/名称	中文	大连友惠国际贸易有限公司
	英文	0
股权比例（%）		40
认缴注册资本（万美元）		4
认缴出资方式	其中：现金（万美元）	4
	实物（万美元）	0
	无形资产（万美元）	0
	土地使用权（万美元）	0
	股权（万美元）	0
	其他（万美元）	0
累计实际出资金额（万美元）		4

境外投资者


姓名/名称	中文	朝鲜新兴信息技术贸易会社 ❶
	英文	0
国籍（或地区）/注册地		朝鲜 ❷
资金来源地		朝鲜
股权比例（%）		60 ❸
认缴注册资本（万美元）		6
认缴出资方式	其中：现金（万美元）	6
	实物（万美元）	0
	无形资产（万美元）	0
	土地使用权（万美元）	0
	股权（万美元）	0
	其他（万美元）	0
累计实际出资金额（万美元）		6

1. Choseon Xinxing Information Technology Trade Association
2. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
3. Ownership Stake in China-based company

Source: The Panel, website (address on file) accessed on April 2021

[55] One expert objects to this annex because the content needs further corroboration.

Annex 64: Corporate Registry Records and Analysis of Social Media Profiles[56]



CERTIFICATE OF INCUMBENCY

Name of Company: SUPER GOLD HOLDINGS INC.

We, BEP (Anguilla) Limited of Babrow Building, The Valley, Anguilla, British West Indies, being the duly appointed Registered Agent of SUPER GOLD HOLDINGS INC. (the "Company"), an International Business Company incorporated in Anguilla on the 3rd Day of October 2016 with registration number 2414897 hereby certify the followings:-

1. The Company is in Good Legal Standing in Anguilla;
2. That as far as can be determined from the documents retained at the Registered Office of the Company at Babrow Building, The Valley, Anguilla, British West Indies:
   a. The authorized capital of the Company is US$1,000,000.00 divided into 1,000,000 shares of US$1.00 par value.
   b. The sole director is:

Name	Date of Appointment
CHIEN, CHIH-WEI No. 150, Cheng'ai Rd., Fengshan Dist., Kaohsiung City 830, Taiwan	25th September 2018

   c. This company does not have a secretary because this is not mandatory under the International Business Companies Act 2000 of the laws of Anguilla under which the company was incorporated.
   d. The current shareholder (i.e. companies/individuals with 10% or more of the shares/voting rights of the Company, of which non are held in the form of bearer shares) is:

Name	No. of Shares Held	% of Shares / Voting Rights
CHIEN, CHIH-WEI No. 150, Cheng'ai Rd., Fengshan Dist., Kaohsiung City 830, Taiwan	1,000,000	100%

1

TO ENABLE ASSIGNMENT OF A COMPANY IDENTIFICATION NUMBER, PLEASE PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING DETAILS:

CURRENT COMPANY NAME* SPRING GAIN INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
FORMER NAME(S) (if known)

Please indicate if:
- [ ] This is correcting the details for an existing company on the LR-F database
- [x] This is a newly established company
- [ ] This is a change of company name (please give former names above)
- [ ] This is a company merger (please give former names of all companies above)

DATE OF REGISTRATION 8 MAY 2008
[redacted] OF REGISTRATION TAIWAN, [redacted]
CONTACT ADDRESS* NO.150, CHENG-AI RD., FENGSHAN CITY
TOWN* KAOHSIUNG COUNTY
POSTAL/ZIP CODE* 830
[redacted] TAIWAN, [redacted]

1

TELEPHONE 07-336-4888 FAX 07-535-4222
E-MAIL [redacted]@MANSON.COM.TW WEBSITE

2

IF KNOWN PARENT COMPANY
IMO ship identification number(s)* 7903366
If not available other ship details (please supply at least one IMO ship identification number in the current fleet. This helps in the identification of company records)

MANSON SHIPPING (SINGAPORE) PTE LTD.
JIU LI SHUN TRADING CO., LTD.
Manager
[redacted]

[redacted]

新加坡萬事順船務代理有限公司台灣分公司
聚利順貿易股份有限公司
[redacted]
[redacted]@MANSON.COM.TW
07-336-4888
07-535-4222

2

Winson Oil Bunkering Pte. Ltd.
80 RAFFLES PLACE, #41-01 UOB PLAZA 1, SINGAPORE 048624
TEL : +65-6222-9888 FAX : +65-6220-0988

Jiu Li Shuen Trading Co., Ltd
26/F-1 NO.29, HAI-PIEN ROAD, LINGYA DISTRICT, KAOHSIUNG 802 , TAIWAN [redacted]
TEL : +886-7336-4888 FAX : +886-7535-4222

2

WINSON OIL DMCC
UNIT NO.: 3807, DMCC BUSINESS CENTRE, LEVEL NO 1, JEWELLERY & GEMPLEX 3, DUBAI, U.A.E
E-MAIL : bunker@winsonoil.ae

Source: the Panel

[56] The Panel has redacted this third party primary documentation in order to issue a consensus report. Six Panel members object to this redaction.

Annex 65-1: Survey of NGOs on the effects of COVID-19 on humanitarian operations

In order to assess the impact of COVID-19 on humanitarian organizations operating within the DPRK, the Panel sent a survey of questions to 38 organizations. Responding organizations included both UN organizations as well as non-governmental organizations that applied for exemptions either directly to the 1718 Committee, or through a Member State or the UN Resident Coordinator in the DPRK. At the outset, the Panel clarified that responding to its inquiry was optional and that it had no bearing on the exemption approval processes within the 1718 Committee. The following questions were sent to the organizations.

QUESTION 1: What is your assessment of the impact of the limitations related to the COVID-19 pandemic and sanctions on the DPRK, and in what way has it influenced the overall humanitarian situation? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment.

QUESTION 2: Please provide detailed information and data on whether your organization experienced reductions in operational capacity due to issues related to quarantine measures in the DPRK and / or implementation of UN sanctions.

QUESTION 3: If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs? What, if anything, could be improved in the exemption process, or in the implementation of UN sanctions, to better meet your operational needs and objectives?

Table Annex 65-1. Humanitarian organizations' responses to the Panel's Survey

The Panel does not take a position on the responses and has not verified the veracity of any claims made therein. The Panel has redacted Member States' identities and other phrases which might jeopardize the safety of the relevant organizations.

Org. No.	Responses
1	"It is a serious problem that the process of obtaining approval for the exemption for humanitarian assistance to DPRK takes a long time at this critical juncture of the COVID-19 pandemic and natural disasters. Since the UN Security Council Committee approved the updates to the Implementation Assistance Notice No.7 the Committee has announced that it would expedite the exemption procedure for emergency assistance to DPRK for natural disasters and COVID-19. However, it turned out that submitters of the humanitarian exemption requests must provide detailed information of necessary goods they plan to deliver to DPRK, including specifications. To meet the condition, non-governmental organizations, or NGOs on the ground in [redacted] need to confirm a purchase deal with the providers of goods or purchase the items before submitting the exemption requests to add the required information of the supplies in their documents. Yet it is not easy for the NGOs to purchase goods in advance, not knowing if they could obtain approvals for their exemption requests. Some providers tend not to easily share detailed information about their products unless the NGOs purchase them first or make a contract for future purchases. But timing is the most critical element for humanitarian assistance for emergencies because the aid needs to be delivered before things deteriorate or more severe damages occur. However, it is highly likely to miss the golden time in this situation while preparing for the exemption approval. Such a result would negatively impact humanitarian assistance for all cases, including natural disasters and the pandemic." "In 2018 after sanctions against DPRK were strengthened, the country's food production was 4.95M tons, down by 9% compared to 2017, which caused the nation to require humanitarian assistance. Also, malnutrition is closely related to various humanitarian situations other than food shortage. As mentioned above, submitting an exemption request itself already takes a long time before the actual humanitarian assistance is delivered to DPRK; thus, we need to consider and review calling for the adoption of the "Whitelist." " "The "secondary boycott" measures have prevented bank transactions for payments for humanitarian supplies and vessels to enter DPRK ports, and the routes for delivering humanitarian items to DPRK have been blocked. As a result, DPRK counterparts have given up on humanitarian projects for their country. Due to the prolonged suspension of assistance for DPRK and inter-Korean cooperation and exchange, it has become evident that the donors and sponsors of NGOs increasingly tend not to show interest in DPRK projects. Therefore, the UN needs to ease approval conditions for exemption requests on humanitarian supplies so that the NGOs can resume their assistance activities actively." "[Foreign] banks are more and more reluctant to supply sufficient amounts of cash, particularly if the cash supply is intended for projects in DPRK. Despite the exemptions that are granted to the funds dedicated to humanitarian operations, it is common that banks delay or block the supply of cash, leading to additional administrative work on [the organization's] side to unblock the situation."
2	"The drastic measures imposed by the country in regard to the complete cessation of movements of goods and people had repercussions on the preparation of the planting activities on the one hand, and on importations of agricultural inputs on the other hand. Both of these resulted in a large shortage of domestic production, which is estimated to have caused huge impacts on the population. In addition to the COVID-19 limitations' impact on the humanitarian situation, the management of the numerous natural disasters

	of 2020 further exacerbated the dire food insecurity." "...with no direct access to the country, it proves difficult for [the organization] to monitor, assess and analyze the impact of the suspension of its food security projects on their beneficiaries, let alone the general impact of COVID-19 limitations and the cessation of importations on the humanitarian situation in DPRK." "Since the DPRK imposed strict quarantine measures and closed its borders in January 2020, [the organization's] operational capacity in DPRK has been highly compromised. In March 2020, two out of the three expatriates present in Pyongyang were able to leave the country…[P]artnership with local actors has been made more fragile. This is already having strong consequences on future programming capacity, such as the impossibility to be able to seek new funding for the next coming years. Partners have indeed cited the lack of post-COVID-19 visibility as reasons not to seek further grants and develop new projects." "As of October 2020, all of [the organization's] projects are officially suspended. This will have immediate consequences when the country reopens, as suspended projects will require further extension from funding partners to cover reopening assessment phases. The mid-term operational capacity of the organization in DPRK has also been impacted due to the increased remote communication and management issues that arose from the absence of expatriates in Pyongyang." The organization further noted that overhead costs, which continue despite the lack of operations, are "not fully eligible for support by funding partners." "In 2018, [the organization] observed an increase in the prices of the project goods, of 5 to 25% depending on the item (25% for cement). Korean providers offer prices that are two to five times higher than Chinese providers. Chinese[57] providers also tend to increase their offers due to the complexity and uncertainty of the customs processes. Besides, the need to separate batches according to delays in obtaining exemptions and clearances implies regular additional transportation costs which are significant for [the organization's] project budgets." "the daily implementation of the humanitarian exemption implies to manage simultaneously: the logistic processes for the purchases put on hold, contract modifications with providers to adapt to new constraints and delays, writing follow-up modifications of previously granted exemptions, dealing with complicated [redacted] domestic regulations reluctant to implement humanitarian exemptions...These recurrent tasks do require some extra time from Project Managers and Country Director, which eventually takes away time for the qualitative achievement of the projects' results. All in all, these unintended impacts of the implementation of sanctions result in a general delay in all project implementation. It proves to be all the more important that authorization processes be more simplified and flexible in order not to infringe on the organizations' operational capacity." "The general opinion is that the request process is not quite optimal but that it remains acceptable. In order to better meet the organization's operational needs and objectives, more guidance from the Committee could be valuable for [the organization]."
3	"Since our last correspondence...we have observed almost no changes regarding the situation with our project activities in North Korea."

[57] One expert objects to the usage of "Chinese" and "customs processes" in this sentence.

4	"The strict measures and limitations that [the organization] has been itself facing in regards to the COVID 19 have significantly reduced the organization's capacity to monitor the impacts of the restrictions at a local and national level." "The last [the organization's] expatriate staff left the country in August 2020 considering the total suspension of the activities and the complete lack of visibility regarding a potential restart of [the organization's] operations in the country, as well as the possibility to send personnel, funds and equipment needed to properly run the projects." "The access and communication barriers imposed by the COVID 19 situation as well as the lack of secondary data from other sources make it impossible for [the organization] to propose an analysis of the humanitarian situation evolution in regards with the current pandemic." "...restrictions made impossible for [the organization] to keep implementing its projects within acceptable quality and integrity standards, forcing the organization to suspend all its activities." "...indeed, certain support running costs must be maintained, but they are not fully eligible for our financial partners and [the organization] will not be able to pay these costs with its own funds if the situation continues over time. Moreover, considering the impossibility to send cash to DPRK [redacted], [the organization] has therefore been accumulating debts since the suspension of its operations." "In terms of future operational capacity, the restart of [the organization's] activities in the country will imply a mission revitalization period ...; relaunch discussion for designation of national staff; clean up liabilities; sending back international staffs to the country; assessing the situation of each suspended projects and restart the contact with farms and partners; importing the material and equipment blocked at the border; etc.). Additional extension of projects will probably be needed, inducing costs that were not initially planned; [the organisation] is coordinating with its financial partners and will propose adjustments to its projects once the situation will have been reassessed." "Even though the COVID 19 related restrictions on importations decided by DPRK are responsible for this situation, it has to be mentioned that [the organization] currently has materials and equipment... blocked at the border since January 2020. [the organization] has no choice since then to request extension of the exemption granted for this purchase to ensure it is still valid when the border reopens." "An issue to report is that the exemptions granted to [the organization] are sometimes not recognized by [redacted] customs, which implies additional negotiations and explanation delays with [redacted] authorities to eventually lift this barrier."

Source : the Panel

Annex 65-2: Statements from NGOs regarding UN sanctions

The following quotes have been compiled from the responses to the Panel's survey to NGOs.

The Panel does not take a position on the responses and has not verified the veracity of any claims made therein.

The Panel has redacted Member States' identities and other phrases which might jeopardize the safety of the relevant organizations.

- "...The cash flow limitations remain the main challenge for organisations to operate in DPRK. Specifically, the closing of all banking channels to DPRK implies [redacted] in the country, thus representing an additional administrative and HR constraint. Banks appear to be reluctant to risk engaging with the DPRK, which is impacting all programmes. In general, the unavailability of cash in the country makes it complicated for organisations to implement activities. Action plans must be adapted to the availability of cash, to the detriment of needs."
- "the administrative work related to sanction compliance slightly increases the workload of project managers and the Country Director. The legal expertise required to understand the information involved in the sanction mechanisms and the absence of a direct channel for resident INGOs to communicate with the UNSC Sanctions Committee has, on some occasions, proven detrimental to other tasks and responsibilities. All in all, the administrative work related to sanctions implementation takes away fluidness, which impacts the working rhythm but does not infringe on the optimal dynamism of programme implementation."
- "following the set of sanctions implemented in 2018 (following UNSC resolution 2397 of December 2017), the [redacted] Customs have put a special emphasis on humanitarian imports, creating additional delays instead of easing the exempted imports."
- "the importation process through [redacted] has proven to be increasingly complicated as issues specific to [redacted] customs arise. These delays resulted in major impacts on project's implementation (and on the population's well-being), such as the suspension of the transportation of food to children institutions and the lack of vegetable intake by children due to the insufficiency of winter production because of the absence of the procured pipes to be used for the construction of greenhouses. All in all, these delays are estimated to have affected up to 30,000 to 45,000 beneficiaries, mostly children"
- "several major suppliers stopped submitting offers, mentioning specifically the [redacted] sanctions in place since January 2018, which do not specify any exemption for humanitarian activities. Suppliers are worried, increasingly reluctant to send their offers to call for tenders and discouraged by the [redacted] sanctions, in terms of customs clearance as well as in terms of banking."

- "each slight modification of technical specification must be notified to the UNSC SC, which appears to increase the planned duration of the action. As so, some activities have been delayed and no-cost extensions have been requested to donors for some projects due to the duration extension of the purchase procedures."
- "...Despite the exemptions that are granted to the funds dedicated to humanitarian operations, it is common that banks delay or block the supply of cash, leading to additional administrative work on [the organization's] side to unblock the situation."
- "Since the sanctions have come to force, a drop in the number of suppliers applying for the tenders [the organization] open in the frame of the procurement of goods and equipment. This decrease in the potential supplier diversity has a direct impact on prices competitively, goods and equipment quality."
- "...the exemption process is now well understood and managed but can still provoke delays in case of unexpected administrative issue (e.g.: [redacted] customs that sometimes refuse to recognize the exemptions granted to [the organization] –calling for additional negotiations)."

Source : the Panel

Annex 65-3: Summary of suggestions from NGOs

The following list of suggestions has been compiled from the responses to the Panel's survey to NGOs. The Panel does not take a position on the suggestions and has not verified the veracity of any claims made therein. The Panel has redacted Member States' identities and other phrases which might jeopardize the safety of the relevant organizations.

- "The end of the COVID-19 pandemic is an unforeseeable future. Thus, the Committee needs to reconsider its sanctions against DPRK on humanitarian assistance to help resolve the unprecedented case in the country. Also, the Committee should streamline the exemption procedure by writing a Whitelist on the already approved supplies or similar projects."
- "It sometimes takes a long time for an exemption request for a humanitarian project for DPRK to be approved because of the awareness that all people in Pyongyang belong to the privileged class. Such an awareness needs to change that delivery of humanitarian assistance should be made without prejudice for those who live in Pyongyang but are underprivileged."
- "The first suggestion is the extension of the exemption validity period. It was [the organization's] opinion that 6 months was a too short period to be able to: put in place the calls for tenders; examine, assess and preselect offers based on technical and financial criteria; request and obtain the validation of the service provider by [the state official]; finalize the contract with the service provider; and proceed to the importation and customs. It has previously been the case that, by the time the entire process is completed, the validity of the exemption reaches its term. It then leaves little time for the activities to be put in place."
- "The market realities are not often aligned with the technical specificities provided in the exemption request submitted to the UNSC Sanctions Committee. This implies that the slightest modification requires the submission of a new request to the Committee in order to confirm the exemption and enable [redacted] clearances… The most convenient adjustment to the exemption process for [the organisation] would be to be able to get a global validation from the Sanctions Committee for each project, thus covering the entirety of the project's duration. Such a measure would most definitely ease the project implementation."
- "[The organization] would also like to suggest the Sanctions Committee to assist in supporting customs authorities in transit countries by sending comprehensive instructions to facilitate the timely clearing of humanitarian items, as well as to consider issuing a communication to Member States, encouraging them to assist in exploring banking channels and highlighting that banking operations which support humanitarian operations are exempt from sanctions.

- "As of October 2018, the Sanctions Committee now publishes authorizations online, this can be very useful in asserting permissions. A good practice that could be implemented to facilitate the process would be to translate these documents into Chinese as well."
- "the extension of the 6-month validity period granted for each exemption. Indeed, considering the weight of the exemption request process as well as the procurement delay necessary to import the goods and equipment in DPRK, the 6-month exemption granted so far complicates the implementation of the projects since it has to be quickly renewed to prevent delays in the delivery of the following items to be imported. In addition, despite the fact that the exemption process is now well understood and managed by all the stakeholders, any issue in the exemption granting process or more likely in the importation process could delay the importation to more than 6 months and therefore make null and void the exemption valid for 6 months. The current restriction on imports linked to the COVID 19 situation is a good example of this constraint: as mentioned previously, [the organization] had to request extension of the exemption due to the fact that the goods and equipment covered by the granted exemption are still blocked at the border. Considering the complete lack of visibility about the timeframe to expect regarding the resumption of the imports, it is likely that [the organisation] will have to ask for a new extension of the exemption."
- "Strengthen the link with the [redacted] authorities to facilitate the customs clearance process"
- "Make fast tracks when it comes to 1) amendment justified in terms of quantity 2) renewal in the event of expiration."

Source : the Panel

Annex 66: Consolidated list of recommendations

Maritime

On vessel identity laundering and swap

1. Member States and ship registries should issue up-to-date circulars on identified laundered AIS digital profiles used as cover identities, so as to caution against trading with such ships.

2. Where there is suspicion about the validity of the identifiers of a vessel, port and other relevant maritime authorities should conduct the necessary checks of the history of such vessels entering its port jurisdiction waters, pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution 2397 (2017).

3. Flag registries should require all applicants seeking to join their registry to include up-to-date photographs of the exterior (bow, stern deck) and interior of their vessels where vessel identifiers are displayed.

4. Member States hosting shipyards that service foreign-flagged vessels should raise awareness of the risk of vessels seeking physical alterations or other modifications to obfuscate their identity in order to engage in sanctionable activities.

On information sharing

5. Flag registries should regularly publish a list of deregistered vessels on their website and in maritime circulars for the broader shipping community.

6. The misuse of MMSIs is a trend affecting various flag registries. To assist and ensure that the MMSIs of flag registries are not fraudulently used, the Panel encourages registries and Member States in whose waters vessels transmit fraudulent identifiers to investigate such vessels and to share the results of their investigations, including with the Panel, in particular where it relates to suspected sanctions evasion activities.

On AIS manipulation

7. Member States should monitor and investigate vessels that broadcast suspect identifiers particularly in waters where DPRK and DPRK-linked vessels are known to operate.

8. Flag registries should ensure dedicated personnel for monitoring the AIS status of their registries' fleet as part of their due diligence efforts, including contacting ships that broadcast AIS information that is different from that in their registered profile.

9. Classification societies should certify the existence of a single, functional, type A AIS system on each vessel as part of a periodic safety inspection. Inspections should look for evidence of multiple AIS systems.

On beneficial ownership information

10. The Panel reiterates its recommendation that Member States require their relevant competent authorities to disclose beneficial ownership information related to all legal entities seeking to register vessels under their ship registry. Member States with open registries should endeavour to collect identifying and contact information for each individual who owns or exerts control over the foreign entity to which each vessel belongs, whether as a controlling shareholder, a financier of the enterprise, or a senior manager or decision-maker. Such information should be made available to relevant entities such as law enforcement, as well as to the Panel, to facilitate sanctions implementation efforts.

Trade and Customs

11. The Panel recommends that the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) look into possible measures to prevent erroneous usage of country codes for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea (KP and KR respectively).

12. The Panel recommends that Member States streamline their export and import control lists, using as supportive material the Panel's informal list of prohibited commodities.

13. The Panel notes that Member States could study the possibility of using the ASYCUDA system, developed by UNCTAD (a computerized customs management system, now used in more than 80 countries; see https://asycuda.org/en/) to monitor transactions with sanctioned jurisdictions.

14. The Panel recommends that the customs authorities of Member States use the above-mentioned resources for the information of and usage by the trading agents of their jurisdictions for due diligence purposes, particularly when dealing with prohibited commodities in relation to trade with sanctioned jurisdictions.

Luxury Goods

15. The Panel reiterates its recommendation that Member States streamline their export control lists to reflect the list of prohibited luxury goods in a manner consistent with the objectives of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016), avoiding unnecessary broadening of their scope in order not to restrict the supply of unprohibited goods to the civilian population nor have a negative humanitarian impact once trade restarts.

16. The Panel reiterates its recommendation that Member States encourage their business entities and nationals exporting luxury goods to include a contractual provision to prevent resale to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

17. The Panel reiterates its recommendation that Member States and relevant organizations encourage shipping and transportation companies to provide thorough systems for checking consignees, bearing in mind the risk of trans-shipment.

Finance

18. The Panel notes the October 2020 revision by the Financial Action Task Force of Recommendation 1 and its Interpretive Note (R.1 and INR.1) to require countries and private sector entities to "identify, assess, understand and mitigate their proliferation financing risks (PF risk)" related to "the potential breach, non-implementation or evasion of the targeted financial sanctions". Pursuant to this requirement, the Panel recommends that all Member States and private sector entities review the recently published FATF Guidance on Proliferation Financing Risk Assessment and Mitigation.

Unintended Impact of Sanctions

19. The Panel notes the usefulness of biannual briefings by the relevant United Nations agencies on the unintended impact of sanctions and recommends that the Committee continue this practice.

20. The Panel reiterates the need for urgent measures to re-establish the banking channel.

21. The Panel recommends that the Security Council continue to address issues and processes that mitigate the potential unintended adverse impacts of sanctions on the civilian population of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and on humanitarian aid operations to benefit the country's vulnerable population and overcome the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic.